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This thesis explores poverty in South Korea. Elderly poverty has been regarded as one 
of the most urgent issues in Korea, so the first chapter analyses the trends and 
determinants of elderly poverty, while the second chapter decomposes the anti-poverty 
efficacy and efficiency of the Korean public transfer programmes. The third chapter 
identifies the effect of COVID-19 on poverty and household livelihood which is a 
contemporary and urgent issue. In addition, this thesis adopts relatively new research 
designs in each chapter to identify more relevant findings and implications. 
 
Chapter 1. The trends and determinants of elderly poverty in South 
Korea: using both relative and absolute poverty thresholds 
Background: Although social expenditure for the elderly has sharply increased since 
the mid-2000s, the relative poverty rate of people aged 65 over in Korea was 43.8% in 
2017. This rate has remained at the highest level of the OECD member countries.  
Data: This chapter analyses the Korean Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) from 
2003 to 2017. The KLIPS allows to capture longitudinal changes in elderly poverty 
because it has the longest panel data on labour activities and household income in Korea.  
Methodology: (i) Trends of elderly poverty: This chapter adopts four poverty lines to 
identify the multi-dimensions of elderly poverty: one relative poverty line (a poverty 
index) and three absolute poverty lines (deep poverty indices). (ii) Determinants of 
elderly poverty: It conducts panel logistic regression with the above poverty lines as the 
4 
 
criteria of binary dependent variables. In addition, it adopts the Lasso (least absolute 
shrinkage and selection operator) to select more relevant independent variables. 
Findings: (i) Trends: The absolute poverty rate 1 dropped from 35.9% in 2003 to 9.8% 
in 2017, however the relative poverty rate reduced slightly from 48.5% to 43.9%. (ii) 
Determinants: Firstly, householder employment, household size, the number of 
pensioners, family support, and net assets are significant on relative and absolute 
poverty. Secondly, some of the absolute poverty elderly were able to overcome their 
poverty in recent years thanks to the Basic Old-Age Pension implementation in 2008. 
Lastly, the healthy elderly tend to participate in the labour market more actively and 
have more earned income, so they can overcome relative poverty.  
Implications: (i) Public transfer programmes have had positive effects on absolute 
elderly poverty, but they are still insufficient on relative poverty. Therefore, work 
activities and family support are still important income sources for the elderly. (ii) To 
reduce relative elderly poverty effectively, it is necessary to improve not only public 
transfer programmes, but also work incentive schemes for the healthy elderly.  
 
Chapter 2. The efficacy and efficiency of public transfer programmes 
on elderly poverty in South Korea 
Background: This chapter decomposes and compares the anti-poverty efficacy and 
efficiency of major public transfer programmes in Korea. It can find implications for 
policy makers who usually need to design better policy measures with finite resources.  
Data: It uses the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS) from 2006 to 2018 because 
the KOWEPS has a variety of information on the Korean public transfer programmes. 
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Methodology: (i) Efficacy: This chapter measures the efficacy through the Shapley 
decomposition because the traditional decomposition approach has additivity and path 
dependence problems. (ii) Efficiency: It establishes four efficiency criteria focusing on 
coverage and benefit. (iii) It employs one relative poverty threshold and one absolute 
poverty threshold. (iv) It analyses the following four representative programmes in the 
Korean welfare system: public pension; the Basic Pension; the National Basic 
Livelihood Security (NBLS); and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  
Findings: (i) Efficacy: Public pension has the largest anti-poverty efficacy of the four 
programmes. The Basic Pension ranks second and its efficacy rose in 2008 and 2014 
when it was expanded. However, the NBLS and the EITC have small efficacy. (ii) 
Efficiency: Public pension covered only 40% of the elderly in 2018 because it was 
introduced much later than in other countries. Whereas the Basic Pension has had too 
generous coverage since 2008, so more than half of recipients were not in absolute 
poverty in 2018. The NBLS is a main public assistance programme, but it supports only 
a quarter of the absolute poverty elderly. The EITC is more efficient for relative poverty. 
Implications: (i) By the maturing of public pension, its coverage will reach nearly 90% 
of the elderly by 2060, so it needs to be a centrepiece of the benefits system for the 
elderly. (ii) The Basic Pension has to be restructured to assist the deep poor elderly. (iii) 
The NBLS should provide more support to the absolute poverty elderly. (iv) The EITC 
needs to increase benefit to incentivise work activities of the elderly. 
 
Chapter 3. The effects of COVID-19 and response measures on poverty, 
income and consumption in South Korea 
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Background: Among several response measures, the Emergency Disaster Relief Funds 
triggered important debates because this is the first-ever universal benefit in Korea. 
Data: This chapter analyses the Korea Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(KHIES). The KHIES allows to separate (i) the effect of the pandemic as changes in 
non-social benefits income (disposable income – the social benefits) and (ii) the effects 
of response measures as changes in the social benefits (including the above relief). 
Methodology: (i) Poverty: This chapter sets both a relative and an absolute poverty 
thresholds. (ii) Income and consumption expenditure: It adopts changes-in-changes (CC) 
instead of difference-in-differences (DD) because the parallel trends assumption of DD 
cannot be investigated due to the recent KHIES redesign. It conducts CC at five income 
and expenditure percentiles (5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95%) and on the vulnerable 
(female, young, and elderly households) to identify disproportionate effects.  
Findings: (i) Poverty: The pandemic delivered immediate impacts, so the poverty rate 
increased in the first quarter 2020. However, the poverty rate decreased in the second 
quarter due to the relief. (ii) Income: COVID-19 has had more critical effects on the 
poor and the vulnerable; while the relief was a universal benefit, and its benefit was 
proportionate to household size not income. Consequently, income increase effects were 
insignificant on high-income percentiles. In addition, the poor and the vulnerable faced 
an income reduction in the third quarter as the relief was a one-off payment. (iii) 
Consumption: Household consumption expenditure recovered in the second quarter.  
Implications: (i) The government measures need to be concentrated on the poor and the 
vulnerable in response to the disproportionate effects. (ii) The measures are required to 
be immediate and sustainable, so improving the current system can be a feasible option. 
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Chapter 1.  
The trends and determinants of elderly poverty 





The relative poverty rate among those who aged 65 over in South Korea (hereafter 
Korea) was 43.8% in 2017, which it was the highest of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries (OECD, 2020). Furthermore, 
Korea faces a rapidly ageing population related to the retirement of the ‘Baby Boomers’ 
who were born after the Korean War (1950-1953) and are currently joining the elderly. 
Therefore, elderly poverty in Korea has been regarded as one of the most urgent issues 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare in Korea [MOHW], 2018). In addition, 79% of Korean 
respondents reported that an ageing population presents a serious problem, as it came 
the second out of 21 countries (Pew Research Centre, 2014). 
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Socio-economic changes have had fundamental effects on elderly poverty in 
Korea and the elderly have been the most vulnerable generation to poverty risk. Firstly, 
living arrangements have shifted rapidly due to industrialisation and urbanisation (Jones 
& Urasawa, 2014; Ku & Kim, 2020; Lee, 2018; Park & Kim, 2016). The number of 
single elderly households sharply increased from 115 thousand in 1985 to 1.4 million in 
2018 (Statistics Korea [KOSTAT], 2020). In addition, the elderly living alone are more 
likely to be in poverty than the elderly living with other household members (Ku & Kim, 
2020; Park & Kim, 2016; Yun & Kwon, 2014). 
 Secondly, a social attitude to financial support for their older parents has 
changed notably. Family support for older parents has always been considered as an 
important duty of adult children’s filial piety in traditional Confucian culture. However, 
more recently this original value has significantly declined (Jung, Pirog & Lee, 2016; 
Koh & Yang, 2021; Sung & Dunkle, 2009). For example, in 1998, 90% of Korean 
respondents answered that family members (e.g., adult children) should support their 
older parents. However, this figure dropped to 27% in 2018 (KOSTAT, 2020).  
Lastly, economic growth was valued more highly than improving welfare in the 
past, so the social security system in Korea has not developed sufficiently (Choi & 
Hong, 2018; Choi, Chung & Joo, 2018; OECD, 2018; Yeo, 2019). As a result, the 
Korean economy has grown remarkably, but it also caused several social problems 
including elderly poverty. Therefore, the Korean government set up the social welfare 
system and has increased public transfer expenditure since the 2000s (Ramesh, 2003). 
In terms of the social security system in Korea (Table 1.1), firstly, the National 
Pension was introduced in 1988 as a centrepiece in this welfare system and it had spread 
to every business and workplace by 2006. The National Pension is a contribution-based 
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social insurance programme and a funded pension (National Pension Service in Korea 
[NPS], 2020). It has a narrower coverage and a smaller amount of benefit than in other 
developed countries (Jones & Urasawa, 2014; OECD, 2018).  
Table 1.1. The social security system in Korea 
 National Pension  Basic Pension NBLS 
Concept Social insurance Means-tested benefit Means-tested benefit 
Introduction 
1988 (expanded by 
2006) 
2014 (the Basic Old-Age 
Pension from 2008) 










Age: 62 and over 
Contribution period: 10 
years and over 
Age: 65 and over 
Income: bottom 70% 
Income: below 30-50% 
of median income 
Recipients 5.6 million      5.6 million 
2.1 million 
65+: 0.8 million 
Benefits  
(£, monthly)  
£269 (average)   
£167-200 for the single 
elderly 





17.7  11.3  10.7  
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 Korean Won (KRW), (2) The age eligibility of the National Pension is 62 years and over in 
2020. It will increase to 65 years old by 2033, (3) The income threshold of the NBLS: the Livelihood Benefit set at 
30% of median income, the Medical Benefit at 40%, the Housing Benefit at 45%, the Education Benefit at 50%, (4) 
Data: 2020; Source: Author’s summary, KOSTAT (2020), Ministry of Education in Korea (2019, 2020), Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport in Korea (2019, 2020), MOHW (2019, 2020, 2021), and NPS (2020, 2021) 
 
 
Secondly, the Basic Old-Age Pension was introduced in 2008, as a 
supplementary measure of the National Pension. Its name is a pension, but it is a tax-
based income support programme through means-testing. It was expanded to the Basic 
Pension in 2014 and the Basic Pension provided £167-200 per month (hereafter 1 GBP 
= 1,500 Korean Won [KRW]) to the bottom 70% of the elderly by income in 2020 
(MOHW, 2020). Lastly, the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) was introduced 
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in 2000 after the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 as a major public assistance 
programme for general residents based on means-testing (Lee & Phillips, 2011; MOHW, 
2020). The NBLS was reformed in 2015 to reduce a blind spot within the welfare 
system and it covers the Livelihood Benefit, the Medical Benefit, the Housing Benefit, 
and the Education Benefit. Consequently, the Korean social expenditure for the elderly 
increased from 8.1 billion pounds in 2005 to 32.5 billion pounds in 2017 (OECD, 2020). 
Despite the expansion of social expenditure, the relative poverty rate of the 
elderly decreased by only 0.5%p from 42.8% in 2006 to 42.3% in 2017 (A1.1 in 
appendices and KOSTAT, 2020). After the reform of the NBLS, the statutory poverty 
threshold was revised from ‘absolute poverty’ based on the Minimum Cost of Living 
(MCL) to ‘relative poverty’ set at 30-50% of median income (MOHW, 2015). Therefore, 
most researchers in Korea have focused on relative poverty and have concluded that the 
relative elderly poverty rate is still high (Chae & Heshmati, 2017; Cho & Yeo, 2017; 
Hwang, 2016; Jeon, 2019; Ku & Kim, 2020; Lee, Ku & Shon, 2019). Some also insist 
that public transfer is still insufficient compared to other OECD member countries, and 
the Korean government should provide more financial support to the poor elderly 
(OECD, 2018; Yeo, 2019). 
This chapter will use both relative and absolute poverty thresholds to capture the 
trends and determinants of elderly poverty. This is because the two poverty can have 
different characteristics and allow us to compare poverty and deep poverty (Atkinson, 
Cantillon, Marlier & Nolan, 2002; Decerf & Ferrando, 2020; Marchand & Smeeding, 
2016; Ravallion, 2012). Some researchers have defined multiple poverty lines to 
ascertain different poverty trends (Ku, 2004; Meyer & Sullivan, 2013; Notten & 
Neubourg, 2011; Park & Kim, 2016). In this chapter, the relative elderly poverty rate 
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decreased slightly, whilst the absolute poverty rate dropped rapidly. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews literature on the 
determinants of elderly poverty and multi-poverty thresholds. Section 1.3 introduces the 
Korean Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS); and sets poverty lines and 
methodology. Section 1.4 calculates poverty rates; compares the characteristics between 
the poor and non-poor elderly; and demonstrates the determinants of elderly poverty. 
Lastly, section 1.5 summarises this research, and discusses implications and limitations.  
 
1.2. Literature review  
From the mid-2000s, several researchers have paid considerable attention to elderly 
poverty in Korea (Choi, 2007; Hong & Kim, 2012; Lee, 2009; Seok, 2009). The first 
reason is the revision of the Korea Household Income and Expenditure Survey (KHIES), 
which presents the official statistics of the Korean government, in 2003 and 2006 when 
the elderly poverty rate increased by 5.9%p and 8.3%p, respectively (Korea Institute for 
Health and Social Affairs [KIHASA], 2018). Secondly, the proportion of the elderly 
amongst the total population in Korea sharply increased from 5.9% in 1995 to 10.2% in 
2008 (KOSTAT, 2020). Lastly, the Korean government introduced the Basic Old-Age 
Pension to alleviate elderly poverty in 2008 (MOHW, 2020). These reasons have led to 
some researchers highlighting this issue.  
1.2.1. Determinants of elderly poverty  
Most literature has commonly focused on demographic and economic characteristics, 
and public transfer. Choi (2007) investigates the characteristics of householders (e.g., 
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age and education) and households (e.g., assets and region) using panel logistic 
regression. This research analyses the KLIPS from 1998 to 2004 and establishes the 
relative poverty line at 40% of median equivalised disposable income. It defines the 
elderly as aged 55 and over and includes only the elderly living alone or with a spouse. 
It also shows age, educational attainment, and marital status of householders; and assets 
and region of households as being significant on elderly poverty.  
Cho and Yeo (2017) also examine the determinants of elderly poverty in Korea. 
They conduct panel logistic regression using the Korea Welfare Panel Study from 2006 
to 2015. However, they adopt different age and poverty thresholds from Choi (2007). 
They define the elderly as aged 65 years and over and set the relative poverty threshold 
at 60% of median equivalised disposable income. This study conducts the Hausman test 
and applies the fixed effects model. On the one hand, it finds that householder 
employment, logged monthly subjective minimum living cost, and logged property 
price all have significant effects on elderly poverty. On the other hand, their research 
shows that place of residence of households and educational attainment of householders 
are insignificant on the determination of elderly poverty. 
Further determinants of elderly poverty include changes in public transfer 
income as well as living arrangements. In recent times, Ku and Kim (2020) find such 
determinants and their contributions to considerable change in the elderly poverty rate 
between 1996 and 2014. They analyse the Korea National Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure 1996 and the KHIES 2014 using decomposition analysis. As such, they 
define the age of an elderly person as being 60 years and over, and the relative poverty 
line as being 50% of median equivalised disposable income. They conclude that the 
elderly poverty rate increased from 28.7% in 1996 to 40.8% in 2014. To be specific, 
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changes in public transfer and tax together dedicated to a reduction in poverty risk of 
the elderly. While shifts in living arrangements and ageing of householders have had 
negative effects on elderly poverty.  
In response to the social expenditure expansion, some researchers have 
inspected the effect of increased public transfer income on well-being of the elderly. 
Lee, Ku and Shon (2019) analyse the potential crowding out effect of the Basic Pension 
on financial support from their adult children. They examine the KHIES 2013 and 2014 
using difference-in-differences (DD). They define the elderly as aged 65 and over which 
is equal to the eligible age of the Korean Basic Pension. They set recipients of the Basic 
Pension as a treatment group and non-recipients as a control group. Since the Basic 
Pension was introduced in July of 2014, they compare the average monthly income in 
April-June to in July-December. They conclude that the Basic Pension increased 
household income of the Korean elderly and did not have a significant crowding-out 
effect on private transfer income. 
However, Koh and Yang (2021) oppose to the conclusion of the above Lee et al. 
(2019) and insist that the Basic Old-Age Pension (former the Basic Pension) in Korea, 
which was introduced in 2008, displaced private transfer completely. They analyse the 
KHIES from 2006 to 2013 using DD. They compare age group 65-84 as being 
recipients of the Basic Old-Age Pension to aged 45-64 as being non-recipients. The 
former age group was set as a treatment group and the latter was set as a control group. 
They conclude that the Basic Old-Age Pension entirely reduced financial support from 
their adult children, so it has limited effects on household income of the Korean elderly.  
Literature above commonly proved that demographic and economic 
characteristics, and public transfer are significant factors on the poverty status of the 
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Korean elderly. In addition, most literature analysed a longitudinal dataset to capture 
dynamic changes in elderly poverty and relevant socio-economic transitions, since the 
Korean society has faced considerable shifts related to elderly poverty, such as: the 
accelerated ageing population; the social attitude changes to support older parents; and 
the expansion of social expenditure. Meanwhile, the above literature adopted a variety 
of the age criteria of the elderly and poverty thresholds, therefore this chapter will 
review these issues in section 1.3. 
1.2.2. Multiple poverty thresholds 
As aforementioned, this chapter uses multiple poverty thresholds. This section reviews 
some prior papers which have adopted several poverty thresholds and illustrated 
different poverty trends. Ku (2004) utilises multi-poverty lines, such as: (i) the relative 
poverty threshold: set at 40% of median equivalised disposable income in each year, 
and (ii) the absolute poverty threshold: anchored at the first official MCL surveyed in 
1999 and annually adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This study analyses the 
Korea National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in 1991, 1996, and 2000, and 
sets the age of the elderly at 60 years and over. It describes that the absolute poverty rate 
of the elderly decreased from 47.9% in 1991 to 33.5% in 2000, nevertheless the relative 
elderly poverty rate increased from 27.0% to 38.8% during the same period.  
More recently, Park and Kim (2016) also employ both relative and absolute 
poverty thresholds, however they adopt different definitions to Ku (2004), such as: (i) 
the relative poverty threshold: set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income, and 
(ii) the absolute poverty threshold: equivalent to the official MCL in each year. They 
define the elderly as aged 65 years and older and analyse the KLIPS in 1998, 2008, and 
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2011. They describe that the absolute elderly poverty rate decreased from 50.0% in 
1998 to 32.8% in 2011, while the relative poverty rate of the Korean elderly increased 
from 41.2% to 46.4% in the same year.  
In the USA, an alternative absolute poverty threshold was introduced to measure 
the poverty reduction effects of government measures. The USA government had 
initiated significant welfare programmes through the ‘War on poverty (1964)’; however, 
from the late-1980s, some criticised that this endeavour could not alleviate poverty 
problem despite massive fiscal expenditure (Lemann, 1988). In order to identify the 
poverty mitigation effect, Meyer and Sullivan (2013) use an alternative poverty 
threshold to reflect tax and noncash benefits. In contrast, the official poverty threshold 
in the USA does not consider the effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), food 
stamps, and other in-kind transfers. They find that the official poverty rate in the USA 
slightly decreased from 19.5% in 1963 to 15.1% in 2010, while their alternative poverty 
rate dropped from 31.6% to 8.2% in the same period. Therefore, they stress that poverty 
has been considerably reduced by tax credits and in-kind benefits.  
Another approach compares the poverty rates amongst the USA and the EU 
member states with both relative and absolute poverty lines. Notten and Neubourg 
(2011) apply not only the relative poverty threshold in the EU to the USA but also the 
absolute poverty threshold in the USA to the EU member nations to compare the 
poverty trends in each country. The EU uses the relative poverty line set at 60% of 
national median income; whereas the USA adopts the absolute poverty line based on 
minimum cost of living. In addition, they employ disposable income to consider tax and 
public transfer. They show that the absolute poverty rate in the UK decreased from 24.3% 
in 1993 to 13.7% in 2000, however the relative poverty rate slightly declined from 19.6% 
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to 17.1% in the same period. Most countries display that the absolute poverty rate 
decreased more than the relative poverty rate.  
This paragraph defines some issues. Firstly, this chapter will establish multiple 
poverty thresholds to explore the multi-dimensions of elderly poverty in Korea. The 
above studies also commonly set multiple poverty thresholds. For example, both Ku 
(2004), and Park and Kim (2016), which focused on Korean elderly poverty, used the 
relative and absolute poverty thresholds. In addition, the Korean government changed 
the statutory poverty threshold from the absolute poverty threshold to the relative 
poverty threshold after the NBLS reform in 2015 (KIHASA, 2017). In other words, 
Korea had the multiple official poverty thresholds during the research period of this 
chapter (2003-2017). Secondly, since literature adopted disposable income to consider 
the effects of public transfer and tax rather than gross income, this chapter also will use 
disposable income. Lastly, this chapter will analyse more recent data to capture the 
effects of recently expanded public transfer programmes on elderly poverty (e.g., the 
Basic Pension implementation in 2014 and the NBLS reform in 2015). 
 
1.3. Data and methodology 
1.3.1. Data: The Korean Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) 
The KLIPS is a longitudinal survey of households and individuals in Korea. It launched 
in 1998 immediately after the Asian Financial Crisis and has been carried out annually 
by the Korea Labour Institute (KLI). It has the longest series of panel data in Korea and 
contains a variety of information on the labour market and income activities of 
households and individuals. As the employment rate of the Korean elderly was the 
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second highest of the OECD members in 2018 (OECD, 2020), it can be a suitable 
dataset for this chapter. In addition, it is a large-scale panel study with its sample of 
nearly 7,000 households (KLI, 2020a). Therefore, it has been widely used for research 
on poverty, income and labour activities to track the long-term changes in Korea.  
 This paragraph compares the KLIPS to other available datasets in Korea. Firstly, 
the Economically Active Population Survey is the official statistics in Korea, but it does 
not include income, expenditure, and assets data (KOSTAT, 2019c), so it cannot 
analyse poverty issues. Secondly, the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging and the 
Korea Retirement and Income Study are biannual panel datasets, and they contain 
income, expenditure, and assets information. However, they cover only middle/old-aged 
population who aged 45/50 and over, respectively (Korea Employment Information 
Service, 2020; National Pension Research Institute in Korea, 2019), so they cannot 
calculate a poverty threshold of the whole population in Korea (Lee, 2018). Lastly, the 
National Survey of Tax and Benefit started in 2008 much later than the KLIPS in 1998. 
It focuses on tax information (Korea Institute of Public Finance, 2020), and it does not 
have sufficient data on labour and economic activities. 
This chapter uses data from the 7th wave to the 21st wave surveyed from 2004 to 
2018 (KLI, 2020a, 2020b), so it can examine the effect of recently implemented public 
transfer for the elderly (e.g., the Basic Old-Age Pension in 2008, the Basic Pension in 
2014, and the NBLS reform in 2015) and the period of economic downturn (e.g., the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2008-2009). Moreover, it converts gross income to disposable 
income as discussed in section 1.3.2. To calculate disposable income, it needs to 
consider the non-consumption expenditure and the other subsidies of the KLIPS. These 
items were surveyed from the 7th wave and the 6th wave, respectively. Therefore, this 
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chapter uses data from the 7th wave. Since the KLIPS contains income data of a 
previous year, this chapter describes year of income data (e.g., the 7th wave data: 2003).  
1.3.2. Elderly households and household income 
Elderly households: The age criteria of the elderly in literature and statistics are 65, 60, 
55 or 66 (e.g., (i) Age of 65: Cho & Yeo, 2017; Lee et al., 2019; Park & Kim, 2016; (ii) 
60: Chae & Heshmati, 2017; Ku, 2004; (iii) 55: Choi, 2007; (iv) 66: OECD, 2020). The 
Basic Pension and the official statistics of the Korean government define the age 
threshold of the elderly as 65 (Basic Pension Act 2020, Article 3; KOSTAT, 2019b; 
MOHW, 2020). Therefore, more researchers have tended to apply this official age 
threshold of 65 in recent times. Moreover, Kwan and Walsh (2018) conducted the meta-
analysis on elderly poverty research in several countries and they found that 32 out of 
56 papers had defined age as 65 and over. Therefore, this chapter also defines the 
elderly as aged 65 and over.  
In addition, an elderly household in this chapter is one whose head is elderly. 
This is because the elderly in a household with a non-elderly head can share income of 
their householder, so they have a much lower poverty rate than the average of the whole 
elderly group (Lim, 2016; Park & Kim, 2016). Therefore, most prior studies have 
defined an elderly household as one which has an elderly head to identify elderly 
poverty more exactly (Cho & Yeo, 2017; Jeon, 2019; Ku, 2004; Lee, 2018; Seok & Kim, 
2012; Sung & Kim, 2018). 
Disposable income: This chapter uses disposable income by deducting non-
consumption expenditure and irregular income from gross income. Since disposable 
income reflects tax and public transfer, it can measure the effect of redistribution policy 
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on poverty more clearly (Atkinson et al., 2002; Meyer & Sullivan, 2013; OECD, 2013; 
UN, 2011). In addition, disposable income excludes irregular income (e.g., windfall 
gains) to consider sustainable financial resources for consumption. In this regard, the 
OECD and the United Nations (UN) recommend disposable income rather than gross 
income to calculate household income statistics (OECD, 2013; UN, 2011).  
 Income components: This chapter specifies household income into five 
components, such as: earned income, real estate income, financial income, public 
transfer income, and private transfer income (Table 1.2). In terms of transfer income, 
some separate it to public transfer and private transfer (KOSTAT, 2019b), but others do 
not classify it (OECD, 2013; UN, 2011). This chapter divides it into public transfer and 
private transfer to distinguish their trends and effects on poverty alleviation. Public 
transfer income is sharply increased by the social expenditure expansion, but private 
transfer income is slightly raised due to the cultural changes to support older parents 
(Table 1.7). Furthermore, this chapter splits public transfer to social insurance and 
means-tested benefits, because a contribution-based social insurance programme and a 
mean-tested benefit can have different effects on elderly poverty (Hwang, 2016).  
Equivalence scale: The KLIPS collects income data at a household unit. 
However, household income data need to be equivalised to consider economies of scale 
in consumption by an equivalence scale (Atkinson et al., 2002; Haughton & Khandker, 
2009; Marchand & Smeeding, 2016). As each household has a different size, it can have 
a different level of economy of scale in its consumption by sharing goods and services 
among household members. Therefore, the OECD and the UN suggest the OECD old 
scale, the OECD modified scale, and the square root scale to consider an economy of 
scale (OECD, 2013; UN, 2011). 
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Table 1.2. Income classification 
Income components Description 
Earned income wages and salaries, profit from self-employment 
Financial income interest on deposit, stock dividend, interest on private loans or credits 
Real estate income rent and land lease fee 
Public transfer 
income 
(1) Social insurance: National Pension benefit and occupational pension 
benefit 
(2) Means-tested benefits: Basic Pension benefit, NBLS benefit, and other 
subsidies from the government 
Private transfer 
income 
financial support from other households (e.g., children and relatives) and 
non-governmental organisations 
Source: KLIPS user’s guide (KLI, 2020a) and KLIPS codebook (KLI, 2020b) 
 
 
Among these three scales, the square root scale is widely used for taking 
statistics and comparing poverty rates. The Korean government also uses the square root 
scale to calculate the official poverty rate (KOSTAT, 2019b) and most Korean literature 
has adopted the square root scale (Chae & Heshmati, 2017; Choi, 2007; Choi & Yeo, 
2017; Lee et al., 2019). Therefore, this chapter also mainly uses the square root scale 
(e.g., household disposable income is divided by two, if a household size is four). The 
OECD modified scale is used to equivalise the MCLs because the Korean official MCL 
was also equivalised by this modified scale (MOHW, 2017).  
1.3.3. Poverty thresholds and price indices 
Absolute poverty and relative poverty: A poverty threshold is rooted in its theoretical 
background on poverty (Table 1.3). On the one hand, an absolute poverty threshold is to 
support ‘basic needs’ and is mainly calculated to the cost of purchase a bundle of 
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essential goods. On the other hand, a relative poverty threshold is maintaining a ‘normal 
living standard’ in a community and represents a given percentile in the income 
distribution in a country (Haughton & Khandker, 2009; Notten & Neubourg, 2011). 
Therefore, an absolute poverty line generally tends to be lower than a relative poverty 
line. An absolute poverty line typically aims to maintain the same real value in different 
times and places therefore it is adjusted by a price index to reflect inflation; whereas a 
relative poverty line is automatically adjusted by fluctuations in income (Atkinson et al., 
2002; Marchand & Smeeding, 2016).  
Table 1.3. Absolute poverty and relative poverty 
 Absolute poverty Relative poverty 
Concept basic needs normal living standard 
Measurement 
the cost of purchase a bundle of 
essential goods 
a given percentile in income 
distribution (e.g., 50% or 60% of 
median income) 
Adjustment 
adjusted by a price index  
to reflect inflation 
automatically adjusted by changes  
in income 
Example USA, World Bank EU, OECD, Korea 
Source: Author’s summary, Atkinson et al. (2002), Haughton and Khandker (2009), and Notten and Neubourg (2011) 
 
 
 An absolute poverty threshold is more suitable for least developed countries 
where basic needs (e.g., famine, clean water, and safe shelter) are still important issue 
(Decerf & Ferrando, 2020; Lakner, Mahler, Negre & Prydz, 2020; Ravallion, 2012). 
While a developed country tends to employ a relative poverty threshold. This is because 
it already supports basic material needs for residents, so absolute poverty is generally no 
longer an urgent issue. It puts its policy priority on social inclusion, social participation, 
and relative satisfaction on well-being, therefore relative poverty is regarded as a more 
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relevant poverty indicator (Chen & Ravallion, 2012; Deaton, 2006; Plotnick, 2012). 
Korea also changed its official poverty threshold from the absolute poverty threshold to 
the relative poverty threshold in 2015. This is because the absolute poverty scale did not 
fully express well-being for residents (Nam & Park, 2020; KIHASA, 2017; Yeo, Kim, 
Kim, Yang & Choi, 2005).  
This chapter takes the above two poverty thresholds to analyse the multi-
dimensions of elderly poverty in Korea. The first reason is that relative and absolute 
poverty can have different trends in Korea as described in section 1.2.2 (Ku, 2004; Park 
& Kim, 2016). In addition, absolute poverty decreased more than relative poverty 
globally (Decerf & Ferrando, 2020; Notten & Neubourg, 2011; Ravallion, 2012). 
Secondly, the relative elderly poverty rate in Korea is extremely higher than in other 
developed countries. This suggests that supporting basic needs can be still an important 
issue for the Korean elderly. Lastly, since the Korean official poverty threshold was 
changed in 2015, both relative and absolute poverty thresholds were the official 
indicators during the research period of this chapter 2003-2017. Therefore, it is worth 
tracking both elderly poverty rates to explore policy responses and their implications. 
Poverty thresholds: This chapter applies three absolute poverty thresholds and 
one relative poverty threshold (Table 1.4). Firstly, the absolute poverty thresholds are 
anchored at the first official MCL surveyed in 1999 (KIHASA, 1999) and adjusted by 
three price indices. Secondly, the relative poverty threshold is set at 50% of median 
equivalised disposable income in each year. The Korean government and the OECD 
also establish the same relative poverty line for taking official statistics (KOSTAT, 
2019b; OECD, 2020).  
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Price indices: This chapter places three price indices for inflation adjustment to 
the absolute poverty thresholds (Table 1.4). The first index is the Korean official CPI, 
and it is similar to the USA where the absolute poverty threshold is anchored at the 
initial poverty threshold developed by M. Orshansky in 1963 and adjusted by the CPI-U 
annually (Fisher, 1997; Fox, 2020). The second approach is adjusting by price changes 
in all 372 items included as the basic necessities of the poor in MCL 1999 while 
maintaining the same items and weights. Lastly, the third index is the ‘CPI for living 
necessaries’ that was designed to focus on essential necessities for all Koreans as an 
alternative indicator of the CPI. These three indices have different weights, for example: 
the ratio of food was 28.5% in the CPI 2017 (MCL1), 40.7% in the MCL 1999 (MCL2), 
and 37.7% in the CPI for living necessaries 2017 (MCL3) (KIHASA, 1999; KOSTAT, 
2019a).  
Table 1.4. Multiple poverty thresholds 
Poverty lines Description 
Absolute poverty line 1 
anchored at the initial MCL in 1999 and adjusted by the CPI (the 
USA style) 
Absolute poverty line 2 
anchored at the MCL 1999 and adjusted by price changes in 372 
items (the MCL 1999 has 372 items and maintaining the same items 
and weights) 
Absolute poverty line 3 
anchored at the MCL 1999 and adjusted by the CPI for living 
necessaries (an alternative price indicator of the CPI) 
Relative poverty line 
set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income in each year 




1.3.4. Dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variables: This chapter focuses on the poverty status of the Korean elderly 
and sets four poverty thresholds. Therefore, it defines four binary dependent variables. 
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If a household has smaller equivalised disposable income than the absolute or relative 
poverty threshold, this household has value of 1 and 0 otherwise, as can be seen in 
equation (1.1).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
  1   𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ < 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒
  0   𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒
 (1.1) 
Note: 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1,2, … . , 𝑇, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable and 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is equivalised disposable income 
 
 
Independent variables: A large literature has selected independent variables with 
theoretical backgrounds, but this chapter conducts the Lasso (least absolute shrinkage 
and selection operator) to select better explanatory variables and to avoid the overfitting 
problem. The Lasso is a regularised regression model by minimising the residual sum of 
squares subject to a L1-norm penalty function (Belloni, Chernozhukov, Hansen & 
Kozbur, 2016; Lee & Hong, 2018; Tibshirani, 1996). This condition can be expressed as 
equation (1.2). The Lasso adds the penalty term of 𝜆 ∑ |𝛽𝑗|
𝑝
𝑗=1 , the 𝜆  is a penalty 
parameter and ∑ |𝛽𝑗|
𝑝
𝑗=1  is the sum of the absolute value of potential coefficients. 









             (1.2) 
Note: 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, 𝜆 is a penalty parameter, p is the number of potential variables 
 
 
This chapter reviewed prior studies and selects 19 potential variables which 
include nine householder variables and ten household variables (A1.2 in appendices); 
and then it conducts lasso logit command with plugin option in Stata (Stata Press, 2019). 
As a result of the Lasso, it designates ten independent variables (Table 1.5). In addition, 
it conducts unpaired t-test on means difference according to the poverty status of the 
elderly, and all ten independent variables are statistically significant at the 1% level 
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(A1.3 in appendices).  
In terms of householder, firstly, hage is the age of householders. Secondly, hgen 
is the gender of householders, and coded as 0 for a male and 1 for a female. Thirdly, 
hwork is the employment status of householders, and coded as 0 if a householder is 
employed and 1 if a householder is unemployed (including economically inactive 
status). Fourthly, hedu is the education years of householders. Lastly, hheal is the self-
reported physical health condition of householders, and coded as 0 when a respondent 
answered healthy and 1 otherwise.  
Table 1.5. Independent variables 
Category Name Description 
Householder hage age, years 
 
hgen dummy, gender, 0=male, 1=female 
 
hwork  
dummy, employment status, 0=employed, 1=unemployed 
(including economically inactive status) 
 
hedu education years  
 
hheal dummy, self-reported health condition, 0=healthy, 1=unhealthy 
Household region 
dummy, place of residence, 0=urban areas (Seoul and other 
metropolitan regions), 1=rural areas (province regions)  
 
size the number of household member(s) 
 
pens the number of pensioner(s) 
 
childs 
dummy, 0=no financial support from their adult children, 
1=receiving financial support from their adult children 
 
assets net assets = assets - debt (log) 
 
 
In regard to household variables, firstly, region is the place of residence, and a 
binary variable coded as 0 for a household living in urban areas (Seoul and other 
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metropolitan cities) and 1 for rural areas. Secondly, size is the number of household 
members. Thirdly, pens is the number of public pensioners in each household. Fourthly, 
childs is binary, and 0 means an elderly household does not receive financial support 
from adult children and 1 otherwise. Since financial support from adult children 
accounts for 96% of private transfer income of an elderly household (Koh & Yang, 
2021), the variable of childs can cover overall private transfer income. Lastly, the 
variable of assets is the logged amount of net assets. The KLIPS has surveyed property 
price as categories (e.g., 100 to less than 200 million KRW) if a respondent did not 
know the exact price of real estate (KLI, 2020a). This chapter used the mean price of 
each range to convert to continuous price (Choi & Kim, 2015; Kim & Song, 2010). 
 
1.3.5. Pooled OLS and panel logistic regression  
This chapter conducts pooled OLS and panel logistic regression as equation (1.3) and 
(1.4), respectively. Panel data have distinct advantages compared to cross-sectional data. 
They allow us to control individual heterogeneity and study complex issues of dynamic 
relations. In equation (1.4), Λ  is the logistic cumulative distribution function. Panel 
logistic regression assumes that an error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑙  follows the logistic distribution instead 
of the normal distribution (Baltagi, 2011; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Wooldridge, 2012).  
            Pooled OLS (linear model): 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.3) 
            Panel logistic regression (non-linear model): 𝑦𝑖𝑡  =  Λ (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽𝑙) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑙     (1.4) 





1.4.1. Poverty thresholds and poverty rates  
Poverty thresholds: The relative poverty threshold increased from £380.9 in 2003 to 
£773.3 in 2017 per month; whereas the absolute poverty thresholds rose from £249.1 
(MCL1) - £257.1 (MCL3) to £350.5 (MCL1) - £409.6 (MCL2) in the same period 
(Figure 1.1 and A1.1 in appendices). The relative poverty threshold set at 50% of 
median equivalised disposable income more than doubled for 14 years since economic 
growth in Korea leads to improving its household income. However, the Korean CPI as 
an adjustment index of the absolute poverty threshold increased by 40% (KOSTAT, 
2020). Among these three MCL indicators, the MCL2 shows the highest growth since 
the MCL2 has a more weight on food than the other MCLs, and food price doubled 
between 2003 and 2017. Whereas the MCL1 illustrates the lowest rise as its weight on 
food is smaller than the MCL2 and the MCL3.  
Figure 1.1. Trends of the poverty thresholds (GBP) 
 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Monthly poverty thresholds, (2) A1: the absolute poverty threshold 1 (MCL1), 
A2: the absolute poverty threshold 2 (MCL2), A3: the absolute poverty threshold 3 (MCL3), R: the relative poverty 
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The absolute poverty thresholds, which are lower than the relative poverty 
threshold, can allow us to analyse elderly poverty more correctly because elderly 
households tend to have smaller income and expenditure than non-elderly households 
(Table 1.6). Some researchers conclude that a poverty threshold for elderly households 
needs to be set at 50-65% of non-elderly households (Jeon, 2003; Kim & Lee, 2019; 
Seok, 2017). In addition, the USA government also assigned a lower poverty threshold 
of the elderly than that of the working age (Census Bureau in the USA, 2018).  
Poverty rates: The poverty rates also display different trends. The absolute 
elderly poverty rates dropped from 35.9% (MCL1) - 37.2% (MCL3) in 2003 to 9.8% 
(MCL1) - 14.9% (MCL2) in 2017 (Figure 1.2 and A1.1 in appendices). However, the 
relative elderly poverty rate reduced slightly from 48.5% to 43.9% in the same year. 
This demonstrates that the relative elderly poverty rate is stagnant at a high level. In 
addition, the absolute elderly poverty rate is also still high compared to the non-elderly.  
Figure 1.2. Trends of the poverty rates (%) 
 
Note: (1) 65+: age 65 and over, 64-: age below 65, (2) A1: the absolute poverty rate 1 (MCL1), A2: the absolute 
poverty rate 2 (MCL2), A3: the absolute poverty rate 3 (MCL3), R: the relative poverty rate; Source: Author’s 
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As described in section 1.2.2, Ku (2004) and Park and Kim (2016) conclude that 
their relative elderly poverty rates increased despite reductions in the absolute elderly 
poverty rates. However, both relative and absolute poverty rates decreased in this 
chapter, which analysed more recent data. This implies that the recently introduced 
public transfer programmes in Korea can have more positive effects on elderly poverty.  
In addition, the relative poverty rate of the non-elderly decreased from 15.4% in 
2003 to 10.2% in 2017 and their absolute poverty rates remarkably dropped from 8.1% 
(MCL1) - 8.3% (MCL3) to 2.1% (MCL1) - 2.9% (MCL2) in the same period. It means 
that the poverty issue of the non-elderly is likely to be alleviated significantly in Korea. 
However, it also presents that the poverty gap between the non-elderly and the elderly 
in Korea is far higher than in any other OECD members (OECD, 2020).  
1.4.2. Characteristics of elderly households  
Householder: Older, female, unemployed, and unhealthy householders tend to be below 
the poverty lines. Among them ageing of householders could have effects on the gender 
and health of householders. Firstly, female’s life expectancy of 86.3 years is longer than 
male of 80.5 years in 2021 (KOSTAT, 2021). Therefore, the ratio of female 
householders among the elderly is considerably higher than the non-elderly, and it can 
lead to the feminisation of poverty. Secondly, only half of elderly householders reported 
their physical health was in good condition, and this figure is much lower than non-
elderly householders. 
Meanwhile, the employment rate (1 – hwork; an employed householder is coded 
as 0) of the whole elderly group is 33%. This figure was the second highest of the 
OECD members in 2018 (OECD, 2020). This is because public pension income is 
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insufficient, so the Korean elderly need to participate in the labour market (Kang, 2015; 
Kim, Baek & Lee, 2018). Among the three groups, the employment rate of the absolute 
poverty elderly group is only 15% and it is the lowest of the three groups. In general, 
the employment rate of the non-poor elderly is higher than that of the poor elderly, and 
it can be a main factor determining the poverty status of the Korean elderly (Jeon, 2019).  
Household: Poor households tend to live in rural areas rather than urban areas 
and have small household size fewer than two persons. In addition, the three elderly 
groups have only 0.2-0.4 pensioner fewer than one person. The coverage rate of the 
National Pension was only 46.4% of the Korean elderly in 2020 (KOSTAT, 2020; NPS, 
2021) and it also distributes smaller benefits than in other developed countries, because 
the Korean National Pension has a short operation history (Yeo, 2019). In contrast, 
nearly 70% of elderly households receive financial support from their adult children.  
Income, expenditure, and assets: Elderly households have smaller income and 
expenditure than non-elderly households (Jeon, 2003; Kim & Lee, 2019; Seok, 2017). 
Household income reduced to approximately 67% after retirement, and this figure was 
the lowest of the OECD members (OECD, 2020). However, household expenditure also 
decreased significantly, such that elderly households could maintain a surplus in their 
household balance. This contrasts to poor non-elderly households are in deficit. 
In terms of earned income, firstly, earned income accounts for half of disposable 
income of the whole elderly group and this figure was the second highest of the OECD 
members in 2016 (OECD, 2020). Secondly, the two poor elderly groups have much 
smaller earned income than the whole elderly group. This implies that earned income is 
still important income source, but its distinct gap could have an influence on the poverty 
risk of the elderly (Ko, Woo, Ku & Lee, 2019; Park & Kim, 2016; Seok, 2009). 
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Table 1.6. Characteristics of elderly households 
  
Householder age 65+ (65 and over) 64- (below 65) 












hage (age, years) 73.17 75.31 75.63 46.25 46.51 43.12 
hgen (0=male) 0.33 0.48 0.58 0.15 0.29 0.30 
hwork (0=employed) 0.67 0.78 0.85 0.13 0.35 0.42 
hedu (education years) 7.95 5.96 5.25 12.98 11.48 11.89 
hheal (0=healthy) 0.38 0.51 0.56 0.05 0.17 0.17 
Household 
region (0=urban areas)  0.56 0.58 0.60 0.52 0.50 0.50 
size (persons) 2.06 1.67 1.53 3.10 2.48 2.13 
pens (number of 
pensioners) 
0.43 0.30 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.05 
childs (0=no transfer 
from their children) 
0.71 0.73 0.64 0.12 0.17 0.13 
Income  
(£, month) 
Gross Income 1,778.3 714.3 440.4 2,656.1 647.1 327.4 
Disposable income 1,234.4 442.2 237.4 2,427.9 502.4 169.8 
Equivalised disposable 
income  
822.5 345.6 198.9 1,395.3 319.2 115.5 
(a) Earned income 641.7 111.0 33.7 2,261.5 389.0 100.1 
(b) Financial income 26.0 9.3 5.5 16.1 3.5 3.3 
(c) Real estate income  104.7 19.0 7.9 48.1 5.4 2.7 
(d) Public transfer 301.1 152.0 105.0 49.6 60.4 36.0 
(d)-1 Social insurance 236.7 63.9 26.3 34.9 23.3 9.8 
(d)-2 Means-tested benefits 64.3 88.0 78.7 14.6 37.2 26.3 
(e) Private transfer 168.5 153.4 87.1 70.0 49.5 31.7 
Expenditure 
(£, month) 
Gross expenditure  832.4 454.1 341.8 1,596.7 739.2 567.6 
Non-consumption 
expenditure 
7.5 2.6 1.9 17.4 5.5 4.0 
Balance (£, month) 946.0 260.2 98.5 1,059.4 -92.1 -240.3 
Assets (£, 
thousand) 
(a) Real estate 157.2 82.5 65.0 142.7 60.3 62.8 
(b) Savings 17.5 7.5 6.3 17.4 5.2 6.0 
Debt 15.0 5.3 4.1 30.4 15.3 14.3 
Net assets 159.7 84.8 67.2 129.7 50.2 54.4 
Observations 18,281 9,731 4,081 58,576 8,089 3,313 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Weighted average, (3) Equivalence scale: square root of household size, (4) Data: 
between 2003 and 2017, (5) Disposable income = (a) Earned income + (b) Financial income + (c) Real estate income 
+ (d) Public transfer + (e) Private transfer – Non-consumption expenditure, (6) (d) Public transfer = (d)-1 Social 
insurance + (d)-2 Means-tested benefits, (7) Balance = Gross income – Gross expenditure; Source: Author’s 
calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata)  
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Social insurance income displays significant differences according to poverty 
status of elderly households. The National Pension is a contribution-based pension 
programme, and its benefit is related to lifetime wage and contribution years (NPS, 
2020), so the poor elderly tend to receive smaller benefits. This means that the National 
Pension could retain poverty gaps after retirement (Choi, 2018; Hwang, 2016). In 
contrast, poor elderly households receive more means-tested benefits (e.g., the Basic 
Pension and the NBLS) from the Korean government. Therefore, means-tested benefits 
can mitigate poverty and income inequality among the elderly (Lee & Phillips, 2011; 
Lee et al., 2019; Lim, 2016).  
In addition, the elderly tend to have more net assets than the non-elderly, 
because they had accumulated their lifetime income to support consumption after 
retirement. Among the three elderly groups, the absolute poverty group has the smallest 
assets. Meanwhile, the Koreans have a strong preference for real estate assets over 
financial assets in comparison to other developed economies (Financial Services 
Commission in Korea, 2019), therefore the ratio of real estate to the total assets is nearly 
90%. 
1.4.3. Changes of elderly households  
Householder: Householder age, female householders, householder educational 
attainment, and unhealthy householders commonly increased between 2003 and 2017 in 
the three elderly groups. However, the employment rate shows different trends. To be 
specific, the employment rate (1 – hwork) of the whole elderly group and the relative 
poverty elderly group increased by 8%p and 1%p, respectively; whereas this rate of the 
absolute poverty elderly group decreased by 3%p from 14% to 11% in the same year.  
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Table 1.7. Changes of elderly households  
Poverty status All (65+) Relative poverty (65+) 
Absolute poverty 1 
(MCL1, 65+) 
Year 2003 2017 Diff. 2003 2017 Diff. 2003 2017 Diff. 
hage (age, years) 71.11 74.79 3.68 72.44 77.87 5.43 73.18 78.27 5.08 
hgen (0=male) 0.45 0.27 -0.18 0.62 0.39 -0.22 0.65 0.48 -0.17 
hwork (0=employed) 0.74 0.66 -0.08 0.83 0.81 -0.01 0.86 0.89 0.03 
hedu (education years) 6.89 8.88 1.99 4.89 6.89 2.01 4.63 6.15 1.53 
hheal (0=healthy) 0.35 0.39 0.04 0.47 0.54 0.07 0.49 0.58 0.08 
region (0=urban areas) 0.51 0.57 0.06 0.56 0.59 0.03 0.58 0.63 0.05 
size (persons) 2.09 2.06 -0.03 1.69 1.70 0.01 1.58 1.51 -0.07 
pens (pensioners) 0.19 0.57 0.38 0.13 0.44 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.21 
childs (0=no family support) 0.46 0.73 0.28 0.58 0.78 0.20 0.58 0.60 0.02 
Gross Income 1,047.1 2,356.5 1,309.4 385.9 1,037.1 651.2 323.3 599.9 276.6 
Disposable Income 716.6 1,643.5 926.9 227.5 611.3 383.8 171.5 294.0 122.6 
Equivalised 
disposable income 
460.1 1,102.7 642.5 176.8 472.2 295.4 139.0 245.6 106.6 
(a) Earned income 397.0 886.8 489.7 78.5 132.5 54.0 42.8 24.7 -18.1 
(b) Financial income 29.1 21.6 -7.5 9.3 9.8 0.5 5.1 2.2 -3.0 
(c) Real estate income  59.5 123.0 63.5 7.7 25.0 17.3 7.2 4.1 -3.0 
(d) Public transfer 145.3 446.7 301.4 46.0 263.6 217.6 40.9 175.7 134.8 
(d)-1 Social insurance 123.7 347.3 223.6 12.9 121.2 108.3 7.8 54.9 47.1 
(d)-2 Means-tested benefits 21.6 99.3 77.8 33.0 142.4 109.3 33.1 120.8 87.7 
(e) Private transfer 90.8 174.8 84.0 88.8 183.4 94.7 77.9 89.7 11.9 
Gross expenditure 552.1 1,040.4 488.2 316.3 596.8 280.5 276.8 463.4 186.5 
Non-consumption 
expenditure 
5.1 9.3 4.2 2.6 2.9 0.3 2.3 2.4 0.0 
Balance 494.9 1,316.1 821.2 69.6 440.4 370.8 46.5 136.5 90.0 
Real estate assets 83.8 205.7 121.8 45.8 113.2 67.4 40.9 85.3 44.3 
Savings 9.9 26.5 16.6 3.8 12.5 8.7 3.4 10.3 6.9 
Debt 8.0 19.0 10.9 4.2 5.8 1.6 3.8 2.2 -1.6 
Net assets 85.7 213.2 127.5 45.5 119.9 74.4 40.5 93.4 52.9 
Observations 563 1,806 - 331 885 - 254 208 - 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Weighted average, (3) Equivalence scale: square root of household size, (4) 
Disposable income = (a) Earned income + (b) Financial income + (c) Real estate income + (d) Public transfer + (e) 
Private transfer – Non-consumption expenditure, (5) (d) Public transfer = (d)-1 Social insurance + (d)-2 Means-tested 
benefits, (6) Balance = Gross income – Gross expenditure, (7) Income, expenditure, and balance: pounds per month, 
assets (Real estate assets, Savings, Debt, and Net assets): thousand pounds; Source: Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th 
wave – 21st wave microdata) 
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Household: Firstly, the ratio of households living in rural areas increased in the 
three groups. Secondly, the number of household members in the absolute poverty 
elderly group decreased sharply 1.58 in 2003 to 1.51 in 2017. Thirdly, the number of 
public pensioners nearly tripled from 2003 to 2017 in the three groups by the maturing 
of public pension. Lastly, the ratio of family support receipt increased in the three 
groups.  
Income, expenditure, and assets: Gross income and disposable income increased 
from 2003 to 2017 in the three groups. In particular, social insurance and means-tested 
benefits increased rapidly due to the expansion of public transfer. However, earned 
income displays a different trend only in the absolute poverty elderly group. Their 
earned income decreased from £42.8 in 2003 to £24.7 in 2017 per month; whereas 
earned income increased in the other two elderly groups. The declines in the 
employment rate and health condition of householders, and household size can 
contribute to the reduction in earned income of the absolute poverty elderly group. 
1.4.4. Panel logistic regression 
POLS, FE and RE: This chapter conducts panel logistic regression and pooled OLS. 
The estimates of pooled OLS and random effects model can be biased and inconsistent 
if an unobservable error term is correlated with independent variables. However, fixed 
effects model can allow this endogeneity (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Hill, Griffiths & 
Lim, 2018; Wooldridge, 2012). Therefore, prior papers, which analysed panel data to 
identify elderly poverty, tended to adopt the fixed effects model (Chae & Heshmati, 
2017; Cho & Yeo, 2017; Kim & Kim, 2019; Lee, 2018). As a result of the Hausman test, 
this chapter also adopts the fixed effects model (A1.4 in appendices). 
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In terms of the results of the fixed effects model, firstly, the independent 
variables of householder age, householder employment, household size, the number of 
pensioners, and financial support from adult children are all significant at the 1% level 
in the relative and absolute poverty models. Secondly, the education years of 
householders and the residing region of households are not significant in these models. 
Thirdly, the self-reported physical health status of householders is only significant in the 
relative poverty analysis, but it is insignificant in the absolute poverty models. Lastly, 
the variable of net assets is significant in the both models, but it has smaller p-value in 
the relative poverty analysis. 
1.4.4.1. Householder (1): age (hage) 
In the relative poverty analysis, householder age has a positive coefficient, and it is 
significant at the 1% level. It means that older householders are more likely to be in 
relative poverty. This result is consistent with a generally accepted consensus, because 
the older elderly are more likely to be unhealthy, so they are difficult to have a job. 
Several pieces of research also have concluded that the older elderly in Korea are more 
vulnerable to relative poverty (Choi, 2007; Lee, 2018; Seok & Kim, 2012).  
However, in the absolute poverty models, the coefficients of householder age are 
negative (Table 1.8), and this represents that the younger elderly can be more vulnerable 
to absolute poverty than the older elderly. This can imply that some absolute poverty 
households could overcome their absolute poverty in later years. However, they have 
remained in relative poverty as this coefficient is positive in the relative poverty model. 
For example, the Basic Old-Age Pension, which was implemented in 2008, reduced the 
absolute elderly poverty rate by 4.6%p between 2007 and 2009, but the relative elderly 
poverty rate was decreased by only 0.9%p (Kim, 2013).  
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Table 1.8. Panel logistic regression (FE) 
Dependent variables 
1 = a household below the relative (or the absolute) poverty line  
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Observations 10,386 9,778 10,398 10,148 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) Since householder gender is constant, hgen is omitted in FE; Source: 
Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) 
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Additional panel logistic regression (1): by two birth year cohort groups 
In this regard, this chapter conducts the heterogenous analysis by two birth year cohort 
groups, such as: (i) the older elderly group: householders born in 1943 or earlier, and (ii) 
the younger elderly group: householders born after 1943 (A1.5 in appendices). The 
older group could receive the Basic Old-Age Pension since 2008, so some of them 
being below the poverty line before 2008 could overcome absolute poverty thanks to the 
Basic Old-Age Pension. Since the KLIPS does not collect the Basic Old-Age Pension 
benefit data separately (KLI, 2020a), this chapter performs the above analysis to 
identify the anti-poverty effect of the Basic Old-Age Pension on elderly poverty.  
As a result of this analysis, the older group has significant negative coefficients 
on householder age in the absolute poverty models, whereas the younger group has 
insignificant coefficients. This implies that the older elderly could overcome their 
absolute poverty thanks to the Basic Old-Age Pension implementation in 2008. 
However, the older elderly has a positive coefficient on householder age in the relative 
poverty analysis. This can indicate that the Basic Old-Age Pension could have limited 
effects on the older elderly to overcome their relative poverty. 
1.4.4.2. Householder (2): gender (hgen) 
In general, female householders are more likely to be in poverty because females tend to 
have a weak position in the labour market (Choi & Ryu, 2003; Marchand & Smeeding, 
2016; Seok & Kim, 2012; Yeo, 2019). In pooled OLS, householder gender is 
statistically significant in the absolute poverty models, and female householders show a 
higher poverty risk than male householders (A1.4 in appendices). However, it is omitted 
in the fixed effects model since householder gender is constant and has no within 
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variation in the research years.  
Additional panel logistic regression (2): by two gender groups 
To explore relations between gender and elderly poverty, this chapter conducts the 
second heterogenous analysis by gender groups, such as: (i) the male householder group, 
and (ii) the female householder group (A1.6 in appendices). Firstly, household 
employment is significant at the 1% level on both males and females, but the male 
householders have much higher coefficients than the female householders. It indicates 
that employment is commonly an important factor for elderly households, but the male 
elderly can overcome poverty more effectively if they are employed. This is because 
male workers tend to have more wage than female workers in Korea (MOEL, 2021). 
Secondly, family support is also significant at the 1% level on both males and females 
in the absolute poverty models, but the female householders have larger coefficients 
than the male householders. It can imply that the female group is more dependent on 
family support from their adult children to overcome the deep poverty. 
1.4.4.3. Householder (3): employment status (hwork) 
The employment of householders is also significant in all relative and absolute poverty 
models at the 1% level. The Korean elderly tend to retire from their main job in mid-50s; 
find another job as a bridge job; and then exit in early-70s from the labour market (Kim, 
2019). Since the Korea’s public pension has not sufficiently developed, the Korean 
elderly need to have a job to make ends meet even though this job has generally inferior 
job quality (Jeon & Cho, 2017). Therefore, the employment rate of the elderly was 31.3% 
in 2018 and earned income presented 52.5% of household income in 2016. These 
figures were the second highest of the OECD member countries (OECD, 2020). In 
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addition, if an elderly householder has a job, this elderly household can reduce poverty 
risk by 14% (Ko et al., 2019).  
1.4.4.4. Householder (4): education years (hedu) 
The variable of education years is not omitted in the fixed effects model since only 
seven householders completed more educational attainment after 65 years old. This 
variable is not significant in both relative and absolute poverty models. However, in 
pooled OLS, this variable has negative coefficients, this means that less-educated 
householders are more likely to be in poverty (A1.4 in appendices). 
1.4.4.5. Householder (5): self-reported physical health condition (hheal) 
The physical health condition of householders could have relations with working 
activities and earned income. In this chapter, it is significant only in the relative poverty 
analysis at the 5% level, while it is not significant in the absolute poverty models. 
Physically healthy householders tend to participate in the labour market more actively, 
work longer time, and have more wage than unhealthy householders, so they could 
overcome their relative poverty more effectively.  
To be specific, firstly, the employment rate of healthy elderly householders was 
48.1%, this figure was nearly 4 times higher than unhealthy elderly householders of 
12.2% in 2017. Secondly, healthy elderly householders worked 19.7 hours per week, 
whereas unhealthy elderly householders worked only 4.2 hours per week in 2017. 
Lastly, an elderly household whose householder is healthy had £740.7 of equivalised 
earned income per month, but an elderly household with an unhealthy householder had 
only £268.7 of equivalised monthly earned income in 2017.  
On the one hand, the relative poverty threshold was £773.3 per month in 2017 
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(Figure 1.1 and A1.1 in appendices), so healthy householders could overcome relative 
poverty with earned income and other income sources, but this could be difficult for 
unhealthy householders. On the other hand, the absolute poverty thresholds were £350.5 
(MCL1) - £409.6 (MCL2) in 2017 (Figure 1.1 and A1.1 in appendices), so elderly 
households could overcome absolute poverty with the above earned income and public 
transfer income (e.g., the Basic Pension: £133 per month in 2017) regardless of health 
condition of householders.  
1.4.4.6. Household (1): place of residence (region) 
Before the mid-2000s, the variable of region was statistically significant on the 
determination of elderly poverty status. To be specific, the elderly in rural areas were 
more vulnerable to poverty (Choi & Ryu, 2003; Choi, 2007). However, in recent times, 
others concluded that the region was insignificant on poverty status (Cho & Yeo, 2017).  
In this chapter, the region is not significant because the Korean social security 
system for the elderly has developed since the mid-2000s, and this system is mainly 
operated by the central government with common eligibility and benefit criteria in all 
regions. For example, firstly, the National Pension is managed by the NPS with the 
national legislation regardless of regions. Secondly, the central government is financing 
nearly 80% of the Basic Pension and the NBLS budget, and these subsidies are provided 
under the same rules on eligibility and benefit (MOHW, 2020). Therefore, the region 
could be insignificant on the poverty status of the elderly in more recent times.  
1.4.4.7. Household (2): the number of household members (size) 
The number of household members is significant on all relative and absolute poverty at 
the 1% level. If the elderly live with their adult children, they can share income of their 
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adult children. Whereas single elderly households are generally the most vulnerable to 
poverty and couple elderly households are also in danger of poverty (Ku & Kim, 2020; 
Park & Kim, 2016). For example, the poverty rates of single elderly households and 
couple elderly households were 70.9% and 47.1%, respectively, in 2011. These rates 
were considerably higher than the elderly living with working age household members 
of 18.7% in 2011 (Yun & Kwon, 2014).  
1.4.4.8. Household (3): the number of pensioners (pens) 
The number of pensioners is also significant on all relative and absolute poverty at the 1% 
level. As can be seen in Table 1.7, the number of pensioners sharply increased from 
0.13 in 2003 to 0.44 in 2017 of the relative poverty elderly group and from 0.12 to 0.33 
of the absolute poverty elderly group. In addition, social insurance income of the 
relative poverty elderly group increased from £12.9 in 2003 to £121.2 in 2017 per 
month and this amount of the absolute poverty elderly group also rose from £7.8 to 
£54.9 during the same period. Therefore, the expansion of public pension could have 
positive effects on elderly poverty. 
Additional panel logistic regression (3): by two age groups 
However, the older elderly and the younger elderly have the substantial gap in the 
coverage of the National Pension which is a centrepiece of the public pension system in 
Korea. To be specific, the National Pension covered 52.7% of the younger elderly aged 
65-79 and distributed £238.2 per month to them in 2019; whereas the older elderly aged 
80 and over were insured only 20.8% and received £130.2 per month in the same year 
(KOSTAT, 2020). Since the National Pension in Korea was introduced in 1988 as a 
contribution-based earning-related pension and its coverage was expanded by 2006, the 
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older elderly could not have sufficient contribution periods to the National Pension 
before retirement. Therefore, this chapter conducts the third additional analysis by two 
householder age groups, such as: (i) the younger elderly group: householders aged 65-
79, and (ii) the older elderly group: householders aged 80 and over. 
The number of pensioners is significant on the householder age of the younger 
elderly group at the 1% level in the relative and absolute poverty models. This implies 
that the pension receipt has positive effects on the poverty status of the younger elderly. 
However, the coefficients of the older elderly group have lower significance than those 
of the younger elderly group (A1.7 in appendices). This means that the Korean public 
pension does not help the older elderly sufficiently to overcome their poverty. 
1.4.4.9. Household (4): financial support from adult children (childs) 
Financial support from their adult children is also statistically significant on both 
relative and absolute poverty at the 1% level. Despite social expenditure expansion, the 
ratio of public transfer to household income of an elderly household was only one-
fourth, and this figure was much smaller than the OECD average of 65.4% in 2016 
(OECD, 2020). Therefore, family support from their adult children is still an important 
income source for elderly households.  
1.4.4.10. Household (5): net assets (assets) 
Net assets are statistically significant on relative poverty at the 1% level, but it is 
significant on absolute poverty at the 5% or 10% level. Since retirees can utilise their 
assets when their expenditure exceeds their income, assets can be also an important 
indicator of well-being (Ahn, 2018; OECD, 2013; Wolff, 2010). However, p-values are 
different between relative and absolute poverty. Absolute poverty households could be 
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relatively difficult to liquidate their assets because they do not have sufficient assets for 
their essential living condition.  
To be specific, an absolute poverty elderly household possessed 93.4 thousand 
pounds of net assets in 2017 (Table 1.7), however it was lower than the median housing 
cost for the Korean ‘Jeonse’ of 104.6 thousand pounds in 2017 (Korea Real Estate 
Board, 2020). The Jeonse is a unique long-term lease system in Korea, and cheaper than 
a normal rent contract since a tenant pays only a lump sum deposit without a monthly 
rent and a landlord returns the deposit to the tenant when the rent contract finishes. An 
absolute poverty elderly household had smaller assets than this essential housing cost, 
so this household could be relatively difficult to utilise their assets. Whereas a relative 
poverty elderly household owned 119.9 thousand pounds in the same year (Table 1.7), 
and it was more than the cost of the Korean Jeonse. Therefore, a relative poverty 
household can utilise a fraction of assets when it is struggle to a financial difficulty. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
After the Korean War (1950-1953), the Korean economy had started from a devastated 
territory, but came to change its position from a recipient of international assistance to a 
donor country. In this process, the Korea had focused on economic growth, but the 
welfare system in Korea had not sufficiently matured. Therefore, the Korean elderly 
have tended to face a high poverty risk after retirement. It is different from the elderly in 
other developed countries because they have well-developed public pension schemes, so 
they are less vulnerable to poverty (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Marchand & Smeeding, 2016; 
Meyer & Wu, 2018; OECD, 2019a). As a result, elderly poverty is considered as one of 
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the most critical issues in Korea (MOHW, 2018; Pew Research Centre, 2014), so the 
Korean government has enhanced social expenditure for the elderly recently. Therefore, 
this chapter analyses the trends and determinants of elderly poverty. This chapter can 
also suggest some implications for other countries where financial support programmes 
for the elderly have not sufficiently improved. 
Trends of elderly poverty: This chapter calculates both relative and absolute 
poverty thresholds and identifies the relative and absolute poverty rates of the Korean 
elderly. Firstly, the relative poverty threshold doubled from £380.9 in 2003 to £773.3 in 
2017 per month (Figure 1.1 and A1.1 in appendices). However, the absolute poverty 
threshold 1 (MCL1) increased from £249.1 to £350.5 during the same year. Secondly, 
this chapter displays that the relative poverty rate decreased by only 4.6%p from 48.5% 
in 2003 to 43.9% in 2017. However, the absolute poverty rate 1 (MCL1) dropped 
rapidly from 35.9% to 9.8% during the same period (Figure 1.2 and A1.1 in appendices).  
Determinants of elderly poverty: This chapter conducts the Lasso and unpaired 
t-test to select more relevant independent variables and investigates the determinants of 
relative and absolute poverty using panel logistic regression. Firstly, the variables of 
householder employment, household size, the number of pensioners, and family support 
are all significant at the 1% level on both relative and absolute poverty. However, 
household region is not significant on both relative and absolute poverty.  
Secondly, householder age has a positive coefficient on relative poverty, but it 
has negative coefficients on absolute poverty. In other words, the older elderly are more 
vulnerable to relative poverty. It is consistent with a well-known consensus since the 
older elderly tend to be unhealthy and difficult to have a job. However, this chapter 
shows that the younger elderly are more susceptible to absolute poverty. Therefore, this 
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chapter conducts the additional heterogenous analysis and finds that the older elderly 
could overcome their absolute poverty in later years thanks to the Basic Old-Age 
Pension implementation in 2008. 
Thirdly, the self-reported physical health condition of householders is only 
significant on relative poverty. The healthy elderly householders tend to participate in 
the labour market more actively and work longer time, so they can have more wage and 
overcome their relative poverty. However, the unhealthy elderly householders show a 
lower employment rate and working hours, so they earn much smaller income than the 
relative poverty threshold. Meanwhile, they can overcome absolute poverty with their 
earned income and public transfer income regardless of their health condition.  
Lastly, the variable of net assets is statistically significant on relative poverty at 
the 1% level, but it is significant on absolute poverty at the 5% or 10% level. This is 
because absolute poverty elderly households have smaller assets than the essential 
housing cost, so they could be relatively difficult to liquidate their assets. 
Implications: The Korean social security system has been maturing substantially, 
therefore the absolute elderly poverty rate remarkably decreased. However, it is still 
insufficient to alleviate relative poverty of the elderly, so the elderly need to seek 
additional income sources (Kang, 2015; Kim et al., 2018). Therefore, householder 
employment, household size, the number of pensioners, and family support have 
commonly significant effects on elderly poverty.  
This chapter finds different determinants between relative and absolute poverty. 
Firstly, the Basic Old-Age Pension (former the Basic Pension) has positive anti-poverty 
effects on absolute elderly poverty. The additional heterogenous analysis describes that 
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the Basic Old-Age Pension can have positive effects on the older elderly to overcome 
absolute poverty (A1.5 in appendices). This implies that the Basic Old-Age Pension can 
be a helpful income supplement of the National Pension for the older elderly. While the 
older elderly are not covered sufficiently by the National Pension because they tended 
to retire before the minimum ten contribution years (A1.7 in appendices). 
Secondly, work incentive programmes (e.g., the Earned Income Tax Credit) can 
have positive effects on relative elderly poverty. In recent times, the labour market 
participation of the elderly has been regarded as an important anti-poverty measure in 
developed countries (OECD, 2019b). The employment rate of the Korean elderly is 
higher than other developed countries (OECD, 2020), and this rate increased from 26% 
in 2003 to 34% in 2017 (Table 1.7). Furthermore, in this chapter, self-reported physical 
health condition is significant on relative poverty. This indicates that healthy elderly can 
work longer hours and have more earned income, so they can overcome relative poverty. 
Work incentive programmes can facilitate more work activities of the elderly and 
reduce relative poverty more effectively. 
In the future, social expenditure for the elderly will be increasing due to rapid 
population ageing, so the government debt as a percentage of GDP will increase from 
41.9% in 2018 to 150%-196% in 2060 (OECD, 2018, 2020; Zoli, Wang, Laxton, 
Mursula & Yao, 2018). However, under the current social security system, the relative 
elderly poverty rate will be able to remain at a high level. Therefore, different 
approaches are needed to improve poverty reduction efficacy and efficiency of public 
transfer expenditure. 
Limitations: This chapter describes that public transfer has positive effects on 
the poverty status of the Korean elderly, but it cannot identify how much each public 
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transfer programme reduces the elderly poverty rate. In addition, this chapter cannot 
separate the anti-poverty effects of public transfer programmes (e.g., the Basic Old-age 
Pension). This is because the KLIPS does not divide public transfer benefits in detail. 
Policy makers can find meaningful implications to design better anti-poverty measures 
through comparison of efficacy and efficiency among several public transfer 
programmes. Therefore, the chapter 2 will decompose and compare the anti-poverty 
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A1.1. Poverty thresholds and poverty rates  
A1.1.1. Poverty thresholds (GBP) 
 


















2003 380.9 249.1 254.6 257.1 - 237.2 
2004 400.0 257.4 266.7 267.8 - 245.5 
2005 433.5 266.3 281.2 281.5 - 267.6 
2006 465.2 272.4 287.4 290.8 444.1 278.9 
2007 498.1 278.6 293.9 299.1 464.0 290.6 
2008 497.5 288.6 307.8 312.7 483.6 308.7 
2009 536.3 300.6 326.9 324.5 491.8 327.2 
2010 580.4 308.2 334.8 332.7 523.0 336.2 
2011 606.5 318.9 357.7 345.7 555.2 355.1 
2012 645.8 329.9 378.1 357.3 590.4 368.9 
2013 653.6 334.9 388.8 360.8 610.9 381.4 
2014 674.4 339.2 388.8 363.5 626.3 402.3 
2015 704.9 342.3 392.1 364.0 645.1 447.5 
2016 740.6 345.1 396.6 365.1 708.1 - 
2017 773.3 350.5 409.6 371.2 735.8 - 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Monthly poverty thresholds, (3) Relative poverty threshold: set at 50% of 
equivalised disposable income of the KLIPS, (4) The official relative poverty threshold: 50% of median equivalised 
disposable income of the KHIES (2006-2016) and the Korea Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions 
(2017) because the official poverty index changed in 2017, (5) The official relative poverty rate: the KHIES has 
collected single households since 2006, (6) The official absolute poverty threshold: the official MCL for a single 
household in each year, (7) The statutory poverty threshold changed from absolute poverty threshold to 30-50% of 
median income since 2015; Source: KLIPS analysis: Author calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) and 




A1.1.2. Poverty rates (%) 
 
KLIPS analysis Official 
 
65+ (and over 65) 64- (below 65) 65+ 18-65 
 
R A1 A2 A3 R A1 A2 A3 R R 
2003 48.5 35.9 36.8 37.2 15.4 8.1 8.2 8.3 - - 
2004 46.8 28.6 29.3 29.7 15.1 6.4 6.7 6.7 - - 
2005 47.1 26.6 29.1 29.1 14.0 5.9 6.6 6.6 - - 
2006 47.8 25.4 27.9 28.3 14.6 5.6 6.2 6.3 42.8 11.1 
2007 48.6 25.7 28.3 28.9 13.0 4.1 4.4 4.6 43.6 11.1 
2008 49.5 24.4 27.6 28.5 15.0 7.4 8.0 8.1 44.1 11.5 
2009 48.0 23.1 26.0 25.6 13.0 5.0 5.6 5.6 45.9 11.5 
2010 50.8 20.9 24.4 23.9 12.5 4.2 5.0 4.9 46.3 11.3 
2011 46.0 18.2 22.4 21.5 10.9 3.3 4.2 3.9 47.6 10.8 
2012 45.7 17.5 21.9 20.0 11.3 3.3 4.1 3.8 47.2 10.0 
2013 45.1 15.9 21.1 18.1 10.1 3.3 4.1 3.6 48.1 9.6 
2014 43.4 15.5 20.0 17.8 10.6 3.2 3.8 3.4 47.4 9.3 
2015 44.0 11.9 16.8 13.8 9.7 2.6 3.3 2.8 44.8 8.5 
2016 42.0 10.6 15.2 12.4 10.2 2.8 3.4 3.0 46.5 9.0 
2017 43.9 9.8 14.9 11.5 10.2 2.1 2.9 2.4 42.3 12.6 
Note: (1) A1: the absolute poverty rate 1 (MCL1), A2: the absolute poverty rate 2 (MCL2), A3: the absolute poverty 
rate 3 (MCL3), R: the relative poverty rate, (2) The official poverty rate: based on the KHIES (2006-2016) and the 
Korea Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions (2017) because the official poverty index changed in 
2017, (3) The official relative poverty rate: the KHIES has collected single households since 2006; Source: KLIPS 




A1.2. Lasso (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) logistic regression 
A1.2.1. Potential variables 
Category Name Description 
Householder hage age, years 
 i.hgen dummy, gender, 0=male, 1=female 
 i.hwed 
dummy, marital status, 0=unmarried, widowed or divorced, 
1=married or couple 
 i.hwork 
dummy, employment status, 0=employed, 1=unemployed 
(including economically inactive status) 
 hworkyr work years in lifetime 
 i.wind 
dummy, employment, type of industry, the Korean Standard 
Industrial Classification (KSIC), 0-20 (0: unemployed) 
 i.wocc 
dummy, employment, type of job, the Korean Standard 
Classification of Occupations (KSCO), 0-10 (0: unemployed) 
 hedu education years in lifetime  
 i.hheal dummy, self-reported health condition, 0=healthy, 1=unhealthy 
Household i.region 
dummy, place of residence, 0=urban area (Seoul, Busan, Daegu, 
Incheon, Daejeon, Gwangju, and Ulsan), 1=rural area (province 
areas)  
 size the number of household member(s) 
 lonum the number of household member(s) aged below 65  
 hinum the number of household member(s) aged 65 and over 
 workers the number of worker(s) in a household 
 pens the number of pensioner(s) in a household 
 i.nbls 
dummy, 0=no financial support from the National Basic 
Livelihood Security (NBLS), 1=receiving the NBLS 
 i.subs 
dummy, 0=no financial support of other subsidies (including the 
Basic Pension and other subsidies), 1=receiving other subsidies 
 i.childs 
dummy, 0=no financial support from their adult children, 
1=receiving financial support from their adult children 
 l_assetp net assets = assets - debt (log) 
 cons a constant term 
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A1.2.2. The result of the Lasso logistic regression 
Category Name R A1 A2 A3 Decision 
Householder hage 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.22 Selected 
 0.hgen -0.01 - - - Selected 
 0.hwed 0.09 0.07 0.08 - (size) 
 0.hwork -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 - Selected 
 hworkyr - - - - dropped 
 4.wind - - - -0.04 (hwork) 
 8.wocc - - - -0.04 (hwork) 
 9.wocc - - - -0.01 (hwork) 
 hedu -0.27 -0.28 -0.29 -0.42 Selected 
 0.hheal -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 Selected 
Household 0.region - - - - Selected 
 size -0.24 -0.24 -0.26 -0.22 Selected 
 lonum - -0.04 - -0.20 (size) 
 hinum - - - - dropped 
 workers -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.27 (hwork) 
 pens -0.25 -0.21 -0.25 -0.10 Selected 
 0.nbls -0.14 -0.20 -0.18 -0.21 dropped 
 0.subs - -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 dropped 
 0.childs 0.18 0.13 0.15 - Selected 
 l_assetp -0.21 -0.25 -0.24 -0.34 Selected 
 cons -1.51 -1.23 -1.34 0.14  
Note: (1) hwed is correlated with size (corr = 0.52), (2) wind and wocc are correlated with hwork (corr = -0.68 and     
-0.93) and the level of the coefficients are relatively low, (3) region is dropped in the Lasso regression, but this 
chapter adopts it because prior studies have different conclusions (e.g., significant: Choi (2007) and Choi and Ryu 
(2003); insignificant: Cho and Yeo (2017)), (4) lonum is correlated with size (corr = 0.88), (5) workers is correlated 
with hwork (corr = -0.88), (6) nbls and subs have many missing values in early years  
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A1.3. Unpaired t-test 
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Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
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Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-




A1.4. Pooled OLS and panel logistic regression (fixed effects and random effects model) 
A1.4.1. Dependent variable (1): Relative poverty 
Variables POLS 
Panel Logistic Regression 
FE RE 
Householder 
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Observations 18,281 10,386 18,281 
R-squared 0.2930 - - 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) 
 
Hausman Test: chi2(9) = 160.60, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
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A1.4.2. Dependent variable (2): Absolute poverty 1 
Variables POLS 
Panel Logistic Regression 
FE RE 
Householder 
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Observations 18,281 9,778 18,281 
R-squared 0.1803 - - 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) 
 
Hausman Test: chi2(9) = 395.74, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
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A1.4.3. Dependent variable (3): Absolute poverty 2 
Variables POLS 
Panel Logistic Regression 
FE RE 
Householder 
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Observations 18,281 10,398 18,281 
R-squared 0.2054 - - 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) 
 
Hausman Test: chi2(9) = 308.54, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
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A1.4.4. Dependent variable (4): Absolute poverty 3 
Variables POLS 
Panel Logistic Regression 
FE RE 
Householder 
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Observations 18,281 10,148 18,281 
R-squared 0.1965 - - 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) 
 
Hausman Test: chi2(9) = 437.26, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
73 
 
A1.5. Panel logistic regression (1): Heterogenous analysis by birth year cohorts, FE 
A1.5.1. Dependent variables: (1) Relative poverty, (2) Absolute poverty 1  
Variables 
(1) Relative poverty (2) Absolute poverty 1 


















































































































































Observations 8,126 2,260 8,583 1,195 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) Since householder gender is constant, hgen is omitted in FE; Source: 
Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) 
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A1.5.2. Dependent variables: (3) Absolute poverty 2, (4) Absolute poverty 3 
Variables 
(3) Absolute poverty 2 (4) Absolute poverty 3 



















































































































































Observations 8,973 1,425 8,864 1,284 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) Since householder gender is constant, hgen is omitted in FE; Source: 




A1.6. Panel logistic regression (2): Heterogenous analysis by gender groups, FE 
A1.6.1. Dependent variables: (1) Relative poverty, (2) Absolute poverty 1  
Variables 
(1) Relative poverty (2) Absolute poverty 1 








































































































































Observations 7,080 3,306 5,287 4,491 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-





A1.6.2. Dependent variables: (3) Absolute poverty 2, (4) Absolute poverty 3  
Variables 
(3) Absolute poverty 2 (4) Absolute poverty 3 








































































































































Observations 5,780 4,618 5,557 4,591 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-






A1.7. Panel logistic regression (3): Heterogenous analysis by age groups, FE 
A1.7.1. Dependent variables: (1) Relative poverty, (2) Absolute poverty 1 
Variables 
(1) Relative poverty (2) Absolute poverty 1 
Aged 65-79 
Aged 80 and 
over 
Aged 65-79 







































































































































Observations 8,386 1,107 6,991 1,874 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) Since householder gender and education years (aged 80 and over) are 
constant, they are omitted in FE; Source: Author’s calculation (KLIPS 7th wave – 21st wave microdata) 
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A1.7.2. Dependent variables: (3) Absolute poverty 2, (4) Absolute poverty 3  
Variables 
(3) Absolute poverty 2 (4) Absolute poverty 3 
Aged 65-79 
Aged 80 and 
over 
Aged 65-79 








































































































































Observations 7,506 1,968 7,280 1,940 
Note: (1) Coefficients, standard errors (in square brackets), and 95% confidence intervals (in parentheses), (2) * p-
value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) Since householder gender and education years (aged 80 and over) are 






Chapter 2.  
The efficacy and efficiency of public transfer 




Due to the maturing of social security system, elderly (hereafter aged 65 and over) 
poverty has improved significantly in most developed countries (Korpi & Palme, 1998; 
Meyer & Wu, 2018; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD], 2019; Plotnick, 2012). South Korea (hereafter Korea) has also introduced 
major welfare programmes, such as: the National Pension in 1988, the National Basic 
Livelihood Security (NBLS) in 2000, and the Basic Old-Age Pension in 2008; and 
initiated the multi-layered benefits system for the elderly (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare in Korea [MOHW], 2018a). However, the relative poverty rate of people aged 
over 65 was 43.4% in 2018. This figure was the highest of the OECD member nations 
(Figure 2.1) and much higher than the total population’s poverty rate in Korea (16.7%). 
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Figure 2.1. The poverty rates of the OECD member countries (%) 
 
Note: (1) The poverty rate: the relative scale set at 50% of national median income, (2) The elderly: aged 65 over, (3) 
Data: 2018 or the latest year; Source: OECD (2020) 
 
 
In the light of these circumstances, the Korean government announced the 
Proposal for the National Pension Reform in 2018 (Lee, 2019; MOHW, 2018a; Yun, 
2019). This proposal was distinct from two previous the National Pension Reforms in 
1998 and 2007. Firstly, this plan aimed for the National Minimum Income for the 
elderly to be one million Korean Won (equivalent to £667, hereafter 1 GBP = 1,500 
Korean Won [KRW]) monthly per person. This income level was based on the 
subjective minimum living expenses for the elderly (MOHW, 2018a). Secondly, this 
plan suggested the following four combinations to support the cited income level with 
the National Pension and the Basic Pension (Table 2.1).  
However, this plan was unable to muster sufficient public support in Korea and 
has been suspended because additional fiscal burden is a controversial issue related to 
Korea’s rapidly ageing population (Choi, 2019; Kim, 2019; Tchoe & Kang, 2019; Yun, 
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the government debt to GDP will be increased from 41.9% in 2018 to 150%-196% in 
2060 (OECD, 2018, 2020; Zoli, Wang, Laxton, Mursula & Yao, 2018). Moreover, some 
researchers cast a doubt on the anti-poverty effect of welfare expenditure (Kim & Kim, 
2020; Ryu & Kim, 2019; Sung & Kim, 2018). In addition, others argue that the 
unemployed working age are economically more vulnerable than the elderly in the 
current welfare system (Hong, 2011; Kang, 2017; Nahm, 2018). 

















Pension 40% +  
Basic Pension 12%) 
55% (National 
Pension 40% +  
Basic Pension 15%) 
57% (National 
Pension 45% +  
Basic Pension 12%) 
62% (National 
Pension 50% +  
Basic Pension 12%) 
Contribution rate 














400 (£267,  
since 2022) 
300 (£200) 300 (£200) 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Contribution rate in option 3: 10% in 2021-2025, 11% in 2026-2030, 12% since 
2031, (3) Contribution rate in option 4: 10% in 2021-2025, 11% in 2026-2030, 12% in 2031-2035, 13% since 2036, 
(4) The Basic Pension benefit: 300 thousand KRW since 2021; Source: MOHW (2018a)  
 
In this regard, it is essential to evaluate the anti-poverty achievements of the 
current public transfer programmes (Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; Yoon, 2013). A large 
literature has evaluated the effect of a single programme on elderly poverty and has 
concluded that each programme has a substantial positive effect. However, it also has 
some limitations. Firstly, it cannot compare directly which a programme performs more 
effectively. This issue can be crucial for policy makers because they usually need to 
find better policy measures with finite resources. Secondly, it is difficult to identify 
potential different effects on the poor and the deep poor because prior studies usually 
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have focused on a single poverty threshold which is the same as the official poverty 
threshold in Korea set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income.  
Some studies have compared the anti-poverty effects of multiple programmes 
together using the traditional analytical approach (Ben-Shalom, Moffitt & Scholz, 2012; 
Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; Meyer & Wu, 2018). This method computes the gap between a 
pre-transfer income poverty rate and a post-transfer income poverty rate; and it regards 
this gap as the anti-poverty effect of a transfer programme. In this way, it is expedient 
and comprehensible, but it has additivity and path dependence problems when the 
analysis decomposes the effects of several programmes (Aristondo & Onaindia, 2019; 
Azevedo, Inchauste, Olivieri, Saavedra & Winkler, 2013; Fortin, Lemieux & Firpo, 
2010; Gelbach, 2016; Hong, 2011; Ko, Woo, Ku & Lee, 2019; Shorrocks, 2013).  
Therefore, this chapter examines the anti-poverty effects of several programmes 
with the Shapley decomposition method. Firstly, it analyses the four major programmes 
in Korea, such as: public pension (social insurance); the Basic Pension (a generous 
means-tested benefit); the NBLS (a strict means-tested benefit); and the Earned Income 
Tax Credit ([EITC], a tax credit). Secondly, it employs the Shapley decomposition 
instead of the traditional method. Lastly, it adopts both relative and absolute poverty 
thresholds to consider different characteristics of the poor and the deep poor.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews a relevant literature. 
Section 2.3 briefly explains the multi-tier benefits system in Korea. Section 2.4 
introduces the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS); establishes relative and absolute 
poverty thresholds; compares the traditional analysis and the Shapley decomposition; 
and describes efficiency evaluation indices. Section 2.5 computes the poverty thresholds 
and poverty rates; decomposes the anti-poverty contributions of the above four 
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programmes; and calculates the efficiency indices. Section 2.6 discusses the different 
trends of two poverty rates and potential behavioural responses. Finally, section 2.7 
summarises the results of this chapter and suggests some implications for the next steps.  
 
2.2. Literature review 
It is a general premise that a welfare state should prioritise support for well-being of its 
residents, so the OECD members spent 46.2% of their budget on welfare and health in 
2017 (OECD, 2020). At the same time, they are also faced with more criticism on the 
poverty reduction effect of welfare expenditure. Therefore, the efficacy and efficiency 
of welfare programmes are becoming more important indicators to evaluate policy 
performances (Kenworthy, 1999; Kim, 2009; Meyer & Mittag, 2019; Notten, 2015).  
As more welfare programmes have been implemented in Korea, more 
researchers have analysed their anti-poverty effects. However, they generally evaluated 
a single public transfer programme, such as: (i) the National Pension: Chang (2019), 
and Sung and Kim (2018); (ii) the Basic Pension (including the Basic Old-Age Pension): 
Kim and Kang (2020), Lee, Ku, and Shon (2019), Lee and Moon (2014), and Seol and 
Lim (2019); (iii) the NBLS: Gim and Choi (2014), Hong (2002), and Jung, Kim, and 
Lim (2016); and (iv) the EITC: Hong, Moon, and Lee (2016). Only a few researchers 
have decomposed and compared the poverty alleviation effects of several programmes. 
2.2.1. Anti-poverty effects of multiple public transfer programmes 
Kim (2017) calculates the anti-poverty effects of public pension, the Basic Pension, the 
NBLS, and other subsidies in Korea using the KOWEPS from 2006 to 2015. This study 
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adopts the relative poverty threshold set at 50% of median equivalised disposable 
income. It points out that public pension had a larger anti-poverty effect (-4.6%p) on the 
poverty rate of the whole population than the Basic Pension (-3.6%p) and the NBLS     
(-1.5%p) in 2015. Meanwhile, the NBLS alleviated poverty more efficiently than the 
Basic Pension and public pension. However, this study has some limitations because it 
examines the whole population without categorising some sub-population groups (e.g., 
the elderly) and uses a single poverty threshold.  
Kang (2017) also decomposes the anti-poverty efficacy of public pension, the 
Basic Pension, the NBLS, and the EITC using the KOWEPS in 2014. It adopts the 
relative poverty threshold which is the same as Kim (2017), but it separates the elderly 
from the entire population to capture different features. According to this study, public 
pension had the overwhelming anti-poverty efficacy for the elderly (-13.0%p) whereas 
the Basic Pension, the NBLS, and the EITC had small contributions below -1%p. 
Meanwhile, the Basic Pension had a wider coverage than other programmes. However, 
it decomposes a single year with a single poverty threshold. 
The USA researchers also assess the efficacy of the USA’s welfare programmes. 
Ben-Shalom, Moffitt and Scholz (2012) analyse the anti-poverty efficacy using the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in 1984, 1993, and 2004. It adopts 
three poverty thresholds: (i) the deep poverty threshold: set at 50% of the official 
poverty threshold in the USA; (ii) the normal poverty threshold: set at the poverty 
threshold; and (iii) the near poverty threshold: set at 150% of the poverty threshold. It 
demonstrates that the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), which is a social 
insurance programme similar to the National Pension in Korea, had the greatest efficacy 
(-8.0%p), and the EITC (-0.9%p) also had the prominent positive effect on the normal 
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poverty rate of the whole population in 2004. 
Meyer and Wu (2018) also examine anti-poverty effects in the USA using the 
SIPP from 2008 to 2013. This study also uses three poverty thresholds the same as Ben-
Shalom et al. (2012). It concludes that the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) had the largest efficacy (-31.9%) on the whole population. However, the 
Supplemental Security Income, which is a means-tested benefit, alleviated poverty 
efficiently because it was designed to support the vulnerable. 
In the UK, child poverty is considered as an urgent issue. Bradshaw and Huby 
(2014) analyse the effects of public transfer programmes on child poverty in the UK 
using the EU Statistics on Income and Living Condition in 2010. They decompose the 
poverty reduction effects of child benefits, old age benefits, housing benefits, work-
related benefits, and social exclusion benefits (income support programmes which are 
not elsewhere classified). The relative child poverty rate set at 60% of national median 
income in the UK was 19.0% in 2010. The child benefits had the largest anti-poverty 
effect of 43%. In addition, the social exclusion benefits and the work-related benefits 
mitigated the poverty rate by 24% and 11%, respectively.  
2.2.2. Literature using the Shapley decomposition 
The traditional approach in the above literature has additivity and path dependence 
issues (Aristondo & Onaindia, 2019; Azevedo et al., 2013; Fortin et al., 2010; Gelbach, 
2016; Hong, 2011; Kim, 2017; Ko et al., 2019; Shorrocks, 2013). Therefore, Hong 
(2011) adopts the Shapley decomposition to decompose the anti-poverty efficacy by 
income components in Korea. It analyses the KOWEPS in 2008 and adopts the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index as a decomposable poverty index. It uses the absolute 
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poverty threshold set at the Minimum Cost of Living (MCL) which was the official 
poverty threshold in Korea before 2015. It concludes that earned income (-64.1%p) had 
the greatest anti-poverty efficacy on the whole population. However, social insurance 
income (-3.1%p) and the NBLS (-1.1%p) had smaller efficacy than private transfer       
(-5.4%p). This indicates that the Korean welfare system did not support the residents 
sufficiently. However, this study does not include recently implemented benefits (e.g., 
the Basic Pension 2014). In addition, it does not evaluate the anti-poverty efficiency of 
programmes and it sets only one poverty threshold.  
Yoo (2019) also adopts the Shapley decomposition and the FGT index to 
analyse the poverty reduction efficacy of each income component using the KOWEPS 
in 2016. It uses the relative poverty threshold set at 50% of median equivalised 
disposable income. It finds that public transfer income had the greatest poverty 
reduction effect (-17.9%p) on the Korean elderly, and then earned income (-16.3%p) 
and private transfer (-11.1%p) also had considerable positive effects. However, it does 
not decompose the contribution of each transfer programme separately and not assess 
their poverty alleviation efficiency. In addition, it adopts only a single poverty threshold.  
 According to literature review, this paragraph defines some issues. Firstly, this 
chapter also analyses the KOWEPS, because the KOWEPS has a variety of information 
on public transfer programmes in Korea (Hong, 2011; Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; Yoo, 
2019). Secondly, it examines the longitudinal changes of welfare programme 
expansions since the mid-2000s. The KOWEPS allows to identify these changes as the 
KOWEPS has been conducted annually since 2006. Thirdly, it adopts both relative and 
absolute poverty thresholds to capture different influences on the poor and the deep 
poor. Fourthly, it focuses on the elderly rather than the whole population because 
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elderly poverty is a widely recognised urgent issue in Korea (MOHW, 2018b). Fifthly, 
it employs the Shapley decomposition and the FGT index. Lastly, it evaluates both 
efficacy and efficiency of welfare programmes. Section 2.4 will discuss the above issues. 
 
2.3. The public transfer programmes for the elderly in Korea 
2.3.1. The multi-tier benefits system in Korea 
Korea has the four-tier benefits system for the elderly (Table 2.2 and MOHW, 2018a). 
The zero and first tiers are public transfer programmes administered by the Korean 
government. The zero tier is the NBLS which is a strict means-testing programme for 
deep poor households. The first tier is a centrepiece of this system in most countries 
(OECD, 2019). In Korea, the National Pension is a mandatory and contribution-based 
social insurance programme, whereas the Basic Pension is a tax-financed non-
contributory programme. Besides, occupational pensions are operated separately by the 
government for public officials.  
Table 2.2. The multi-tier benefits system in Korea 
Tier Concept Programmes 
3 Tier Private, voluntary Personal Pension 
2 Tier Private, voluntary Retirement Pension  
1 Tier 






0 Tier Public, means-testing NBLS 
Note: Occupational pensions are operated for public officials (including public school teachers), military personnel 
and private school teachers separately by the Korean government; Source: Author’s summary, GEPS (2020), MOHW 




The second and third tiers are voluntary based private pension programmes. The 
second tier is the Retirement Pension which is transforming from a lump-sum 
retirement allowance scheme. The third tier is the Personal Pension. The Korean 
government provides tax incentives to facilitate them, but their recipient ratios are still 
below 1% in this KOWEPS dataset.  
Table 2.3. The social security system in Korea 
 National Pension Basic Pension NBLS EITC 







1988 (expanded by 
2006) 
2014 (the Basic 
Old-Age Pension 
from 2008) 






based (9%) and 
funded pension 







Age: 62 and over 
Contribution 
period: 10 years 
and over 








below £13,333 (a 
single household) 
       Recipients 5.6 million      5.6 million 
2.1 million 
65+: 0.8 million 
4.2 million 
60+: 1.1 million 
       Benefits  
(£, monthly)  
£269 (average)   
£167-200 for the 
single elderly 








       17.7  11.3  10.7   2.9  
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) The age eligibility of the National Pension is 62 years and over in 2020. It will 
increase to 65 years old by 2033, (3) The income threshold of the NBLS: the Livelihood Benefit set at 30% of median 
income, the Medical Benefit at 40%, the Housing Benefit at 45%, the Education Benefit at 50%, (4) Recipients: 
persons (the EITC: households), (5) Data: 2020; Source: Author’s summary, KOSTAT (2020), Ministry of Education 
in Korea (2019, 2020), Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in Korea (2019, 2020), MOHW (2019, 2020, 
2021), National Tax Service in Korea (2020), and NPS (2020, 2021) 
 
 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on public pension (e.g., the National Pension and 
occupational pensions), the Basic Pension, and the NBLS which are the zero and first 
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tiers in the above system. Moreover, it will include the EITC. Firstly, earned income 
accounted for 52.5% of household income of the Korean elderly in 2016 (OECD, 2020). 
Secondly, single elderly households in Korea have been eligible for the EITC benefit 
since 2013, so 1.1 million households whose householders aged 60 and over received 
the EITC benefit in 2020 (Table 2.3 and National Tax Service in Korea [NTS], 2020). 
Lastly, the increasing labour market participation of the elderly is also regarded as a 
positive change for elderly poverty in developed countries (OECD, 2019). 
2.3.2. The public pension system 
The Korean government has operated the National Pension for general residents and 
occupational pensions for public officials (including public school teachers), military 
personnel, and private school teachers. The National Pension is a central part of the 
public pension system in Korea and its recipients accounted for 87.9% of all pensioners 
in 2019 (GEPS, 2020; Ministry of National Defence in Korea, 2020; NPS, 2020; 
Statistics Korea [KOSTAT], 2020; Teacher's Pension in Korea, 2020). Therefore, this 
section introduces the National Pension as the representative pension scheme in Korea.  
The National Pension was enacted in 1988 and it had spread to every business 
and workplace by 2006 (NPS, 2020). However, this pension was introduced much later 
than other countries. For example, many developed countries introduced their public 
pension schemes by the early twentieth century (e.g., Germany in 1889, France in 1905, 
and the UK in 1908). Furthermore, other developing countries also started public 
pension programmes ahead of Korea (e.g., Malaysia in 1951, Vietnam in 1962, and 
Indonesia in 1977) (Presidential Committee for Policy Planning in Korea [PCPP], 2008).  
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The National Pension covered 46.4% of the elderly in 2020. The average 
monthly benefit has increased (Figure 2.2 (a)) and it reached £268.6 in 2020 (KOSTAT, 
2020; NPS, 2021). The contribution rate has been remaining at 9% of payroll (4.5% 
from an employer and 4.5% from an employee) since 1998 (Jung, Pirog & Lee, 2016; 
NPS, 2020; Yun, 2019). The income replacement rate for 40 years contribution is 43.5% 
in 2021, but it is scheduled to reduce from 50% in 2008 to 40% in 2028 by 0.5%p each 
year by the second reform in 2007 (NPS, 2020; Yun, 2019). A recipient needs to 
contribute for 10 years at least and be aged 62 years and over; and this age criterion will 
be increased up to 65 years by 2033 due to the first reform in 1998 (MOHW, 2018a). 
Figure 2.2. Trends of the benefits of the four programmes (GBP) 
 
(a) Public pension 
 





Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Weighted average, (3) Monthly benefits, (4) Real benefits: adjusted by the 
Consumer Price Index, (5) Equivalence scale: square root of household size, (6) EITC: implemented in 2009 and a 
single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit since 2013; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 











































































































































































































































The National Pension is a defined benefit scheme. The simple benefit formula 
can be expressed as equation (2.1) (Chung, 2015; NPS, 2020). Its benefit is adjusted 
yearly by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to maintain a pensioner’s purchasing power 
(MOHW, 2020a; NPS, 2020). In equation (2.1), (i) C is a proportional constant related 
to the income replacement rate, (ii) A is the monthly average income of all contributors 
during the three years immediately prior to the initial pension benefit receipt, (iii) B is 
pensioner’s individual lifetime average monthly income, and (iv) N is the number of 
contribution years more than 20 years. A is called the distributional factor and B is 
called the earning-related factor.  
    𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶 × (𝐴 + 𝐵) × (1 + 0.05𝑁) (2.1) 
Note: (1) C: a proportional constant related to the income replacement rate, (2) A: the monthly average income of all 
contributors during the three years immediately prior to the initial pension benefit receipt, (3) B: pensioner’s 
individual lifetime average monthly income, and (4) N: the number of contribution years more than 20 years; Source: 
Chung (2015) and NPS (2020) 
 
 
One of the most important issues is that the National Pension has a narrower 
coverage than in other developed countries (Choi & Han, 2016; Chun, 2020; Jones & 
Urasawa, 2014; OECD, 2018). This is because it has two significant loophole groups. 
Firstly, the older elderly are not covered sufficiently because the National Pension was 
expanded by 2006, so the older elderly had retired before the minimum contribution 
years. Therefore, the coverage rate of the older elderly (aged 80 and over) was only 20.8% 
in 2019; whereas this rate of the younger elderly (aged 65-79) was 52.7% (KOSTAT, 
2020). Secondly, dual labour market is a serious problem of the working age (Hwang, 
2016). For example, 98.0% of regular workers were insured but this rate for irregular 
workers (e.g., temporary workers) was only 61.0% in 2019 (Ministry of Employment 
and Labour in Korea, 2020).   
92 
 
In this regard, this chapter will explore some issues of public pension. Firstly, 
since its benefit is much higher than other programmes (Figure 2.2), public pension can 
have the largest anti-poverty efficacy even if it is not a means-testing programme but a 
contribution-based social insurance scheme (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012; Kang, 2017; Kim, 
2017; Meyer & Mittag, 2019). Secondly, by the maturing of the pension system, it can 
have more efficacy in recent years. Lastly, it can have lower efficiency than a means-
tested benefit because it is a universal pension programme (Meyer & Wu, 2018). 
2.3.3. The Basic Pension 
The Basic Old-Age Pension was introduced in July 2008 as a supplementary measure of 
the National Pension (MOHW, 2020a) because only 24.4% of the elderly received the 
National Pension benefit in 2009 (Chung, 2015). Even though it is called as a pension, it 
is a tax-financed subsidy. The monthly benefit was 100 thousand KRW (equivalent to 
£67) and it has provided a cash benefit (Lee & Wolf, 2014; NPS, 2020).  
The Basic Old-Age Pension was expanded to the Basic Pension in July 2014 and 
its benefit doubled to 200 thousand KRW (£133). Moreover, the benefit increased again 
to 300 thousand KRW (£200) in 2021. Its benefit is adjusted by the CPI yearly to 
support living expenses of the elderly like the National Pension. It aims to cover 70% of 
the low-income elderly and 5.6 million received the benefit in 2020 (KOSTAT, 2020). 
It requires that adjusted monthly income, which is based on income and assets, is lower 
than 1,480,000 KRW (£987) for the single elderly and 2,368,000 KRW (£1,579) for the 
couple elderly in 2020 (MOHW, 2020a).  
When it comes to important issues, firstly, some researchers argue that its 
coverage is too generous (Chun, 2020; Chung, 2015; OECD, 2016). Therefore, the 
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Basic Pension benefit can be provided to the non-poor elderly although it was 
introduced to alleviate elderly poverty as a supplement of the National Pension (OECD, 
2016; Yun, 2019). The second issue is the fiscal sustainability pertinent to rapid 
population ageing in Korea. Its expenditure will be increased from 7.9 billion pounds in 
2018 to 19.1 billion pounds in 2027 (National Assembly Budget office in Korea 
[NABO], 2018). Therefore, some insist that the Basic Pension needs to be restructured 
to focus on the deep poor elderly (Kim & Han, 2017; OECD, 2016; Yun et al., 2019). 
Therefore, this chapter will check the changes in poverty reduction efficacy 
related to the Basic Pension expansions in 2008 and 2014 as the first issue of the Basic 
Pension. Secondly, this chapter will examine the anti-poverty efficiency because the 
Basic Pension has had generous eligibility since its expansions in 2008 and 2014. Lastly, 
this chapter will suggest some implications to improve its efficiency. 
2.3.4. The National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) 
The NBLS was established in 2000 after the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 to 
support the minimum living condition for the deep poor (Chung, 2015; Lee & Phillips, 
2011; MOHW, 2020a). The NBLS was designed to cover all poor households whose 
income is below the official poverty threshold, so it has been a major public assistance 
programme.  
The NBLS was reformed in 2015 and changed its poverty threshold from the 
absolute poverty threshold equivalent to the MCL to the relative poverty threshold set at 
30-50% of median income (MOHW, 2015). This is because the absolute poverty 
measure did not sufficiently support the social demand of well-being in Korea (Nam & 
Park, 2020; Yeo, Kim, Kim, Yang & Choi, 2005). The relative NBLS threshold has 
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been automatically adjusted by changes in median income. In addition, it was separated 
to the four sub-benefits by each threshold, such as: the Livelihood Benefit at 30% of 
median income, the Medical Benefit at 40%, the Housing Benefit at 45%, and the 
Education Benefit at 50%. Among them the Livelihood Benefit guarantees household 
income up to the above 30% as a cash subsidy. In other words, this benefit is equivalent 
to the difference between its 30% level and pre-transfer income (Lee, Ku & Shon, 2019; 
MOHW, 2020a).  
In 2019, 2.1 million people received the NBLS benefits and among them 0.8 
million were the elderly (KOSTAT, 2020). Its eligibility is stricter than the Basic 
Pension because it was implemented as a strict means-testing assistance. Firstly, its 
income eligibility is much lower than the Basic Pension. For example, the income 
threshold of the NBLS was 527,158-878,597 KRW (£351-£586) for a single household, 
while the Basic Pension had a higher threshold at 1,480,000 KRW (£987) in 2020. 
Secondly, the NBLS has the family support obligation rule which means those who 
have a working age spouse or adult children are not eligible to receive the benefit. This 
rule is scheduled to relax to reduce a blind spot of the NBLS since 2022 (MOHW, 
2020b). 
The most important issue of the NBLS is its strict eligibility and low coverage. 
Despite the NBLS expansion in 2015, only 3.5% of the population were covered by the 
NBLS in 2019 (KOSTAT, 2020). The minimum income of the Livelihood Benefit was 
in the bottom level of the OECD members in 2015 (OECD, 2018). Moreover, as can be 
seen in Figure 2.2 (c), the average benefit has been stagnant after 2015. Therefore, some 
researchers assert that the NBLS does not sufficiently assist the deep poor (Kim, 2017; 
OECD, 2014).  
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Therefore, firstly, this chapter will analyse whether the NBLS has adequate anti-
poverty efficacy. Secondly, since it has strict income eligibility, it can have a higher 
positive efficacy on absolute poverty than on relative poverty. Lastly, it can have high 
efficiency because it is a strict means-testing programme.  
2.3.5. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
The Korean EITC was implemented in 2009 to encourage the labour supply and self-
support of low-income households in response to a working poor issue (Hwang, 2012; 
Jung & Park, 2013; NTS, 2020). Since the Korean EITC benchmarked the EITC in the 
USA, it also provides a refundable tax credit and has similar a three phases structure: 
phase-up, plateau, and phase-down stages (Hong, Moon & Lee, 2016; Park, 2011). 
Moreover, a single elderly household can have the EITC benefit since 2013 (Lee, Kwon 
& Moon, 2015; NTS, 2020).  
The income eligibility of the EITC has more generous, such as: its income 
threshold for a single household (yearly £13,333) was higher than the NBLS (monthly 
£351-£586) and the Basic Pension (monthly £987) in 2020 (MOHW, 2020a; NTS, 
2020). Its gross expenditure was 4.4 trillion KRW (2.9 billion pounds), and the number 
of recipients was 4.2 million households in 2020. Its yearly average benefit was 
approximately 1.0 million KRW (£695). Among them, 1.1 million senior households, 
whose householders aged 60 and over, received yearly benefit 1.1 million KRW (£746) 
(KOSTAT, 2020). The reason why the seniors take a considerable portion is that the 
average labour market exit age in Korea was 72.3 in 2018 (OECD, 2019), so the 
employment rate of the elderly was 31.3% and this figure was the second highest of the 
OECD member countries in 2018 (OECD, 2020). 
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In response to the working poverty issue, the total expenditure of the EITC 
increased remarkably by 768% and the number of recipients also rose by 513% between 
2009 and 2020 (KOSTAT, 2020). However, the average benefit per household 
increased by only 35.7% and it is still much lower than other programmes (Figure 2.2 
(d)). This indicates that the EITC has been developed to a wider coverage and smaller 
benefit scheme like the Basic Pension.  
 When it comes to research issues, firstly, this chapter will examine the poverty 
mitigation efficacy of the EITC. The efficacy can be lower than other programmes 
because its benefit is small (Figure 2.2 (d)). Secondly, it can have more impacts on 
relative poverty than on absolute poverty because the relative poverty elderly tend to 
have a higher employment rate than the absolute poverty elderly (Table 2.7). 
 
2.4. Data and methodology 
2.4.1. Data: The Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWEPS)  
The KOWEPS is a longitudinal dataset with the sample of nationally representative 
7,000 households. It launched in 2006 and has been carried out annually by the Korea 
Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA) and the Seoul National University. It 
designates 50% of the sample for low-income households and contains specific 
information on public transfer programmes (KIHASA, 2020a; Kim, 2017). Therefore, it 
is a widely used dataset to examine the anti-poverty effects of the Korean public transfer 
programmes (Hong, 2011; Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; Yoo, 2019).  
This chapter analyses data from the 2nd wave to the 14th wave surveyed from 
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2007 to 2019 because the KOWEPS has collected the benefit of each public transfer 
separately from the 2nd wave (KIHASA, 2020a). This chapter can investigate the major 
changes in the Korean welfare system, such as: the implementation of the Basic Old-
Age Pension in 2008, the Basic Pension in 2014, and the EITC in 2009; and the reform 
of the NBLS in 2015. It describes year of income data, since the KOWEPS has income 
data of a previous year (e.g., the 2nd wave: 2006). 
Weights: This chapter uses the weights of the KOWEPS as probability weights 
(KIHASA, 2020a; OECD, 2013; Solon, Haider & Wooldridge, 2015; United Nations 
[UN], 2011). This is because the KOWEPS allocates half of sample to the poor 
(KIHASA, 2020a). If the weights are not adopted, the estimates cannot represent the 
target population systematically. This chapter adopts person weights (person weights = 
household weights × the number of household members) to compute the poverty rate, 
and the efficacy and efficiency indices. This is because the person weights are widely 
used to calculate a poverty rate and income inequality, and the official poverty rate in 
Korea is also using the person weights (Cheon, 2014; Kang, Park, Lee, Jung & Lee, 
2011; KOSTAT, 2020; OECD, 2013; UN, 2011). Meanwhile, this chapter employs the 
household weights in the KOWEPS to compute the characteristics of elderly households.  
2.4.2. Household income 
Income components: This chapter divides household income into primary income, 
private transfer income, public transfer income, and tax and social security contribution 
(Table 2.4 and KIHASA, 2020a). Firstly, primary income includes wage, profit from 
self-employment, and property income. Secondly, private transfer means financial 
support from other households and non-governmental organisations. Thirdly, public 
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transfer contains public pension benefit, the Basic Pension benefit, the NBLS benefit, 
the EITC benefit, other social insurance benefits, and other means-tested benefits. 
Lastly, tax and social security contribution cover direct taxes and the compulsory 
contributions for public pension and the National Health Service.  
Table 2.4. Income classification 
Income components Description 
(1) Primary income 
wages and salaries, profit from self-employment, and property 
income (e.g., interest, rent, and dividend) 
(2) Private transfer 
financial support from other households (e.g., children and 
relatives) and non-governmental organisations 
Public 
transfer 
(3) Public pension National Pension benefit and occupational pension benefit 
(4) Basic Pension Basic Old-Age Pension benefit and Basic Pension benefit  
(5) NBLS National Basic Livelihood Security benefit 
(6) EITC Earned Income Tax Credit benefit 
(7) Other social 
insurance 




allowances for child-care, support for single parent families, 
and allowances for the disabled 
(9) Tax and social security 
contribution 
direct tax (e.g., income tax) and compulsory contributions for 
public pension, National Health Service, and Employment 
Insurance 
Source: KOWEPS user’s guide (KIHASA, 2020a) and KOWEPS codebook (KIHASA, 2020b) 
 
 
This chapter decomposes the anti-poverty effects by nine income components 
(Table 2.4), such as: primary income, private transfer, public pension, the Basic Pension, 
the NBLS, the EITC, other social insurance, other means-tested benefits, and tax and 
social security contribution. Among the above nine components, this chapter focuses on 
the four main public transfer programmes: public pension, the Basic Pension, the NBLS, 
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and the EITC. 
Disposable income: This chapter employs disposable income instead of gross 
income because it represents available income for consumption and savings. Therefore, 
it is regarded as a better income criterion to take household income statistics (OECD, 
2013; UN, 2011). Disposable income includes primary income, private transfer, and 
public transfer, but subtracts tax and social security contribution (Disposable income = 
Primary income + Private transfer + Public Transfer – Tax and social security 
contribution, Table 2.4). Disposable income is equivalised by square root of household 
size to consider economies of scale in consumption (OECD, 2013).  
The KOWEPS collects income data at a household unit, but the public pension 
benefit is provided to an individual pensioner (KIHASA, 2020a). This chapter considers 
all the elderly in a household as recipients if the household has a public pension benefit 
(Kang, 2017). Otherwise, the NBLS benefit and the EITC benefit are provided to a 
household unit, and the Basic Pension benefit is provided to all the elderly in a 
household if its income is below the income eligibility.  
2.4.3. Poverty thresholds 
This chapter uses both absolute and relative poverty thresholds as a deep poverty index 
and a poverty index, respectively. They allow to compare different effects of public 
transfer programmes on both deep poor and poor groups. Firstly, the absolute poverty 
threshold is anchored at the first official MCL surveyed in 1999 (KIHASA, 1999). This 
chapter adjusts it by price changes of 372 items included in the MCL 1999 as essential 
consumption items for the deep poor (KIHASA, 1999; KOSTAT, 2019a). Therefore, it 
can represent the lifestyle of the deep poor. The absolute poverty threshold is 
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equivalised by the OECD modified scale like the Korean official MCL (MOHW, 2017). 
Table 2.5. Multiple poverty thresholds 
Poverty threshold Description 
Absolute poverty 
threshold  
anchored at the initial MCL 1999 and adjusted by price changes in all 372 




set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income in each year (equal 
to the official statistics in Korea and the OECD) 
 
 
Secondly, the relative poverty threshold is set at 50% of median equivalised 
disposable income in each year. It is the same to the official poverty threshold for taking 
statistics in Korea and the OECD (KOSTAT, 2019b; OECD, 2013). 
2.4.4. Efficacy evaluation: The Shapley decomposition  
The traditional method: Several prior studies calculate the poverty reduction effect of a 
public transfer programme as the poverty rate difference between in pre-transfer income 
and post-transfer income. (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012; Ji, 2018; Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; 
Meyer & Wu, 2018). For example, if the poverty rates in pre-transfer income and post-
transfer income are 30% and 10% respectively, the anti-poverty efficacy of this transfer 
income is 20%p (20%p = 30% − 10%). However, the traditional method has some 
limitations when the effects of several public transfer programmes are calculated 
(Aristondo & Onaindia, 2019; Azevedo et al., 2013; Fortin et al., 2010; Gelbach, 2016; 
Hong, 2011; Kim, 2017; Ko et al., 2019; Shorrocks, 2013). 
Firstly, some researchers compute the anti-poverty effect of each transfer 
programme separately (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012; Choi & Hahn, 2019; Kang, 2017; Kim, 
2017; Lee & Choi, 2018; Meyer & Mittag, 2019). For example, the anti-poverty effects 
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of benefit A and benefit B can be calculated as equation (2.2). However, the sum of E(A) 
and E(B) cannot be equal to the total effect of two programmes (e.g., E(A+B) ≠ E(A) + 
E(B)). Therefore, this method cannot maintain the decomposition identity (Chantreuil & 
Trannoy, 2013; Shorrocks, 2013). 
E(A) = pr (pre-transfer income + A) – pr (pre-transfer income) 
 
E(B) = pr (pre-transfer income + B) – pr (pre-transfer income) 
(2.2) 
 
Note: E(A) and E(B) are the anti-poverty effects of benefit A and B, pr (x) is the poverty rate of income x 
 
Secondly, others accumulate each benefit on pre-transfer income sequentially 
(Chung, 2016; Ko et al., 2019; Lee, Lee & Lee, 2015; Meyer & Wu, 2018). However, 
an addition order can be arbitrary. For example, E(A) and E(B) can be calculated by 
either equation (2.3) or (2.4). This method has the path dependence issue (Azevedo et 
al., 2013; Fortin et al., 2010; Gelbach, 2016; Shorrocks, 2013). That means that the 
efficacy can be different by an addition order (e.g., E1(A) ≠ E2(A), E1(B) ≠ E2(B)).  
     E1(A) = pr (pre-transfer income + A) – pr (pre-transfer income) 
 





     E2(B) = pr (pre-transfer income + B) − pr (pre-transfer income)  
 
     E2(A) = pr (pre-transfer income + A + B) – pr (pre-transfer income + B) 
(2.4) 
 
      Note: E(A) and E(B) are the anti-poverty effects of benefit A and B, pr (x) is the poverty rate of income x 
 
The Shapley decomposition: The Shapley decomposition is originated from the 
cooperative game theory and extended to applied economics (Chantreui & Trannoy, 
2013; Shorrocks, 2013). It considers marginal contributions of game players and 
computes a weighted average of each player’s marginal contributions in all possible 
cases (Roth, 1988). This decomposition has the decomposition identity and is 
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independent from a calculation order. It can be applied to decompose a poverty rate by 
income components (Shorrocks, 2013) and some researchers have used the Shapley 
decomposition to analyse poverty, income inequality and consumption (Aristondo & 
Onaindia, 2020; Atkinson, Leventi, Nolan, Sutherland & Tasseva, 2017; Azevedo et al., 
2013; Hong 2011; Jung, Kim & Lim, 2016; Ko et al., 2019; Park, 2017; Yoo, 2019). 
This chapter calculates a contribution of each income component based on the DASP 
package in Stata published by Araar and Duclos (Araar & Duclos, 2013). Meanwhile, 
decomposition analysis calculates the contribution of each component to total changes 
based on correlations, so it cannot be generally interpreted as causal parameters (Fortin 
et al., 2010). This chapter also considers the results of the Shapley decomposition as the 
contributions to reductions in poverty rates of income components. 
The contribution of a player i can be expressed as equation (2.5). The marginal 
effect of the player i is an incremental value when the player i collaborates with other 
players. This can be computed as the difference between the marginal effects of a subset 
S and a subset S-{i} (equal to [𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 − 𝑖)]). In addition, all marginal effects are 
weighted according to a probability of each case by (𝑠 − 1)! (𝑛 − 𝑠)! 𝑛!⁄ . To be specific, 
n players in a universal set N can make n! cases and the subset S of N can make (𝑠 − 1)! 
different orders because this subset S should include the player i. The complement set of 
the subset S can consist of (𝑛 − 𝑠)! orders. Therefore, the weighted average of the 
marginal contributions of the player i can be expressed as equation (2.5) (Aristondo & 
Onaindia, 2020; Ko et al., 2019; Lee & Lee, 2017; Roth, 1988). 
𝐶𝑖(𝑣) = ∑
(𝑠 − 1)! (𝑛 − 𝑠)!
𝑛!
[𝑣(𝑆) − 𝑣(𝑆 − 𝑖)]
𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁




Note: N is a universal set, S is a subset, 𝑣(𝑥) is the value function of a set x 
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The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index: For the Shapley decomposition, we 
need to adopt a decomposable poverty index like the FGT index. It can be expressed as 
equation (2.6). The parameter α can be zero, one, or two. In this chapter, α is zero and 
FGTα=0 is the poverty rate when a poverty threshold is z (Foster, Greer & Thorbecke, 
1984; Hong, 2011). This chapter decomposes the FGT index according to income 
components as expressed in equation (2.7). Household income Y is the sum of income 































 𝑌 = ∑ 𝑆𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1   
  
Note: 𝑥+= max (x, 0), 𝑤𝑖  is a weight of a household i, 𝑤𝑗 is a weight of a poor household j, 𝑦𝑗  is household income of 




2.4.5. Efficiency evaluation criteria 
Several papers identify poverty alleviation efficiency of public transfer programmes 
(Caminada & Goudswaard, 2008; Creedy, 1996; Devereux et al., 2017; Gao, Yang & Li, 
2015; Ji, 2018; Meyer & Wu, 2018; Notten, 2015; Sulaiman, Goldberg, Karlan & 
Montesquiou, 2016). They generally focused on both coverage (recipient) and 
expenditure (benefit).  
This chapter establishes the following four efficiency criteria (Table 2.6). Firstly, 
the chapter examines how much a public transfer programme covers the poor population. 
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At this point, two possible errors can be made, such as an exclusion error and an 
inclusion error (Devereux et al., 2017; Kleven & Kopczuk, 2011). The exclusion error 
can be measured when a benefit does not reach eligible recipients (A / (A+B) in Figure 
2.3). Meanwhile, the inclusion error can be identified when a benefit reaches ineligible 
recipients (C / (B+C) in Figure 2.3).  
Table 2.6. Four efficiency evaluation criteria  
Category Criteria Details 
Coverage 
(recipient) 
Coverage rate 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ⁄ (%) 




efficiency rate  




𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒⁄  
(%p/billion GBP) 
Note: The four criteria calculate the figures among the population and benefit of the elderly; Source: Author’s 
revision, Creedy (1996), Devereux et al. (2017), Gao, Yang and Li (2015) and Ji (2018) 
  
 
This chapter employs the coverage rate (equal to 1 – the exclusion error: B / 
(A+B) in Figure 2.3) and the mis-targeting rate (equal to the inclusion error: C / (B+C) 
in Figure 2.3). In other words, the coverage rate is the proportion of the poor recipients 
in the poor population (potentially eligible people). In addition, the mis-targeting rate is 
the proportion of the non-poor recipients (potentially ineligible people) in all recipients. 
Secondly, in terms of expenditure, benefits can be delivered to both eligible 
recipients and ineligible recipients. The expenditure efficiency rate is the proportion of 
the benefits delivered to the poor in the total transfer expenditure. In addition, this 
chapter identifies how efficiently a programme reduces the poverty rate. The poverty 
reduction rate is the proportion of the poverty rate decrement in the total transfer 
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expenditure (Table 2.6). 
Figure 2.3. Criteria on the coverage efficiency  
 
Coverage rate  
=  
𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 






Mis-targeting rate  
=  






Note: (1) A: the exclusion error can be measured when a benefit does not reach eligible recipients, B: well-targeted 
for eligible beneficiaries, C: the inclusion error can be identified when a benefit reaches ineligible recipients, (2) The 
poor population (Blue dotted circle, A+B), (3) The recipients of a benefit (Grey circle, B+C); Source: Author’s 
revision, Devereux et al. (2017) and Gao, Yang and Li (2015) 
 
 
The above four criteria are summarised in Table 2.6. The criteria calculate the 
figures among the population and benefit of the elderly. In addition, a public transfer 
programme which has a high coverage rate, a low mis-targeting rate, a high expenditure 




2.5.1. Poverty thresholds and poverty rates 
Poverty thresholds: The relative poverty threshold rose by 82.5% from £467.2 in 2006 
to £852.8 in 2018 per month and the absolute poverty threshold increased by 46.6% 
from £287.4 to £421.4 during the same period (Figure 2.4 and A2.1 in appendices). The 
National Minimum Income of £667, which was proposed by the Korean government in 







2018, positioned between the two thresholds. As can be seen in Table 2.5, the relative 
poverty threshold is set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income, and the 
absolute poverty threshold is adjusted by price changes of all 372 items in the initial 
MCL. The relative poverty threshold increased more than the absolute poverty threshold 
because the median income rose more than the price changes.  
Figure 2.4. Trends of the poverty thresholds (GBP) 
 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Monthly poverty thresholds, (3) The poverty thresholds: the relative poverty 
threshold set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income and the absolute poverty threshold anchored at the 
initial MCL 1999 and adjusted by price changes in 372 items (maintaining the same items and weights); Source: 
Author calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) and price changes (KOSTAT, 2020) 
 
 
Poverty rates: The relative elderly poverty rate declined slightly from 50.0% in 
2006 to 43.8% in 2018, but the absolute elderly poverty rate decreased sharply from 
23.1% to 9.0% at the same time (Figure 2.5 and A2.1 in appendices). The two poverty 
rates of the elderly fluctuated by the early-2010s and then have decreased. Several 
public transfer expansions could have positive anti-poverty effects, such as: the Basic 
Pension implementation in 2014, the NBLS reform in 2015, and the EITC eligibility 
relaxation for single elderly households in 2013. Otherwise, two poverty rates of the 
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have suffered severe poverty compared to the non-elderly (OECD, 2020). 
Figure 2.5. Trends of the poverty rates (%) 
 
Note: (1) 65+: age 65 and over, 64-: age below 65, (3) A: the absolute poverty rate, R: the relative poverty rate; 
Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
2.5.2. Characteristics of elderly households 
Householder and household: The two poor elderly households tend to have older, 
female, less educated, and unemployed householders than the whole elderly households. 
In addition, poor elderly households have fewer household members than 2 persons 
(Table 2.7). Meanwhile, 36% of elderly householders have a job, and the employment 
rate (1 – employment; an employed householder is coded as 0) of the Korean elderly 
was the second highest of the OECD member countries in 2018 (OECD, 2020). 
Income: The two poor elderly groups have smaller primary income than the 
whole elderly group because they have low employment rates and small household 
members. In addition, they also have smaller public pension benefits than the whole 
elderly group since the poor elderly could not have sufficient contributions to public 
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programmes could retain the income gap among the elderly (Choi, 2018; Hwang, 2016).  
Table 2.7. Characteristics of elderly households 
              Householder age 65+ (65 and over) 64- (below 65) 












Age (year) 72.88 74.99 76.27 46.79 49.92 50.42 
Gender 
(0=male) 
0.30 0.44 0.54 0.11 0.30 0.26 
Education 
(0=below college) 
0.15 0.06 0.05 0.44 0.23 0.28 
Employment 
(0=employed) 
0.64 0.75 0.84 0.11 0.44 0.56 
House-
hold 






1,066.9 441.6 258.7 1,616.1 338.3 -303.6 
Primary 
income 
643.0 111.1 35.6 1,642.2 201.2 -319.0 
Private 
transfer 
191.9 174.4 117.1 74.3 75.4 65.8 
Public 
pension 
197.8 46.7 25.2 27.4 19.2 17.9 
Basic 
Pension 
46.7 68.4 64.8 3.0 5.6 4.7 
NBLS 20.2 38.2 33.4 8.7 60.5 39,4 
EITC 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.7 1.4 0.5 
Other social 
insurance 
9.4 2.0 0.1 9.2 5.7 4.8 
Other means-
tested benefits 
18.9 20.0 12.5 26.0 34.5 23.6 
Tax and social 
security 
contribution 
61.3 19.5 30.0 175.3 65.1 141.2 
Observations 29,937 18,724 6,549 43,128 6,823 1,753 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Weighted average, (3) Equivalence scale: square root of household size, (4) Data:  
between 2006 and 2018, (5) Disposable income = Primary income + Private transfer + Public Pension + Basic 
Pension + NBLS + EITC + Other social insurance + Other means-tested benefits – Tax and social security 
contribution; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
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Instead, the two poor elderly groups have more the Basic Pension benefits and 
the NBLS benefits than the whole elderly group. This is because the above two benefits 
are targeted to the poor elderly as tax-financed means-testing programmes. Meanwhile, 
the EITC benefit is at a very low level for the three elderly groups and the absolute 
poverty group has the smallest EITC benefit of the three groups. 
2.5.3. Anti-poverty efficacy 
Table 2.8 presents the result of the Shapley decomposition. The figures represent the 
contributions of nine income components to overcome poverty. In other words, 100 + 
the sums of nine contributions are equal to the poverty rates in each year (100 +
∑ 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
9
𝑖=1 ) . Among the nine income components, primary income 
makes the greatest contribution to both relative and absolute poverty.  
Between 2006 and 2018, primary income and private transfer displayed the 
opposing trends in relative and absolute poverty. Firstly, the contribution of primary 
income to relative poverty improved from -31.56%p to -33.85%p; while its contribution 
to absolute poverty deteriorated slightly from -42.81%p to -42.29%p. Secondly, the 
contribution of private transfer to relative poverty worsened from -8.54%p to -7.33%p; 
whereas it enhanced from -19.38%p to -20.81%p to absolute poverty.  
2.5.3.1. Public pension 
The contribution of public pension is the largest of the four public transfer programmes 
(Table 2.8). The anti-poverty effects continued to rise between 2006 and 2018 (Figure 
2.6 (a)) because its average benefit and coverage were increased by the expansion of the 
public pension system (Figure 2.2 (a) and Figure 2.7 (a)). This is consistent with prior 
studies in Korea (Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; MOHW, 2020b). Moreover, the OASDI (or 
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the OASI) in the USA also has the most important anti-poverty impact (Ben-Shalom et 
al., 2012; Meyer & Wu, 2018). 
Table 2.8. The Shapley decomposition by income components (%p) 
Contributions 







Primary income -31.56 -33.85 -2.29 -42.81 -42.29 0.53 
Private Transfer -8.54 -7.33 1.21 -19.38 -20.81 -1.43 
Public pension -8.71 -12.33 -3.62 -9.48 -16.36 -6.88 
Basic Pension -0.05 -2.49 -2.44 -0.68 -7.82 -7.15 
NBLS -0.33 -0.17 0.15 -2.27 -2.73 -0.46 
EITC 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 
Other social insurance -0.58 -0.76 -0.18 -0.62 -0.94 -0.31 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-1.16 -0.43 0.73 -2.66 -1.55 1.11 
Tax and social security 
contribution 
0.93 1.24 0.31 1.02 1.49 0.46 
Sum of contributions -50.00 -56.20 -6.20 -76.88 -91.05 -14.17 
Poverty rate 50.00 43.80 -6.20 23.12 8.95 -14.17 
Note: (1) The poverty rate = 100 + the sum of the contributions of Primary income, Private Transfer, Public pension, 
Basic Pension, NBLS, EITC, Other social insurance, Other means-tested benefits, and Tax and social security 
contribution, (2) EITC: implemented in 2009 and a single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit 
since 2013, (3) Changes: the contributions in 2018 – the contributions in 2006; Source: Author’s calculation 
(KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
Public pension has the second contribution to relative poverty among the nine 
income components, but it ranks third in absolute poverty behind private transfer. The 
first implication is that public pension provides limited support to the absolute poverty 
elderly. Since public pension programmes are contribution-based social insurance 
schemes, the absolute poverty elderly tend to have small pension benefits (Table 2.7). 
Secondly, private transfer has an important positive influence on the absolute poverty 
elderly. The public transfer can have a crowding out effect on family support from adult 
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children, however this effect can be small on the absolute poverty elderly who generally 
have insufficient pension benefits (Kang, 2011; Shin, Nam & Lee, 2014). 
Figure 2.6. Anti-poverty efficacy of the four programmes (%p) 
 
(a) Public pension 
 





Note: (1) The anti-poverty efficacy is calculated by the Shapley decomposition, (2) EITC: implemented in 2009 and a 
single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit since 2013; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 
2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
2.5.3.2. The Basic Pension 
The contribution of the Basic Pension ranks second in relative and absolute poverty of 
the four cited programmes. While its contributions improved two times in 2008-2009 
and 2014-2015, thanks to the implementation of the Basic Old-Age Pension in July 
2008 and the Basic Pension in July 2014, its contributions were flat in other years 
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In terms of absolute poverty, its contribution increased more than ten times and 
the increment of the Basic Pension (-7.15%p) is slightly larger than that of public 
pension (-6.88%p). The implementation of the Basic Old-Age Pension and the Basic 
Pension could have considerable positive effects on absolute poverty. However, public 
pension has a two times higher contribution than the Basic Pension. Moreover, further 
expansion of the Basic Pension will be difficult because its expenditure will be sharply 
increased by the rapidly ageing population (Chun, 2020; Kim & Kim, 2020; NABO, 
2018). This implies that its contribution can be stagnant in the future. 
2.5.3.3. The NBLS 
The anti-poverty effects of the NBLS have remained at a low level (Table 2.8 and 
Figure 2.6 (c)). It has had more positive effects on absolute poverty (-2.73%p in 2018) 
than on relative poverty (-0.17%p) because it has tight eligibility as a strict means-
testing programme. To be specific, its income requirement, which is set at 30-50% of 
median income, is stricter than the relative poverty threshold (MOHW, 2020a).  
The contribution to absolute poverty reduced from 2010 to 2014 because its 
coverage rate decreased (Figure 2.9 (a)). During this period, the Korean government 
launched the Social Security Information System (SSIS) to integrate the information on 
income, assets, and other benefit receipts. The SSIS sought to check the eligibility of 
applicants thoroughly to prevent benefit fraud, so the coverage rate could be reduced 
(Nam & Park, 2020). However, its contribution rate to absolute poverty increased after 
the NBLS expansion in 2015.  
2.5.3.4. The EITC 
The contribution of the Korean EITC is very small: -0.06%p of relative poverty and  
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-0.05%p of absolute poverty (Table 2.8 and Figure 2.6 (d)). This is because the EITC 
benefit is smaller than the benefits of the other programmes, even though 1.1 million 
senior households (householders aged 60 and over) received the EITC benefit in 2020 
(Table 2.3). The contribution to elderly poverty has slightly increased since 2013 when 
single elderly households were eligible to the EITC. 
It is important to note that the contribution to the non-elderly was also nearly      
-0.05%p in both poverty in 2018 (A2.2 in appendices). This contrasts to the USA where 
the EITC has considerable anti-poverty efficacy (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012; Meyer & Wu, 
2018). This is because the USA government provided 44.3 billion pounds to 25 million 
households with the yearly average benefit for a household £1,758 in 2020 (1 GBP = 
1.4 USD), while the Korean government spent only 2.9 billion pounds for 4.2 million 
households with the average benefit per household £695 in 2020 (Internal Revenue 
Service in the USA, 2021; NTS, 2020). 
2.5.4. Anti-poverty efficiency 
2.5.4.1. Public pension 
Coverage rate: The coverage rate was doubled from 2006 to 2018 by the expansion of 
the public pension system. However, it was still remaining at a low level approximately 
40%: 41.7% of the relative poverty elderly and 39.3% of the absolute poverty elderly in 
2018. Its coverage rate is much lower than in other developed countries (OECD, 2019).  
Mis-targeting rate: The mis-targeting rate of relative poverty increased from 
39.0% in 2006 to 41.5% in 2018 and this rate of absolute poverty also rose from 61.9% 
to 66.0%. These rates are higher than other means-testing programmes. This implies 
that the number of non-poor pensioners increased more than poor pensioners because 
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the public pension programmes have been operated as contribution-based social 
insurance. As a result, the pension inequality could worsen among the elderly (Choi, 
2018; Hwang, 2016).  
Figure 2.7. Anti-poverty efficiency of public pension (%, %p/billion GBP) 
 
(a) Coverage rate 
 
(b) Mis-targeting rate 
 
(c) Expenditure efficiency 
 
(d) Poverty reduction efficiency 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients ⁄ All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP); Source: Author’s 
calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
Expenditure efficiency rate: The rate of relative poverty slightly decreased from 
65.8% in 2006 to 63.2% in 2018 and this rate of absolute poverty also declined from 
49.0% to 46.6%. This indicates that more pension benefits were provided to the non-
poor elderly. This is because the pension benefit is proportionate to the contribution 
periods and lifetime wage, as can be seen in equation (2.1) (Choi, 2018; Hwang, 2016). 
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even though the anti-poverty efficacy increased (Figure 2.6 (a) and A2.3 in appendices). 
This is because the mis-targeting rate and the expenditure efficiency rate commonly 
deteriorated. However, it can be inevitable because public pension is not a means-
testing programme but a contribution-based social insurance scheme. 
2.5.4.2. The Basic Pension 
Coverage rate: The coverage rate increased remarkably in 2008 when the Basic Old-
Age Pension was implemented, and it reached nearly 75% in both relative and absolute 
poverty in 2018. These figures are very similar between relative and absolute poverty 
(A2.3 in appendices) because the income eligibility of the Basic Pension is higher than 
the relative poverty threshold. However, it also implies that a quarter of the poor elderly 
cannot receive the Basic Pension benefit, it can be a loophole of the current system.  
Mis-targeting rate: This rate increased sharply to 30.7% of relative poverty and 
to 59.4% of absolute poverty in 2008 and remained at a high level afterward. This 
suggests that more than half of the non-absolute poverty elderly received this benefit. In 
other words, the coverage of the Basic Pension is too generous, so it leads to the 
inefficiency in its poverty reduction. 
Expenditure efficiency rate: This rate also deteriorated since 2008 and decreased 
to 70.8% of relative poverty and 43.1% of absolute poverty in 2018. Although the Basic 
Pension aims to support the poor elderly, it also aids the non-poor elderly. It is the 
similar result of the above mis-targeting rate. Therefore, it is required to be restructured 
for the poor elderly (Chun, 2020; Chung, 2015; OECD, 2016; Yun, 2019). 
Poverty reduction efficiency rate: Its poverty reduction efficiency rate of relative 
poverty is at a low level. This is because the Basic Pension has limited efficacy on 
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relative poverty (Table 2.8). Meanwhile, this rate of absolute poverty is higher than 
other programmes, but it has declined continuously since 2008 (Figure 2.6 (b)). This is 
because the mis-targeting rate and the expenditure efficiency rate worsened like public 
pension. However, it can be an important issue for the Basic Pension, since it is a tax-
financed programme, and its expenditure will be sharply increased due to rapidly ageing 
population. 
Figure 2.8. Anti-poverty efficiency of the Basic Pension (%, %p/billion GBP) 
 
(a) Coverage rate 
 
(b) Mis-targeting rate 
 
(c) Expenditure efficiency rate 
 
(d) Poverty reduction efficiency rate 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients ⁄ All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP); Source: Author’s 
calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
2.5.4.3. The NBLS 
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relative poverty and it also declined from 26.3% to 23.3% of absolute poverty. In other 
words, the NBLS was designed as a backbone in the Korean public assistance system 
but it supports less than a quarter of the deep poor elderly. Between relative and 
absolute poverty, the NBLS covers a higher portion of the absolute poverty elderly than 
that of the relative poverty elderly because it has stricter income eligibility than the 
relative poverty threshold. 
Figure 2.9. Anti-poverty efficiency of the NBLS (%, %p/billion GBP) 
 
(a) Coverage rate 
 
(b) Mis-targeting rate 
 
(c) Expenditure efficiency rate 
 
(d) Poverty reduction efficiency rate 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients ⁄ All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP); Source: Author’s 
calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
Mis-targeting rate: This rate is much lower than other programmes, such as only 
7.0% of relative poverty and 18.1% of absolute poverty in 2018. It indicates that the 








































































































































































































































relative poverty absolute poverty
118 
 
early-2010s when the SSSI was introduced, and then it has fluctuated since 2015 when 
the NBLS was expanded. 
Expenditure efficiency rate: This rate is higher than other programmes, such as 
94.1% of relative poverty and 85.6% of absolute poverty in 2018. This implies that its 
benefit is very efficiently delivered to the poor elderly (MOHW, 2020b). Moreover, a 
deep poor household can have more benefit inversely proportional to its income because 
the amount of the Livelihood Benefit of the NBLS is equivalent to the difference 
between pre-transfer income and its guaranteed minimum income. 
Poverty reduction efficiency rate: Its rate of relative poverty has remained at a 
low level and the rate of absolute poverty tends to decrease except for 2015-2016 when 
the NBLS was expanded. This trend is similar to the anti-poverty efficacy of the NBLS 
(Figure 2.6 (c)). This implies that the NBLS does not sufficiently support the vulnerable. 
2.5.4.4. The EITC 
Coverage rate: This rate is the lowest level of the four programmes, such as only 4.2% 
of relative poverty and 3.9% of absolute poverty in 2018. This is because the EITC has 
a higher income threshold than the two poverty thresholds, so some of non-poor 
households can have the EITC benefit. This rate has increased since 2013 when single 
elderly households were entitled to this EITC benefit.  
Mis-targeting rate: This rate tends to decrease since 2013 and reached 35.6% of 
relative poverty and 62.2% of absolute poverty in 2018. The relative poverty elderly 
have a higher employment rate than the absolute poverty elderly (Table 2.7), so the mis-
targeting rate of relative poverty is lower than that of absolute poverty. This suggests 
that the EITC can be suitable for the relative poverty elderly.  
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Figure 2.10. Anti-poverty efficiency of the EITC (%, %p/billion GBP) 
 
(a) Coverage rate 
 
(b) Mis-targeting rate 
 
(c) Expenditure efficiency rate 
 
(d) Poverty reduction efficiency rate 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients ⁄ All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP), (5) EITC: implemented 
in 2009 and a single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit since 2013; Source: Author’s calculation 
(KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
Expenditure efficiency rate: The relative poverty elderly have a much higher 
expenditure efficiency rate than the absolute poverty elderly. To be specific, this rate 
reached 57.9% of relative poverty and 33.8% of absolute poverty in 2018. This is 
because the relative poverty elderly have a higher employment rate than the absolute 
poverty elderly (Table 2.7). This implies that the EITC can support the relative poverty 
elderly more efficiently than the absolute poverty elderly. 
Poverty reduction efficiency rate: This rate is lower than other programmes as 
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programmes. Meanwhile the poverty reduction efficiency rate increased slightly since 
2013 and it remained at a similar level. This trend is similar to its anti-poverty efficacy. 
 
2.6. Further topics 
2.6.1. Differences between the relative and absolute poverty rates 
As described in Figure 2.5, the two poverty rates have had a larger gap in recent years. 
The relative poverty rate decreased by -6.20%p; while the absolute poverty rate dropped 
by -14.17%p from 2006 to 2018 (Table 2.8). The difference of -7.97%p (-7.97%p =       
-14.17%p – (-6.20%p)) can be divided into the four main parts, as follows: (i) primary 
income (+2.82%p), (ii) private transfer (-2.63%p), (iii) public pension (-3.26%p), and 
(iv) the Basic Pension (-4.70%p).  
Figure 2.11. Anti-poverty contributions by income components (%p) 
Note: (1) The anti-poverty efficacy is calculated by the Shapley decomposition, (2) Positive contributions raise the 
poverty rates, but negative contributions reduce the poverty rates, (3) Other1: other social insurance, other2: other 
means-tested benefits, tax: tax and compulsory social insurance; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 
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Among the four components, (i) primary income and (ii) private transfer have 
the opposite effects on relative poverty and absolute poverty (Figure 2.11). To be 
specific, firstly, in terms of (i) primary income, the employment rate of elderly 
householders increased from 36.4% in 2006 to 38.9% in 2018, but this rate of absolute 
poverty elderly householders dropped from 22.8% to 13.7%. This implies that absolute 
poverty elderly households can experience difficulties to overcoming poverty through 
their primary income, so this change can increase their poverty threat. Secondly, (ii) 
private transfer raises the relative poverty rate, but it reduces the absolute poverty rate. 
As the absolute poverty elderly have smaller public transfer benefits than the relative 
poverty elderly (Table 2.7), they can experience a smaller crowding out effect of family 
support (Kang, 2011; Shin et al., 2014). 
Figure 2.12. Poverty thresholds and public transfer income (GBP) 
 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Monthly poverty thresholds and monthly public transfer income, (3) Public 
transfer: public pension, the Basic Pension, the NBLS and the EITC; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 2nd 
wave – 14th wave microdata) 
 
 
(iii) Public pension and (iv) the Basic Pension benefits reduced the two poverty 
































































poverty. This is because public pension has not yet matured and the Basic Pension does 
not provide a sufficient benefit, so the two benefits are not enough to overcome relative 
poverty. Furthermore, the Korean transfer programmes commonly have developed to 
wide coverage and small benefit schemes. As illustrated in Figure 2.12, the four public 
transfer benefits (public pension, the Basic Pension, the NBLS, and the EITC) 
accounted for 88.5% of the absolute poverty threshold, but only 43.9% of the relative 
poverty threshold in 2018. Therefore, public pension and the Basic Pension can have 
more anti-poverty effects on absolute poverty than on relative poverty.  
2.6.2. Behavioural responses 
According to the labour-leisure choice model, when people receive public transfer 
benefits, they tend to prefer more leisure and reduce labour supply. However, prior 
studies do not consider the potential behavioural responses (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012; 
Hong, 2011; Ji, 2018; Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; Meyer & Wu, 2018; Yoo, 2019). The 
main reason is that empirical studies have reached no consensus about the effects of the 
behavioural responses. Therefore, some studies describe this issue only in the discussion 
section (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012; Meyer & Wu, 2018). 
 An extensive literature in Korea also has provided different results regarding the 
behavioural responses of public transfer programmes. Due to the insufficient public 
transfer benefit, much literature concludes that the elderly are still forced to participate 
in the labour market to make ends meet (Kang, 2015; Kim, Baek & Lee, 2018). Indeed, 
the employment rate of the Korean elderly householders increased from 36.4% in 2006 




 To be specific, firstly, some researchers insist that the National Pension benefit 
can reduce the labour supply of the elderly (Jeon, 2010; Park & Choi, 2018), but others 
disagree because the National Pension benefit is too small to cover living expenses, so 
the Korean elderly tend to take a job to earn additional income (Kang, 2015; Ko et al., 
2019). Secondly, some point out that the Basic Pension benefit reduces the labour 
supply of the elderly (Ko et al., 2019), while others argue that its benefit has no 
significant crowding-out effect on the labour supply (Lee et al., 2019; Lee, Park & Kim, 
2015; Sung & Lee, 2018). The reason is that the Basic Pension distributes a small 
benefit like the National Pension, so it is not sufficient for the elderly.  
With regard to the NBLS and the EITC, relevant research usually analyses the 
labour supply of the working age, so available papers focused on the elderly are very 
limited. Thirdly, some find that the NBLS can reduce the labour supply of the elderly 
(Jeon, 2019), while other research suggests that working time of the elderly recipients 
increased (Ko et al., 2019). Lastly, the EITC has no significant effect on the labour 
supply of the elderly (Shin & Song, 2018). 
Therefore, this chapter does not consider the potential behavioural responses. As 
discussed above, a crowding-out effect on the labour supply of the elderly is still a 
controversial issue. Moreover, the employment rate of the Korean elderly increased 
despite the public transfer expansion. Finally, other factors also have effects on the 
labour supply of the elderly, such as health condition, educational attainment, and 





After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, the Korean government has developed 
the welfare system, for example: the NBLS in 2000, the Basic Old-Age Pension in 2008, 
the EITC in 2009 and the Basic Pension in 2014 (Han, 2020; Kim, 2009; Nahm, 2018; 
Ramesh, 2003; Wilding, 2008). Therefore, the welfare expenditure per GDP was 
sharply scaled up from 2.6% in 1990 to 12.2% in 2019 (OECD, 2020). However, 
criticism has also emerged that the welfare programmes do not enable sufficient 
achievements for elderly poverty (Kang, 2017; Kim & Kim, 2020; MOHW, 2018a; Yun, 
2019). In particular, the relative elderly poverty rate in Korea is still the highest of the 
OECD member countries (Figure 2.1). Therefore, the evaluation of the anti-poverty 
effects is becoming a crucial issue (Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017). 
 Poverty thresholds and poverty rates: This chapter defines both relative and 
absolute poverty thresholds. The relative poverty threshold increased sharply by 82.5% 
from £467.2 in 2006 to £852.8 in 2018 and the absolute poverty threshold increased by 
46.6% from £287.4 to £421.4. Over the same period, the relative elderly poverty rate 
decreased slightly from 50.0% to 43.8%, while the absolute elderly poverty rate reduced 
rapidly from 23.1% to 9.0%.  
Efficacy evaluation: This chapter conducts the Shapley decomposition to avoid 
additivity and path dependence problems of the traditional decomposition. Firstly, 
public pension has the greatest effect on elderly poverty amongst the four programmes 
because the public pension benefit is much higher than in other programmes (Table 2.7). 
That is consistent with other studies (Ben-Shalom et al., 2012; Kang, 2017; Kim, 2017; 
Meyer & Wu, 2018). Furthermore, its contribution increased continuously from 2006 to 
2018. Secondly, the Basic Pension ranks second and its contribution increased sharply 
in 2008-2009 and 2014-2015 due to its expansions in 2008 and 2014. Thirdly, the 
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NBLS has small anti-poverty effects. Its contribution is larger to absolute poverty than 
to relative poverty since its income eligibility is stricter than the relative poverty 
threshold. Lastly, the EITC has limited effects on relative and absolute poverty. 
Efficiency evaluation: This chapter sets the four efficiency criteria on coverage 
and expenditure. Firstly, the coverage rate of public pension doubled from 2006 to 2018, 
but this rate was still around 40% in 2018. Secondly, the Basic Pension supports 75% of 
the poor elderly after its expansion, while its inefficiency also increased, such that 56.8% 
of recipients were not classified as the absolute poor elderly in 2018. Thirdly, the NBLS 
has high efficiency thanks to its strictness, but its coverage rate was smaller than a 
quarter of both poverty in 2018. Lastly, the EITC has high efficiency regarding relative 
poverty compared to absolute poverty because the employment rate of the relative 
poverty elderly is higher than that of the absolute poverty elderly. 
Implications: The Proposal for the National Pension Reform suggested by the 
Korean government in 2018 could not make progress, however it has meaningful 
implications. This proposal included the National Minimum Income for the elderly and 
the four alternatives (Lee, 2019; MOHW, 2018a; Yun, 2019). A further reform will be 
discussed in the foreseeable future, because elderly poverty is still an urgent issue; 
while the National Pension fund will be depleted in 2057 and the Basic Pension 
expenditure puts a massive burden on the government budget due to the rapidly ageing 
population (Kim & Kim, 2020; MOHW, 2018a; NABO, 2018; NPS, 2018). Therefore, 
this chapter makes some recommendations.  
Firstly, the consensus about the level of the National Minimum Income can be 
an important beginning point as a policy goal. The 2018 proposal set the minimum 
income at one million KRW (£667) per month based on the subjective minimum living 
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expenses of the elderly (Lee, 2019; MOHW, 2018a). However, it was higher than the 
absolute poverty threshold calculated in this chapter (£421.4) in 2018 and the income 
threshold of the Livelihood Benefit (£334.4) in the NBLS in 2018 (MOHW, 2020a). 
Furthermore, some researchers have urged that the poverty threshold for an elderly 
household needs to be 50-65% of a working age household in Korea (Jeon, 2003; Kim 
& Lee, 2019; Seok, 2017). In addition, half of the Korean population preferred the 
existing pension benefit level and 63.4% answered that the current contribution rate of 9% 
of the National Pension was burdensome (MOHW, 2018a). Therefore, the target income 
needs to be more realistic and acceptable to the Korean population. 
Secondly, the multi-layered benefits system needs to guarantee the National 
Minimum Income for all the elderly. The public pension needs to be a centrepiece of the 
system. This is because public pension currently has the largest anti-poverty effect, and 
the coverage rate of the National Pension benefit will be increased to 88.9% of the 
elderly in 2060 through the expansion of the public pension system (NPS, 2018). 
Furthermore, in this regard, the Basic Pension needs to be restructured from a wide 
coverage and small benefit structure to a targeted coverage and sufficient benefit system 
(Chun, 2020; Kim & Han, 2017; OECD, 2016; Yun, 2019; Yun et al., 2019). Therefore, 
its income eligibility needs to be lower than the relative poverty threshold. 
Lastly, customised approaches are needed for two poverty groups. The NBLS is 
required to focus more on absolute poverty (Ko et al., 2019; OECD, 2018). Its poverty 
threshold was the lowest level in the OECD members (OECD, 2018), so this level needs 
to be upgraded to the National Minimum Income. In addition, the EITC can have a 
more active role for the relative poverty elderly because this group has a higher 
employment rate than the absolute poverty elderly (Table 2.7). The EITC recipients in 
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the USA are generally positioned near the poverty line and they are more likely to 
overcome poverty thanks to the EITC benefit (Meyer & Wu, 2018). In the light of this, 
the EITC benefit in Korea also needs to be increased to motivate the labour supply of 
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2006 467.2 287.4 50.00 23.12 12.98 5.28 
2007 518.5 293.9 48.11 19.47 11.21 2.95 
2008 559.0 307.8 46.67 14.04 10.46 2.52 
2009 585.1 326.9 43.85 13.56 9.30 1.90 
2010 629.2 334.8 45.51 12.00 8.89 1.47 
2011 670.7 357.7 43.60 13.55 9.50 1.91 
2012 694.7 378.1 45.62 15.80 9.48 2.21 
2013 717.3 388.8 49.42 18.18 9.68 2.20 
2014 719.6 388.8 46.97 16.98 8.82 2.33 
2015 756.9 392.1 44.78 11.75 8.99 2.59 
2016 793.2 396.6 44.84 10.69 9.17 1.80 
2017 819.1 409.6 43.48 9.54 8.23 1.38 
2018 852.8 421.4 43.80 8.95 8.55 1.38 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) The relative poverty threshold: set at 50% of median equivalised disposable 
income in each year, (3) The absolute poverty threshold: anchored at the initial MCL 1999 and adjusted by price 
changes in 372 items (maintaining the same items and weights); Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 






A2.2. The Shapley decomposition by income components 
A2.2.1. Relative poverty, aged 65 and over (%p) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Primary income -31.56 -33.79 -34.70 -36.28 -34.47 -35.18 -32.79 
Private Transfer -8.54 -9.18 -8.06 -8.63 -8.42 -9.48 -9.39 
Public pension -8.71 -8.58 -8.83 -9.02 -9.96 -10.10 -10.60 
Basic Pension -0.05 -0.06 -0.88 -1.55 -1.23 -1.36 -1.36 
NBLS -0.33 -0.21 -0.38 -0.40 -0.40 -0.24 -0.23 
EITC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Other social insurance -0.58 -0.23 -0.61 -0.58 -0.61 -0.55 -0.66 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-1.16 -1.04 -0.82 -0.66 -0.66 -0.64 -0.50 
Tax  0.93 1.20 0.94 0.97 1.27 1.16 1.16 
Poverty rate 50.00 48.11 46.67 43.85 45.51 43.60 45.62 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Primary income -30.19 -31.28 -31.79 -32.02 -33.58 -33.85 -2.29 
Private Transfer -7.92 -8.03 -8.27 -7.84 -8.02 -7.33 1.21 
Public pension -11.15 -11.85 -12.59 -12.19 -11.81 -12.33 -3.62 
Basic Pension -1.09 -1.91 -2.47 -2.56 -2.66 -2.49 -2.44 
NBLS -0.30 -0.25 -0.27 -0.42 -0.37 -0.17 0.15 
EITC -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Other social insurance -0.62 -0.39 -0.37 -0.58 -0.73 -0.76 -0.18 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-0.48 -0.54 -0.68 -0.61 -0.60 -0.43 0.73 
Tax  1.20 1.25 1.27 1.12 1.31 1.24 0.31 
Poverty rate 49.42 46.97 44.78 44.84 43.48 43.80 -6.20 
Note: (1) The anti-poverty efficacy is calculated by the Shapley decomposition, (2) The poverty rate = 100 + the sum 
of the contributions of Primary income, Private Transfer, Public pension, Basic Pension, NBLS, EITC, Other social 
insurance, Other means-tested benefits, and Tax and social security contribution, (3) EITC: implemented in 2009 and 
a single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit since 2013, (4) Tax: Tax and compulsory social 
security contribution, (5) Changes: the figures in 2018 – the figures in 2006; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 
2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
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A2.2.2. Absolute poverty, aged 65 and over (%p) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Primary income -42.81 -44.64 -46.73 -46.88 -46.88 -46.61 -43.88 
Private Transfer -19.38 -20.92 -22.14 -22.05 -22.52 -21.55 -22.62 
Public pension -9.48 -9.77 -9.77 -10.20 -11.17 -11.50 -11.62 
Basic Pension -0.68 -0.73 -3.27 -3.70 -3.60 -3.63 -3.33 
NBLS -2.27 -2.62 -2.42 -2.41 -2.31 -1.91 -1.63 
EITC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Other social insurance -0.62 -0.39 -0.60 -0.70 -0.72 -0.76 -0.84 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-2.66 -2.42 -2.10 -1.54 -1.77 -1.44 -1.29 
Tax  1.02 0.97 1.08 1.05 0.97 0.95 1.02 
Poverty rate 23.12 19.47 14.04 13.56 12.00 13.55 15.80 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Primary income -42.15 -41.70 -41.39 -40.36 -42.33 -42.29 0.53 
Private Transfer -20.36 -19.65 -21.22 -22.20 -21.05 -20.81 -1.43 
Public pension -13.13 -14.46 -15.18 -15.59 -15.62 -16.36 -6.88 
Basic Pension -3.62 -5.12 -7.15 -7.13 -7.15 -7.82 -7.15 
NBLS -1.49 -1.35 -2.26 -3.05 -3.07 -2.73 -0.46 
EITC 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Other social insurance -0.78 -0.61 -0.62 -0.85 -0.98 -0.94 -0.31 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-1.38 -1.31 -1.55 -1.60 -1.55 -1.55 1.11 
Tax  1.10 1.24 1.15 1.50 1.34 1.49 0.46 
Poverty rate 18.18 16.98 11.75 10.69 9.54 8.95 -14.17 
Note: (1) The anti-poverty efficacy is calculated by the Shapley decomposition, (2) The poverty rate = 100 + the sum 
of the contributions of Primary income, Private Transfer, Public pension, Basic Pension, NBLS, EITC, Other social 
insurance, Other means-tested benefits, and Tax and social security contribution, (3) EITC: implemented in 2009 and 
a single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit since 2013, (4) Tax: Tax and compulsory social 
security contribution, (5) Changes: the figures in 2018 – the figures in 2006; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 
2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
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A2.2.3. Relative poverty, aged below 65 (%p)  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Primary income -81.95 -84.23 -84.54 -85.63 -86.37 -86.22 -86.24 
Private Transfer -2.30 -2.57 -2.60 -2.69 -2.56 -2.48 -2.51 
Public pension -1.71 -1.56 -1.67 -1.44 -1.33 -1.42 -1.39 
Basic Pension -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 
NBLS -0.43 -0.39 -0.43 -0.53 -0.48 -0.31 -0.35 
EITC 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 
Other social insurance -0.46 -0.26 -0.28 -0.24 -0.21 -0.17 -0.31 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-0.87 -0.77 -0.83 -0.81 -0.88 -0.64 -0.50 
Tax  0.70 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.88 
Poverty rate 12.98 11.21 10.46 9.30 8.89 9.50 9.48 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Primary income -85.82 -86.99 -86.71 -87.10 -87.85 -88.16 -6.21 
Private Transfer -2.46 -1.80 -2.15 -1.82 -2.06 -1.49 0.81 
Public pension -1.64 -1.61 -1.46 -1.53 -1.49 -1.33 0.37 
Basic Pension -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.15 -0.13 -0.17 -0.16 
NBLS -0.32 -0.34 -0.32 -0.34 -0.27 -0.31 0.12 
EITC -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 
Other social insurance -0.30 -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 -0.31 -0.29 0.17 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-0.61 -0.64 -0.75 -0.57 -0.63 -0.54 0.33 
Tax  0.99 0.64 0.86 1.01 1.03 0.89 0.19 
Poverty rate 9.68 8.82 8.99 9.17 8.23 8.55 -4.44 
Note: (1) The anti-poverty efficacy is calculated by the Shapley decomposition, (2) The poverty rate = 100 + the sum 
of the contributions of Primary income, Private Transfer, Public pension, Basic Pension, NBLS, EITC, Other social 
insurance, Other means-tested benefits, and Tax and social security contribution, (3) EITC: implemented in 2009 and 
a single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit since 2013, (4) Tax: Tax and compulsory social 
security contribution, (5) Changes: the figures in 2018 – the figures in 2006; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 




A2.2.4. Absolute poverty, aged below 65 (%p) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Primary income -87.90 -90.17 -90.56 -90.89 -91.42 -91.75 -91.19 
Private Transfer -3.45 -3.33 -3.50 -3.55 -3.64 -3.21 -3.47 
Public pension -1.81 -1.70 -1.67 -1.56 -1.68 -1.63 -1.70 
Basic Pension -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 
NBLS -1.03 -1.24 -1.25 -1.43 -1.25 -1.18 -1.19 
EITC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Other social insurance -0.38 -0.49 -0.26 -0.30 -0.29 -0.27 -0.29 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-0.75 -0.75 -0.76 -0.78 -0.74 -0.50 -0.48 
Tax  0.62 0.66 0.61 0.51 0.61 0.58 0.64 
Poverty rate 5.28 2.95 2.52 1.90 1.47 1.91 2.21 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Primary income -91.02 -91.28 -90.74 -91.25 -91.29 -91.51 -3.61 
Private Transfer -3.45 -2.98 -3.04 -2.98 -3.08 -2.94 0.52 
Public pension -1.89 -1.92 -2.00 -2.15 -2.19 -2.24 -0.43 
Basic Pension -0.09 -0.14 -0.19 -0.17 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 
NBLS -1.08 -1.08 -1.21 -1.30 -1.49 -1.38 -0.35 
EITC -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
Other social insurance -0.28 -0.32 -0.36 -0.42 -0.50 -0.57 -0.19 
Other means-tested 
benefits 
-0.64 -0.57 -0.71 -0.73 -0.58 -0.67 0.09 
Tax  0.67 0.63 0.86 0.81 0.75 0.93 0.32 
Poverty rate 2.20 2.33 2.59 1.80 1.38 1.38 -3.90 
Note: (1) The anti-poverty efficacy is calculated by the Shapley decomposition, (2) The poverty rate = 100 + the sum 
of the contributions of Primary income, Private Transfer, Public pension, Basic Pension, NBLS, EITC, Other social 
insurance, Other means-tested benefits, and Tax and social security contribution, (3) EITC: implemented in 2009 and 
a single elderly household has been eligible to the EITC benefit since 2013, (4) Tax: Tax and compulsory social 
security contribution, (5) Changes: the figures in 2018 – the figures in 2006; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 
2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
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A2.3. Anti-poverty efficiency of public transfer programmes 
A2.3.1. Public pension, aged 65 and over (%, %p/billion GBP) 
Relative poverty (poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate 19.8 21.0 22.7 27.1 26.9 27.1 29.4 
Mis-targeting rate 39.0 42.2 42.9 43.9 43.6 49.2 47.2 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
65.8 56.9 59.0 60.4 63.2 57.8 57.9 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.74 0.70 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.51 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 32.1 33.4 35.6 37.1 39.7 41.7 21.9 
Mis-targeting rate 39.6 41.0 40.1 38.7 40.5 41.5 2.5 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
68.5 68.3 68.9 70.1 68.2 63.2 -2.6 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.48 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.36 -0.38 
Absolute poverty (deep poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate 19.7 20.4 20.9 26.5 24.8 26.4 27.6 
Mis-targeting rate 61.9 66.9 71.3 68.9 72.3 71.3 71.7 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
49.0 38.7 35.6 41.0 40.2 43.6 38.9 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.80 0.80 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.55 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 30.1 31.7 34.2 35.6 37.5 39.3 19.5 
Mis-targeting rate 65.9 63.7 63.6 63.6 66.2 66.0 4.0 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
45.4 48.7 43.2 49.0 46.7 46.6 -2.4 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.57 0.57 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.48 -0.33 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients ⁄ All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement / Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP), (5) Changes: the 
figures in 2018 – the figures in 2006; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
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A2.3.2. The Basic Pension, aged 65 and over (%, %p/billion GBP) 
Relative poverty (poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate 21.5 21.3 68.1 76.2 75.1 76.7 75.1 
Mis-targeting rate 8.9 10.7 30.7 35.5 32.7 32.5 32.5 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
93.4 91.3 70.9 66.0 68.7 68.4 68.6 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.19 0.26 0.47 0.60 0.46 0.49 0.41 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 73.3 74.4 74.8 72.6 73.4 75.4 53.9 
Mis-targeting rate 26.3 28.4 27.7 29.8 30.1 30.4 21.5 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
75.2 73.1 73.3 71.8 71.8 70.8 -22.6 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.31 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.07 
Absolute poverty (deep poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate 30.4 31.2 73.0 76.0 76.3 75.4 75.9 
Mis-targeting rate 19.5 22.7 59.4 63.6 63.6 61.5 61.1 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
84.4 81.5 42.6 37.1 36.6 38.8 39.0 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
2.55 3.14 1.75 1.42 1.34 1.30 1.01 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 76.3 76.8 77.6 74.5 74.3 75.6 45.2 
Mis-targeting rate 53.8 52.1 52.5 55.5 57.5 56.8 37.4 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
46.7 48.8 47.2 44.6 43.0 43.1 -41.3 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
1.04 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.80 -1.75 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients / All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement / Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP), (5) Changes: the 
figures in 2018 – the figures in 2006; Source: Author’s calculation (KOWEPS 2nd wave – 14th wave microdata) 
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A2.3.3. The NBLS, aged 65 and over (%, %p/billion GBP) 
Relative poverty (poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate 18.1 18.3 17.1 17.1 16.1 16.4 16.0 
Mis-targeting rate 6.1 8.1 5.8 7.3 6.3 7.3 4.4 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
94.5 94.2 96.3 95.3 95.4 94.9 95.5 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.11 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.05 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 14.6 13.9 14.9 15.3 16.1 16.3 -1.8 
Mis-targeting rate 6.6 7.3 8.8 9.8 7.7 7.0 0.9 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
93.4 93.7 94.4 91.2 93.4 94.1 -0.3 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.08 
Absolute poverty (deep poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate 26.3 28.1 26.5 25.2 25.2 24.0 24.2 
Mis-targeting rate 14.5 16.7 20.1 22.5 21.9 21.2 17.3 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
87.8 86.3 82.2 82.6 83.1 84.5 84.7 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.76 0.81 0.70 0.64 0.62 0.52 0.39 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 21.2 19.8 21.3 21.6 22.3 23.3 -3.1 
Mis-targeting rate 18.0 14.8 17.7 21.3 22.8 18.1 3.6 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
82.0 86.7 85.9 79.8 79.7 85.6 -2.2 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.34 0.33 0.48 0.58 0.53 0.47 -0.29 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients / All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement / Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP), (5) Changes: the 




A2.3.4. The EITC, aged 65 and over (%, %p/billion GBP) 
Relative poverty (poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate - - - 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 
Mis-targeting rate - - - 87.6 45.2 29.0 56.6 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
- - - 15.1 60.2 69.3 30.9 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
- - - 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 0.5 1.9 1.9 3.1 4.0 4.2 4.2 
Mis-targeting rate 22.3 14.8 30.4 30.0 35.2 35.6 35.6 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
76.9 83.9 67.6 67.2 55.7 57.9 57.9 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Absolute poverty (deep poor) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Coverage rate - - - 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Mis-targeting rate - - - 98.4 100.0 82.5 86.9 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
- - - 2.8 0.0 17.8 14.2 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
- - - 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 changes 
Coverage rate 0.2 1.5 1.8 2.2 3.5 3.9 3.9 
Mis-targeting rate 86.3 56.4 59.3 68.9 66.1 62.2 62.2 
Expenditure 
efficiency rate 
9.7 41.2 25.1 25.7 22.1 33.8 33.8 
Poverty reduction 
efficiency rate 
0.00 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 
Note: (1) Coverage rate: Poor recipients / All poor population (%), (2) Mis-targeting rate: Non-poor recipients ⁄ All 
recipients (%), (3) Expenditure efficiency rate: Transfer delivered to the poor ⁄ Total transfer expenditure (%), (4) 
Poverty reduction rate: Poverty rate decrement / Total transfer expenditure (%p/billion GBP), (5) Changes: the 
figures in 2018 – the figures in 2006, (6) EITC: implemented in 2009 and a single elderly household has been eligible 






Chapter 3.  
The effects of COVID-19 and response measures 





The COVID-19 pandemic presents not only public health challenges but also socio-
economic issues (International Labour Organisation [ILO], 2020a; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2020b; United Nations [UN], 
2020a). This infectious disease has had unprecedented influences all around the world 
since the start of 2020 (Ferguson et al., 2020). The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
declared it as a global pandemic in March 2020 (WHO, 2020), over 167 million were 
confirmed as positive and 3.4 million passed away as of 26th May 2021 (Johns Hopkins 
University, 2021).   
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 COVID-19 has delivered significant negative effects on the supply and demand 
sides in the global economy (Baldwin & Mauro, 2020; Boone, Haugh, Pain & Salins, 
2020; Carlsson-Szlezak, Reeves & Swartz, 2020). This shrinking economy has adverse 
influences on employment, earnings, and household livelihood (Han, Meyer & Sullivan, 
2020). The world economy is expected to shrink by approximately -3.3% (International 
Monetary Fund [IMF], 2021b; OECD, 2021) in 2020. Furthermore, 114 million jobs are 
expected to be destroyed by the impact of this pandemic (ILO, 2021), and 60 million 
people fell into deep poverty in 2020 (Lakner, Mahler, Negre & Prydz, 2020).  
 Therefore, more vigorous policy responses are required to support the vulnerable 
until the economy has recovered securely from the COVID-19 pandemic (IMF, 2021a; 
OECD, 2020b; UN, 2020a). Many countries have implemented more active fiscal 
measures and some governments, such as: Hong Kong, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea 
(hereafter Korea), and the USA, have introduced universal transfer programmes to help 
their citizens extensively and directly (Korean government, 2020a; Prady, 2020).  
 In response to the outbreak, the Korean government has controlled this 
pandemic well without a national lockdown (Aum, Lee & Shin, 2020; Dighe et al., 2020; 
ILO, 2020b; Lee, Heo & Seo, 2020). Korea suffered from COVID-19 transmission at 
the initial stage, but Korea has flattened the curve successfully (ILO, 2020b; Lee et al., 
2020; Moradi & Vaezi, 2020; OECD, 2020a; You, 2020). However, it has experienced 
economic damage, so the Korean government has implemented fiscal and monetary 
measures equivalent to 16% of its national GDP to overcome economic hardship (Bank 
of Korea [BOK], 2020a, 2020b; Ministry of Economy and Finance in Korea [MOEF], 
2020d, 2020e). As a result, the Korean economy has shown relatively robust resilience 
from this severe pandemic (IMF, 2021a; MOEF, 2020d; OECD, 2020b).  
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 Among its stimulus packages, the Emergency Disaster Relief Funds (hereafter 
the relief) have triggered serious political debates because this relief is the first-ever 
universal transfer programme in Korea (Kim & Lee, 2020; Kim, Koh & Lyou, 2020). 
During previous economic crises, the Korean government introduced means-tested 
benefits only for the deep poor (Ministry of Health and Welfare in Korea [MOHW], 
1999, 2010). Initially, the Korean government designed this relief as a means-testing 
transfer programme for 70% of low-income households (Korean government, 2020b, 
2020c). However, it was converted to a universal programme through discussions in the 
National Assembly in Korea (Kim B., 2020; Ministry of the Interior and Safety in 
Korea [MOIS], 2020a). 
 An extensive literature focuses on both (i) the economic impacts of the 
pandemic and (ii) the positive effects of the government measures. Firstly, several 
researchers have emphasised that this pandemic has had disproportionate effects on the 
labour market. In other words, the pandemic and social distancing have had more 
negative effects on non-essential and physical proximity jobs (Oh & Lee, 2020; 
Palomino, Rodríguez & Sebastian, 2020). In general, low income, low educated, and 
low skilled workers tend to have the above jobs, so the vulnerable have suffered more 
serious negative impacts (Adams-Prassl, Boneva, Golin & Rauh, 2020; Dang, Huynh & 
Nguyen, 2020; ILO & United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific [UNESCAP], 2020; Mongey, Pilossoph & Weinberg, 2020; Sanchez, Parra, 
Ozden & Rijkers, 2020). Secondly, others have analysed the effects of stimulus 
packages on poverty, household income and household consumption expenditure. They 
describe that government benefits have had positive anti-poverty effects on the 




 Several Korean researchers have paid attention to the second topic. To be 
specific, the effect of the relief on consumption has been one of the most highlighted 
issues. The relief has two key aims: (i) providing an income supplement and (ii) 
promoting consumption (Korean government, 2020a). Several papers focus on the 
second aim. They conclude that this relief induced more consumption expenditure as 
24-78% of its benefit (Gim, Lee & Cho, 2021; Hong, 2020; Kim et al., 2020; Korea 
Development Institute [KDI], 2020; Lee, Kang & Woo, 2021). However, the above first 
aim of the relief has been largely disregarded. 
 This chapter will analyse the economic effects of the pandemic and the 
government measures on poverty, household income and household consumption 
expenditure in Korea. Firstly, the chapter will compare the effects of this pandemic to 
the two previous critical economic crises: the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 and the 
Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009. These two shocks are recognised as the most 
important crises in the Korean economy since the 1990s (Kim & Lee, 2020; Lee & Lee, 
2020; MOEF, 2020e; Oh, 2020; Yeo & Kim, 2020; Yoo, 2020). Secondly, it will 
identify whether the pandemic has had disproportionate effects on the vulnerable (e.g., 
female, young, and elderly households). Several papers stress that this pandemic has 
delivered harder impacts on the vulnerable (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020; Dang et al., 2020; 
ILO & UNESCAP, 2020; Mongey et al., 2020; Oh & Lee, 2020; Sanchez et al., 2020), 
so poverty can deteriorate (Lakner et al., 2020; Sumner, Hoy & Ortiz-Juarez, 2020). 
Lastly, it will suggest some policy implications to improve the Korean welfare system. 
 This chapter consists of six sections. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the 
effects of the pandemic and response measures. Section 3.3 introduces the three major 
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crises: (i) the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998, (ii) the Global Financial Crisis 2008-
2009, and (iii) the COVID-19 pandemic 2020. Section 3.4 describes the Korea 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (KHIES); adopts changes-in-changes (CC) 
as an alternative model of difference-in-differences (DD); establishes relative and 
absolute poverty thresholds; and defines variables. Section 3.5 estimates the effects of 
the above three crises and the government measures on poverty, income, and 
consumption expenditure focusing on the vulnerable. Lastly, section 3.6 summarises 
findings and discusses policy implications.  
 
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. COVID-19 and effects 
COVID-19 and social distancing measures have brought negative effects to the labour 
market. Several researchers consider how the pandemic has affected people’s ability to 
do their jobs under lockdown measures. In addition, they also emphasise that the 
pandemic can exacerbate work ability impairment for some types of jobs.  
 Palomino, Rodríguez and Sebastian (2020) calculate the Lockdown Working 
Ability index in the European countries using the EU Labour Force Survey in 2018. 
This index has three main components: essentiality, closure (by a government decision), 
and teleworking; so essential, not closed by authorities, and remote working jobs can 
have high scores. In addition, they insist that low educated workers have a lower point 
(0.33) than high educated workers (0.68), so low educated workers can be more 
vulnerable than high educated workers under lockdown. Therefore, they estimate that 
the relative poverty rate, which is set at 60% of national median wage, will increase by 
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4.9%p in the overall Europe under two months of lockdown. In terms of geographical 
differences, they conclude that Eastern and Southern countries have lower scores than 
Western and Northern nations. Therefore, the poverty rate will increase more in Croatia 
8.5%p and Lithuania 7.3%p than in the UK 3.7%p, Germany 3.7%p and France 3.5%p.  
 Oh and Lee (2020, 2021) estimate the effect of the pandemic on the labour 
market in Korea. They analyse the Korean Labour and Income Panel Study in 2018 and 
conclude that 35% of jobs in Korea can be endangered during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
They point out that non-essential, no working at home, and high physical proximity jobs 
are more vulnerable to the pandemic. Furthermore, low income, low educated and low 
skilled workers tend to have the above jobs. Therefore, low-income households are 
faced with harder impacts, and the relative poverty rate, which is set at 60% of median 
income, is expected to increase by 6.4%p in 2020. However, this study does not 
consider the effect of the government measures (e.g., the relief), so this research can 
overestimate the negative effect of the pandemic.  
Nam and Lee (2020) analyse the effect of COVID-19 on working age 
households in Korea using the KHIES in 2019 and 2020. They adopt DD and divide the 
Korean households into three groups according to the householder’s employment type: 
a permanent worker group, a temporary worker group, and a self-employed worker 
group. They compare household income between the first half of 2019 and the first half 
of 2020 to identify the influence of the pandemic in 2020. They conclude that the self-
employed worker group had the hardest damage of the above three groups. However, 
they do not examine the parallel trends assumption which is an important assumption of 
DD. In addition, they analyse only working age households, even though elderly 
households accounted for 21.8% in Korea in 2019 (KOSTAT, 2021a). 
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3.2.2. Response measures and effects 
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments have expanded fiscal 
assistance for their residents. Therefore, several researchers have analysed the potential 
positive effects of these measures on poverty, household income, and household 
consumption expenditure. They have focused on the effects on the vulnerable who have 
been faced with more negative impacts from the pandemic. 
  The UK government has provided the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (the 
furlough scheme). This was designed to compensate 80% of wage and it has the benefit 
limit up to £2,500 per month (UK government, 2021). Brewer and Tasseva (2020) 
simulate the effects of the pandemic and the government measures using the UKMOD, 
which is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the UK. According to their simulation, 
household income in the UK will decrease by 7.9%, so the relative poverty rate set at 60% 
of median income will increase from 17.4% to 19.8%. The furlough scheme has more 
positive effects on middle-income households than on high-income households because 
it has the benefit limit. In addition, the existing public transfer programmes (e.g., the 
Universal Credit) have more anti-poverty effects on low-income households. 
Han, Meyer and Sullivan (2020) identify the anti-poverty effects of the public 
transfer programmes in the USA using the Basic Monthly Current Population Survey in 
2020. They have paid attention to the fact that the poverty rate improved despite the 
unemployment rate increase in the first half of 2020. They estimate the counterfactual 
pre-transfer income and its poverty rate. They conclude that the government measures 
(e.g., the Economic Impact Payments and unemployment insurance benefits) reduced 
the USA official poverty rate by 4.2%p from 13.5% of the counterfactual pre-transfer 
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poverty rate to 9.3% of the actual post-transfer poverty rate in June 2020. Furthermore, 
they stress that the deep poor faced more severe impacts from the pandemic, but the 
government measures had more positive effects to mitigate their poverty threat.  
 Martin, Markhvida, Hallegatte and Walsh (2020) conduct a case study in San 
Francisco Bay Area in the USA using the SimplyAnalytics platform based on the USA 
Census. They set two poverty thresholds: (i) the poverty threshold: the Low Income 
Level of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the USA equivalent to 
annual income of $25,844 and (ii) the deep poverty threshold: the half of (i) set at 
$12,922. According to their simulation, firstly, the poverty rate will rise from 17.1% to 
25.9% on the condition that this area is under a three-month lockdown. However, this 
rate will be decreased from 25.9% to 19.1% by stimulus packages. Secondly, the deep 
poor can be faced with more severe negative impacts, but the government measures can 
reduce the poverty rate to nearly half. To be specific, the deep poverty rate will be 
increased from 1.7% to 9.5% due to lockdown, but it will be declined from 9.5% to 4.9% 
by stimulus packages. Therefore, this study describes that the stimulus packages in the 
USA have positive anti-poverty effects.  
Meanwhile, some Korean researchers focus on the effect of the relief on 
household consumption expenditure. Lee, Kang and Woo (2021) analyse the KHIES in 
2019 and 2020 to identify the above effect in Korea. Since this relief was distributed 
between May and August 2020, they compare the first quarter to the second/third 
quarters in 2020 using DD and CC. They conclude that this relief facilitated 
consumption expenditure as 65-78% of the benefit. However, they do not investigate 
the parallel trends assumption of DD. In addition, the marginal propensity to consume 
of the relief is still a controversial issue and it has wide range of values, such as: 24.4% 
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(Kim et al., 2020), 29.1% (Gim et al., 2021), and 26.2-36.1% (KDI, 2020). The above 
65-78% could be overestimated, because the KHIES collects the relief, the Employment 
Insurance benefits, and other means-tested benefits in the same category as the social 
benefits (Table 3.4 and KOSTAT, 2019c). 
  From the discussion above, this paragraph defines some research issues. Firstly, 
this chapter will analyse the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the government 
measures on poverty, household income and household consumption expenditure. To be 
specific, it will detect whether the pandemic has more negative effects on the vulnerable 
and the government interventions decrease their poverty risk effectively. Therefore, it 
sets two poverty thresholds and conducts CC at 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% 
percentiles of income and expenditure. In addition, this chapter examines the effects of 
the pandemic on vulnerable groups (female, young, and elderly households). Secondly, 
the KHIES provides a useful dataset, so it will use the KHIES like the above two 
Korean papers (Lee et al., 2021; Nam & Lee, 2020). The KHIES is an official 
nationwide household survey, and its microdata is available since 1990 (KOSTAT, 
2019c), so it allows to compare the effect of the pandemic to previous economic crises.  
Thirdly, it will regard the government measures including the relief as the social 
benefits in the KHIES (Lim et al., 2016; Nam & Lee, 2021; Song, 2021). In other words, 
it separates (i) the effect of the pandemic as the changes in non-social benefits income 
(non-social benefits income = disposable income – the social benefits) and (ii) the effect 
of the government measures as the changes in the social benefits (Table 3.4). Lastly, it 
employs a CC model instead of DD. This is because the KHIES was redesigned in 2017, 
2018, and 2019, respectively (KOSTAT, 2020a), so the parallel trends assumption is 
difficult to be investigated. These issues will be discussed in section 3.4.  
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3.3. COVID-19 and its economic effects in Korea 
3.3.1. The COVID-19 pandemic and social distancing 
The COVID-19 pandemic: Korea has managed the spread of the disease well without a 
national lockdown (Aum et al., 2020; Dighe et al., 2020; ILO, 2020b; Lee et al., 2020; 
Moradi & Vaezi, 2020; OECD, 2020a; You, 2020). Its 3T strategy (testing, tracing, and 
treating) and transparent information sharing are considered as the most important 
factors of this achievement (Argente, Hsieh & Lee, 2020; Lee et al., 2020). Therefore, 
as of 26th May 2021, the number of cumulative cases and deaths are 137,682 and 1,940, 
respectively, and these figures are much smaller than in other nations (Johns Hopkins 
University, 2021; Statistics Korea [KOSTAT], 2021b).   
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the daily confirmed cases of COVID-19 have shown 
fluctuations and the pandemic in Korea can be classified in three waves: (i) the first 
wave in the first quarter 2020, (ii) the second wave in the third quarter 2020, and (iii) 
the third wave from the fourth quarter 2020 to the first quarter 2021 (KOSTAT, 2021b; 
Seong et al., 2021). In the first wave, the first confirmed case was reported on 20th 
January 2020 and the number of cases rapidly increased in February and March. At the 
time, Korea was one of the worst affected countries (ILO, 2020b; Jung, Lee & Song, 
2020; Lee & Choi, 2020; OECD, 2020a). The cumulative confirmed cases were 9,887 
in the first quarter 2020 (Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency [KDCA], 
2020a). In the second quarter, the COVID-19 contagion was relatively stable, so new 
positive cases of 2,963 were smaller than other quarters (KDCA, 2020b). The second 




Figure 3.1. The trend of COVID-19 cases in Korea (daily new cases) 
 
Note: (1) Daily new confirmed cases (persons), (2) The three peaks: the first, second, and third waves, (3) The three 
grey shadow boxes: the first and third quarters 2020, and the first quarter 2021; Source: KOSTAT (2021b) 
 
 
Social distancing: In response to the first wave, since February 2020 the Korean 
government implemented social distancing measures instead of lockdown measures 
(Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters in Korea [CDSCH], 2020). 
Firstly, the Korean government imposed some restrictions to suppress the pandemic 
such as: wearing a face mask, meetings (up to 4 persons allowed), social events (up to 
99 persons), and indoor dining in restaurants (until 10:00 pm only) in Seoul as of 26th 
May 2021. Secondly, schools were closed, and online classes were provided during the 
pandemic hikes. In other periods, the Korean government has restricted the attendance 
rate of a school (e.g., 1/3 or 2/3 of its capacity) according to the regional situation, so 
both physical and online classes were conducted (e.g., physical class: 3 days and online 
class: 2 days per week). The College Scholastic Ability Test (similar to the A-level in 
the UK), usually held in November, was postponed until December 2020 (Ministry of 
Education in Korea [MOE], 2020a, 2020b). Lastly, the government advised non-



































































































3.3.2. Economic impacts 
The pandemic and social distancing measures have delivered immediate and 
disproportionate impacts on the labour market (MOEF, 2020e). The real GDP per capita 
in Korea decreased by 1.4% from £6,044 in the fourth quarter 2019 to £5,959 in the first 
quarter 2020 (Figure 3.2 (a); hereafter 1 GBP = 1,500 Korean Won [KRW]). The 
unemployment rate was 3.7% and this figure was similar to the last quarter of 3.6% 
(Blue line in Figure 3.2 (b)); while the number of temporary absence workers, which 
includes paid leave workers and unpaid leave less than 6 months workers (KOSTAT, 
2019d), rapidly increased from 300 thousand in the fourth quarter 2019 to 924 thousand 
in the first quarter 2020 (KOSTAT, 2021a). Therefore, the unemployment rate with 
temporary absence workers increased from 4.7% to 7.0% (Grey line in Figure 3.2 (b)). 
This means that employers usually imposed temporary absence to their workers instead 
of mass layoffs (MOEF, 2020e; Oh, 2020; Park & Yoo, 2020). However, temporary 
absence workers are categorised as employed workers, so the unemployment rate seems 
to be stable (KOSTAT, 2019c; Oh, 2020). In the second quarter 2020, the real GDP per 
capita diminished again by 3.2% compared to the first quarter, and the unemployment 
rate including temporary absence workers increased to 8.0%.  
Temporary absence workers: The temporary absence workers increase has some 
implications. Firstly, during the pandemic, the number of temporary absence workers 
increased considerably compared to the previous two crises (Figure 3.4 (b) and 3.5 (b)). 
This is because the pandemic is not a structural problem and the economy can recover 
after the pandemic, so employers tend to prefer temporary absence to layoffs. In 
addition, the Korean government expanded the job retention scheme to alleviate 
negative shocks in the labour market (MOEF, 2020d, 2020e). This policy direction is 
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common in other developed countries (OECD, 2020c). Secondly, the coverage of the 
job retention scheme among temporary absence workers increased, but only 22% of 
them received the benefits from the government in 2020. This indicates that nearly 80% 
could still be in unpaid absence (Korea Employment Information Service [KEIS], 2021; 
KOSTAT, 2021a). Therefore, the pandemic can have negative impacts on the labour 
market and household income in Korea.  
Figure 3.2. Economic impacts (1): The COVID-19 pandemic (thousand GBP, %) 
 
(a) Real GDP per capita 
 
(b) Unemployment rate 
Note: (1) The real GDP per capita: quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) The unemployment rate: 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, temporary absence workers: quarterly, not seasonally adjusted; Source: BOK (2021) 
and KOSTAT (2021) 
 
 
Thirdly, the pandemic has disproportionate effects, so the vulnerable (e.g., 
female, young, and elderly workers) can have more negative effects (Oh & Lee, 2020; 
Park & Yoo, 2020; Song, 2021; Yoo, 2020). For example, the number of female 
workers in temporary absence increased rapidly from 179 thousand in the fourth quarter 
2019 to 595 thousand in the first quarter 2020 (KOSTAT, 2021a). Lastly, some 
conventional indices (e.g., the unemployment rate) cannot present exactly the 
difficulties in the labour market because the official statistics consider temporary 
absence workers as employed workers (KOSTAT, 2019c, 2019d; Oh, 2020). Therefore, 

















































































3.3.3. Response measures 
The Korean government has provided fiscal and monetary measures along with the 
current welfare system (BOK, 2020a, 2020b; ILO, 2020b; MOEF, 2020d; OECD, 
2020a). To be specific, the government introduced stimulus packages equivalent to 16% 
of its nominal GDP, and the BOK cut the official base rate from 1.25% to 0.5%. 
Therefore, the Korean economy started recovering in the third quarter 2020. The real 
GDP per capita increased by 2.1% from £5,771 in the second quarter 2020 to £5,894 in 
the third quarter 2020, and the cited unemployment rate including temporary absence 
workers decreased to 6.6% (Figure 3.2 (b)). The Korean economy has shown relatively 
robust resilience from the pandemic. According to the IMF and the OECD, the GDP 
growth rate in Korea is expected at -1.0% in 2020 and it is the best performance among 
the OECD members (IMF, 2021b; MOEF, 2020d; OECD, 2021).  
The Emergency Disaster Relief Funds: The relief is a centrepiece of the Korean 
stimulus packages. This relief is the first universal transfer in Korea and was designed 
as a one-off payment (Kim & Lee, 2020; Kim et al., 2020). The National Basic 
Livelihood Security (NBLS) has been operated since 2000 as a means-tested benefit for 
the deep poor, but the Korean government introduced this additional measure 
considering the substantial impacts of the pandemic on the labour market. The relief 
was planned to support the economically vulnerable and boost consumption (Korean 
government, 2020a). In addition, it was also aimed to help local small businesses.  
In this regard, the Korean government initially announced that it would cover 70% 
of low-income households (Korean government, 2020b, 2020c). However, through 
political debates in the National Assembly in Korea, it was transformed into a universal 
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benefit (MOIS, 2020a). This is because the Korean political parties pledged a universal 
benefit during the general election campaign in April 2020 (Kim B., 2020; Park Y., 
2020). It was distributed between May and August 2020, and 99% of the benefit 
delivered in May. Finally, 14.2 trillion KRW which is equivalent to 95 billion pounds 
was paid by August (Korea Research Institute for Local Administration [KRILA], 2020; 
MOIS, 2020d).  
To be specific, the relief has the following specific characteristics. Firstly, the 
amount of benefit was proportionate to household size regardless of household income, 
such as: 400,000 KRW equivalent to £267 for a single household, and 600,000 KRW 
(£400), 800,000 KRW (£533), and 1 million KRW (£667) for two, three, and four and 
more member households, respectively (Korean government, 2020a). Secondly, the 
beneficiaries needed to spend the benefit by the end of August, otherwise the remaining 
balance was scheduled to expire after the deadline. This implies that policy makers had 
the intention to facilitate consumption in a short-term (Kim & Oh, 2020). This is 
because household consumption expenditure decreased in the first quarter 2020 
compared to the first quarter 2019 (KOSTAT, 2020a; MOEF, 2020a). 
Thirdly, it was provided in four modes: (i) a direct deposit to a credit/debit card, 
(ii) cash, (iii) a prepaid card, and (iv) a gift voucher (MOIS, 2020a). Among them 66.1% 
of the benefit was delivered as a credit/debit card deposit (MOIS, 2020d). Whereas a 
cash benefit was only allowed for the poor, such as the recipients of the NBLS (MOIS, 
2020b). Lastly, except for a cash benefit, the relief was only accepted at local small 
businesses to support local economy (Kim & Lee, 2020; Kim et al., 2020). 
 The relief has some differences to the furlough scheme in the UK (UK 
government, 2021). Firstly, the furlough scheme has been provided to retained workers, 
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but the Korean relief was distributed to all residents as a universal transfer. Secondly, 
the furlough scheme compensates 80% of wage and its benefit has the limit up to 
£2,500 per month whereas the relief benefit was only related to household size. Lastly, 
the furlough scheme has been paid on a monthly basis since May 2020, but the relief 
was disbursed only once between May and August 2020.  
Universal versus targeted benefit: Generally, a targeted benefit is considered as 
more desirable because it can be more efficient and acceptable for social justice (Han et 
al., 2020; IMF, 2021a; OECD, 2020b; Sanchez et al., 2020; UN, 2020a). However, it 
can also have disadvantages, for example administrative time and cost to set optimal 
eligibility and to screen recipients (Kim & Kwon, 2020; Prady, 2020). 
3.3.4. Two previous economic crises 
In this chapter, the economic impacts of the pandemic will be compared to the two 
critical shocks. The three grey shadow boxes in Figure 3.3 illustrate when the Korean 
economy experienced significant economic depressions.  
Figure 3.3. The long-term trend of the economic growth in Korea (thousand GBP, %) 
 
(a) Real GDP per capita 
 
(b) Real GDP growth rate 
Note: (1) The real GDP per capita: yearly, year on year, 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) The real GDP growth rate: yearly, 
year on year, (3) The three grey shadow boxes: the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998, the Global Financial Crisis 





















































































































































The three economic shocks include (i) the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998, (ii) 
the Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009, and (iii) the COVID-19 pandemic 2020. The 
two former crises are considered as the most important economic downturns in the 
Korean economy since the 1990s (Kim & Lee, 2020; Lee & Lee, 2020; MOEF, 2020e; 
Yeo & Kim, 2020; Yoo, 2020). Meanwhile previous epidemics did not spread widely in 
Korea, so they had only limited economic impacts (Oh, 2020). 
3.3.4.1. The Asian Financial Crisis 
This crisis was caused by internal and structural problems in the Korean economy 
(MOEF, 1998, 1999). In 1997, 6 of top 30 large conglomerates (the so-called Korean 
‘Chaebol’) went into bankruptcy; it led to insolvency problems in the financial sector; 
and then the Korean foreign exchange market suffered rapid capital outflow. Therefore, 
the Korean government signed the IMF Stand-By Arrangement to receive financial 
assistance from the IMF in December 1997.  
Figure 3.4. Economic impacts (2): The Asian Financial Crisis (thousand GBP, %) 
 
(a) Real GDP per capita 
 
(b) Unemployment rate 
Note: (1) The real GDP per capita: quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) The unemployment rate 
and temporary absence workers: quarterly, not seasonally adjusted; Source: BOK (2021) and KOSTAT (2021) 
 
 
Since this crisis was based on structural problems, the Korean economy had to 

















































































Therefore, as expressed in Figure 3.4, the real GDP per capita plummeted by 7.5% from 
£2,867 in the fourth quarter 1997 to £2,653 in the first quarter 1998, and the 
unemployment rate sharply increased from 2.6% to 5.8% during the same period. The 
number of temporary absence workers remained at a low level unlike the COVID-19 
pandemic because several enterprises went into bankruptcy directly due to the massive 
economic shock (Oh, 2020; Park & Yoo, 2020). 
However, the Korean government did not have even basic social security 
programmes at the time (MOHW, 1998, 1999). As a result, this crisis had the worst 
impacts on poverty and household livelihood (Yoo, 2020). Not only that, but this crisis 
has left hysteresis effects so far. Firstly, the young generation during the Asian 
Financial Crisis still has had difficulties in employment, earnings, and marriage (Choi, 
Choi & Son, 2020). Secondly, the old generation also has experienced long-lasting 
poverty (Noh & Kim, 2019). 
3.3.4.2. The Global Financial Crisis 
This second crisis was derived from the financial market in the USA and spread to 
Korea in late 2008 (MOEF, 2009). This crisis delivered relatively milder influences 
than the Asian Financial Crisis (Oh, 2020; Yoo, 2020). The first reason is that this crisis 
did not originate from internal problems. Secondly, the Korean government supplied 
vast stimulus packages to overcome this crisis (Kim, 2012). Lastly, after the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the Korean government established the welfare system, including the 
NBLS in 2000 and the Basic Old-Age Pension in 2008 (MOHW, 2009, 2010). 
As illustrated in Figure 3.5, its economic impacts were small compared to the 
Asian Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The real GDP per capita decreased 
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by 3.3% from £4,564 in the third quarter 2008 to £4,415 in the fourth quarter 2008, but 
the Korean economy grew since the second quarter 2009. In addition, the 
unemployment rate was stable at nearly 3% and the number of temporary absence 
workers also had little fluctuation (Oh, 2020).  
Figure 3.5. Economic impacts (3): The Global Financial Crisis (thousand GBP, %) 
 
(a) Real GDP per capita 
 
(b) Unemployment rate 
Note: (1) The real GDP per capita: quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) The unemployment rate: 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, temporary absence workers: quarterly, not seasonally adjusted; Source: BOK (2021) 
and KOSTAT (2021) 
 
 
This section has briefly compared the effects of the three economic crises on the 
real GDP per capita and the labour market. Firstly, the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-
1998 had significant economic shocks, but the Korean government did not establish the 
basic social safety net. After this crisis, poverty issue was highlighted as an urgent issue, 
so the Korean government introduced the NBLS as a means-tested benefit in 2000. 
Secondly, the Global Financial Crisis delivered relatively small impacts on the Korean 
economy and the NBLS could mitigate the negative effects on the deep poor. Lastly, the 
COVID-19 pandemic has had immediate and disproportionate effects on the labour 
market, and the Korean government introduced the relief as a universal benefit. In this 
regard, section 3.5 will analyse more specific changes in poverty, household income and 

















































































3.4. Data and methodology  
3.4.1. Data: The Korea Household Income and Expenditure Survey (KHIES)  
The KHIES is a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted by the KOSTAT quarterly 
(KOSTAT, 2019c). It has a nationally representative sample of 7,200 households and a 
wide range of information on household income and consumption expenditure. Its 
microdata is available from 1990, so it allows to analyse the long-term trends of 
household income and consumption expenditure including the Asian Financial Crisis 
1997-1998 and the Global Financial Crisis 2008-2009. In addition, it also contains the 
latest data including the effect of COVID-19 (Lee et al., 2021; Nam & Lee, 2020). 
Therefore, it can be an adequate dataset to compare the effects of this pandemic to the 
cited two economic crises.  
However, due to its redesign, the KHIES has some limitations. In recent times, 
the KOSTAT reorganised this survey (Table 3.1). This is because poverty and 
household livelihood have been regarded as most important issues in Korea, so policy 
makers and researchers have required more accurate data (Kang & Lee, 2019; KOSTAT, 
2018). The first limitation is that it is difficult to evaluate the parallel trends assumption 
of a DD model since the KHIES does not have sufficient pre-treatment data. This issue 
will be explained in section 3.4.2. Secondly, the survey did not collect quarterly 
expenditure data in 2017 and 2018 (KOSTAT, 2019c). Therefore, this chapter cannot 
conduct the CC analysis on consumption expenditure between the fourth quarter 2019 
and the first quarter 2020, because the expenditure data in the four quarter 2018 (the 
pre-treatment data of the control group) are not available.  
This chapter uses the KHIES to analyse three separate two-year datasets: (i) the 
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Asian Financial Crisis: from the third quarter 1996 to the second quarter 1998, (ii) the 
Global Financial Crisis: from the third quarter 2007 to the second quarter 2009, and (iii) 
the COVID-19 pandemic: from the fourth quarter 2018 to the third quarter 2020. 
Meanwhile, the dataset for the Asian Financial Crisis does not include single 
households because the KHIES has only started surveying one-person households since 
2006 (KOSTAT, 2019c).  
Table 3.1. Revision of the KHIES in 2017, 2018, and 2019 
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019-2020 
Sample size 
(households) 










Note: The KHIES collected yearly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018; Source: KOSTAT (2019c) 
 
 
Weights: This chapter uses the weights of the KHIES as probability weights 
(KOSTAT, 2019c; OECD, 2013; Solon, Haider & Wooldridge, 2015; UN, 2011). To be 
specific, this chapter converts household weights to person weights (person weights = 
household weights × the number of household members) to calculate the poverty rate 
and to conduct the CC analysis. This is because the person weights are generally used to 
estimate a poverty rate and income distribution (Cheon, 2014; Kang, Park, Lee, Jung & 
Lee, 2011; KOSTAT, 2021a; OECD, 2013; UN, 2011). Therefore, the person weights 
are suitable for the CC analysis which utilises the distribution of income. In addition, 
the official poverty rate and income quantile statistics in Korea are also using the person 
weights (KOSTAT, 2021a). Meanwhile, it employs the household weights to describe 




As illustrated in Figure 3.6, the effect of a treatment (e.g., a policy intervention or an 
event) can be measured as 𝐸(𝑦11) − 𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ) (Cunningham, 2021; Hill, Griffiths & Lim, 
2018; Wooldridge, 2012; Yoon et al., 2012). However, the outcome of the treated group 
in the treatment period in the absence of the treatment (𝑦11
𝑐 ) is unobservable, so DD and 
CC take different approaches to estimate the value of 𝑦11
𝑐 .  
Figure 3.6. A treatment effect (an example) 
 
Note: The subscript it means group (i) and time (t). i=0 for a control group, i=1 for a treatment group, t=0 for a pre-
treatment period, and t=1 for a post-treatment period; Source: Author’s summary and Hill et al. (2018) 
 
 
Difference-in-differences: DD is one of the most popular research design models 
in social sciences to measure the effect of a policy intervention or an event. DD allows 
to identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) under some assumptions 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Cunningham, 2021; Hill et al., 2018; Kang, Lee, Park & 
Yoon, 2014; Wooldridge, 2012; Yoon et al., 2012). 
The variables in Figure 3.6 can be decomposed as Table 3.2 (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009; Cunningham, 2021; Hill et al., 2018; Yoon et al., 2012). Firstly, A and B are 
unobservable fixed effects of each group. DD assumes that they are time invariant 
Before After











between pre- and post-treatment periods within groups, but they can have different 
values between the treatment group and the control group (A≠B). Secondly, T is time 
effects. DD assumes that it is the same for all units if the treatment is not implemented 
(the parallel trends assumption). Lastly, D is the ATT which means the average changes 
in the treatment group by the treatment. The first difference eliminates the unobservable 
fixed effects of each group (A and B), so DD can control the unobserved heterogeneity 
of two groups. The second difference removes the time effects under the parallel trends 
assumption. Consequently, a DD analysis can calculate the ATT (=D). 
Table 3.2. Difference-in-differences 





𝑦01 A + T 
Treatment group 
𝑦10 B 
T + D 
𝑦11 B + T + D 
Note: (1) A and B are unobservable fixed effects of each group, (2) T is time effects, (3) D is the ATT (the average 
treatment effect on the treated), (4) The subscript it means group (i) and time (t). i=0 for a control group, i=1 for a 
treatment group, t=0 for a pre-treatment period, and t=1 for a post-treatment period; Source: Author’s summary, 
Cunningham (2021), and Hill et al. (2018) 
 
 
The above difference-in-differences of the two groups can be separated into the 
ATT and the non-parallel trends bias (Cunningham, 2021). Firstly, the difference-in-
differences [(𝐸(𝑦11) − 𝐸(𝑦10)) − (𝐸(𝑦01) − 𝐸(𝑦00))] can be expressed as the first line 
of equation (3.1). Secondly, zero value term (𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ) −  𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ))  added to the 
difference-in-differences of the two groups as the second line. Lastly, the ATT 
(𝐸(𝑦11) −  𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ))  can be isolated from non-parallel trends bias [(𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ) −
𝐸(𝑦10))  − (𝐸(𝑦01) − 𝐸(𝑦00))] as the third line. If the non-parallel trends bias is zero 
(the treatment group and the control group have the parallel trends), DD can calculate 
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the ATT as difference-in-differences. It indicates why the parallel trends assumption is 
essential for a DD model. 
                 [(𝐸(𝑦11) − 𝐸(𝑦10)) − (𝐸(𝑦01) − 𝐸(𝑦00))] 
(3.1)               = [(𝐸(𝑦11) − 𝐸(𝑦10)) − (𝐸(𝑦01) − 𝐸(𝑦00))] + [(𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ) −  𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ))]  
              = [(𝐸(𝑦11) −  𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ))] + [(𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ) −  𝐸(𝑦10))  − (𝐸(𝑦01) − 𝐸(𝑦00))] 
 
Note: The subscript it means group (i) and time (t). i=0 for a control group, i=1 for a treatment group, t=0 for a pre-
treatment period, and t=1 for a post-treatment period 
 
 
As described above, DD can calculate the ATT as difference-in-differences with 
a simple and convenient design (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Cunningham, 2021). In 
addition, DD can eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity among two groups. A DD 
model with a time variable and a group variable can be expressed as equation (3.2). 𝐺𝑖 
is a group dummy variable (if i=0 for a control group, i=1 for a treatment group), 𝑇𝑡 is 
a time dummy variable (if t=0 for a pre-treatment period, t=1 for a post-treatment 
period), 𝐺𝑖 × 𝑇𝑡 is an interaction term of 𝐺𝑖  and 𝑇𝑡 , and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is an error term. The 
coefficient of the interaction term 𝛽3 is the ATT.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐺𝑖 × 𝑇𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.2) 
Note: 𝐺𝑖 is a group dummy variable (𝑖 = 0 for a control group, 𝑖 = 1 for a treatment group), 𝑇𝑡 is a time dummy 
variable (𝑡 = 0 for a pre-treatment period, 𝑡 = 1 for a post-treatment period), 𝐺𝑖 × 𝑇𝑡 is the interaction term of 𝐺𝑖  and 
𝑇𝑡, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term 
 
 
Even though the advantages of DD, this chapter needs to review the feasibility 
of a DD analysis because of the recent redesign of the KHIES. Some Korean 
researchers adopted the DD model to analyse the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the relief using the KHIES, but they did not investigate the parallel trends 
assumption (Lee et al., 2021; Nam & Lee, 2020). The parallel trends assumption is 
untestable because 𝑦11
𝑐  is counterfactual value. Alternatively, this assumption can be 
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investigated indirectly using pre-treatment leads.  
Figure 3.7. Parallel trends in household income and consumption expenditure (GBP) 
 
(a) Income (1Q-2Q) 
 
(b) Income (2Q-3Q) 
 
(c) Consumption expenditure (1Q-2Q) 
 
(d) Consumption expenditure (2Q-3Q) 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Equivalence scale: square root of household size, (3) Household consumption 
expenditure data in 2017 and 2018 are not available because the KHIES did not collect quarterly household 
expenditure data in 2017 and 2018; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
To investigate the parallel trends assumption, we can exploit the seasonality in 
household income and expenditure (Chung, 2009; KOSTAT, 2020a; Lee & Ku, 2015; 
Shin & Han, 2016), and it can be expressed graphically as Figure 3.7. In general, 
household income and expenditure in Korea are larger in the first and third quarters than 
in the second quarter because of the Lunar New Year in the first quarter and the Korean 
Thanksgiving Day in the third quarter. However, income and expenditure show 
different trends only in 2020. To be specific, household income and consumption 











































































































































































The pandemic and the relief distributed since May can have effects on these exceptional 
situations in 2020. 
In general, 2-4 periods of pre-treatment data are required to investigate the 
parallel trends assumption (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Autor, 2003; Gertler, Martinez, 
Premand, Rawlings & Vermeersch, 2016; Kahn-Lang & Lang, 2020; Sohn & Lee, 
2018). However, the KHIES did not collect quarterly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018 
(Table 3.1 and KOSTAT, 2019c), so the parallel trends assumption in expenditure is 
hard to be evaluated (Figure 3.7 (c) and (d)).  
In addition, DD has some issues to be discussed as it identifies the ATT. Firstly, 
the pandemic has had more severe impacts on the vulnerable (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020; 
Dang et al., 2020; ILO & UNESCAP, 2020; Mongey et al., 2020; Oh & Lee, 2020; 
Sanchez et al., 2020), but the heterogeneous effects of the pandemic cannot be captured 
exactly through the ATT because it literally describes the average effect (Athey & 
Imbens, 2006; Yoon et al., 2012). Secondly, the ATT of a DD model can be affected by 
outliers. This chapter analyses household income and expenditure data in the KHIES, 
and these data have the right-skewed distributions due to outliers (Lee et al., 2021).  
Changes-in-Changes: CC is one of the generalised DD approaches. A CC model 
estimates the counterfactual distribution of 𝑦11
𝑐  based on the distributions of 
𝑦00, 𝑦01, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦10 because these three variables are observable (Athey & Imbens, 2006; 
Asteriou, Pilbeam & Sarantidis, 2019; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007; Jung, Lee & Kim, 
2013; Kottelenberg & Lehrer, 2017; Melly & Santangelo, 2015a).  
CC has two key assumptions which are less restrictive than the assumptions of 
DD (Athey & Imbens, 2006; Jung et al., 2013; Kottelenberg & Lehrer, 2017; Lee et al., 
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2021; Melly & Santangelo, 2015a). Firstly, in terms of identification strategy, CC 
assumes time invariance of the distribution of unobservables in each group between pre- 
and post-treatment in the absence of a treatment (the time invariance within groups 
assumption). In other words, the changes in the distribution of unobserved factors do 
not affect the changes in outcomes between pre- and post-treatment in each group. 
Therefore, CC can identify the changes in the outcomes of the control group as the time 
effects, and the changes in the treatment group as the treatment and time effects. 
Meanwhile, CC does not impose a restriction on the distribution of unobserved factors 
between groups. Secondly, CC assumes that higher unobservables correspond to strictly 
higher outcomes (the strict monotonicity assumption). This condition is important 
because CC utilises an inverse function to estimate the counterfactual distribution of 𝑦11
𝑐 . 
Table 3.3. DD and CC 
 DD CC 
Assumptions 
parallel trends between groups 
time invariance within groups 
time invariance within groups 
strict monotonicity 
Advantages 
separating the ATT  
simple and convenient 
less strict assumptions 
heterogeneous treatment effects 
robust to outliers 
Limitations 
stricter assumptions 
unsuitable for heterogeneous effects 
vulnerable to outliers  
only strictly monotonic functions 
complicated 




As can be seen in equation 3.3, a CC model estimates the distribution of 𝑦11
𝑐  
using the distributions of 𝑦00, 𝑦01, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦10, which are observable. The counterfactual 
distribution of 𝑦11
𝑐  can be estimated as 𝐹𝑦,01
−1 (𝐹𝑦,00(𝑦10)) (Athey & Imbens, 2006). 𝐹𝑦,𝑖𝑡 
is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹
−1 is the inverse function of 𝐹.  
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𝜏𝐶𝑖𝐶 = 𝐸(𝑦11) − 𝐸(𝑦11
𝑐 ) = 𝐸(𝑦11) − 𝐸[𝐹𝑦,01
−1 (𝐹𝑦,00(𝑦10))]      (3.3) 
Note: 𝐹 is the cumulative probability function and 𝐹−1 is the inverse function of 𝐹, subscript 𝑖𝑡: 𝑖 = 0 for a control 




A CC model has three advantages over a DD model. Firstly, CC does not require 
the parallel trends assumption and it can estimate the counterfactual distribution of 𝑦11
𝑐  
with a pre- and a post-treatment period data (Asteriou et al., 2019; Melly & Santangelo, 
2015a). So, this chapter can estimate the effects of three critical shocks and the 
government measures using three separate two-year datasets despite the redesign of the 
KHIES. Secondly, CC can analyse a treatment effect at each quantile (e.g., 5%, 25%, 
50%, 75%, and 95%), so it can identify the disproportionate effects of the crises. Lastly, 
CC estimates can be robust to outliers which generally exist in income and expenditure 
data. Therefore, CC can be a useful complement of DD and some researchers also have 
used CC to identify the effect of a treatment (Asteriou et al., 2019; Jung et al., 2013; 
Kottelenberg & Lehrer, 2017; Lee et al., 2021; Melly & Santangelo, 2015a; Roller & 
Steinberg, 2020; Valente, 2019). This chapter adopts the CC algorithm developed by 
Melly and Santangelo (2015b).  
In addition, this chapter conducts quantile DD (Athey & Imbens, 2006; Kim, 
2016; Villa, 2016). The results of quantile DD are generally similar to CC. Some 
estimates have different p-values (A3.3 in appendices) because quantile DD and CC 
adopt different approach to estimate the counterfactual distributions of 𝑦11
𝑐  (Athey & 
Imbens, 2006). In addition, this chapter compares yearly changes in income and 
consumption expenditure (A3.4 in appendices).  
This paragraph discusses the above assumptions of CC. Firstly, the time 
invariance within groups assumption is untestable because this assumption is related to 
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unobservables. This chapter designates a treatment and a control groups as the same 
quarters, respectively (e.g., a control group: the first quarters in 2019 and 2020; and a 
treatment group: the second quarters in 2019 and 2020) to minimise the potential effects 
of seasonality between different quarters (Figure 3.7). In addition, it conducts the Lasso 
to select more relevant control variables to control for more covariates. Secondly, due to 
the strict monotonicity assumption, this chapter cannot conduct a CC analysis on the 
social benefits directly. This is because the social benefits include means-tested benefits 
for low-income households (Table 3.4), so 75.4% of the Korean households had zero 
value of the social benefits in 2019. This means that the strict monotonicity assumption 
can be violated in the social benefits. Thus, this chapter regards the effects of the social 
benefits as the differences between disposable income and non-social benefits income. 
3.4.3. Household income and consumption expenditure 
Household income: This chapter calculates disposable income and then equivalises it by 
square root of household size. This disposable income includes wages, profit from self-
employment, property income, private transfer income, and public transfer income, but 
it deducts direct taxes and social security contributions (Table 3.4). The OECD and the 
UN recommend using disposable income to reflect available financial resources for 
consumption and savings of a household (OECD, 2013; UN, 2011). Meanwhile the 
KHIES collects data at a household unit, so this chapter equivalises household income 
by square root of household size to consider economies of scale in consumption. 
The social benefits: The social benefits in the KHIES include the relief, the 
NBLS benefit, the Employment Insurance benefit, and other means-tested benefits 
(Table 3.4). Therefore, the changes in the social benefits can capture additional response 
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measures of the Korean government in an economic downturn (Lim et al., 2016; Nam & 
Lee, 2021). Therefore, this chapter identifies (i) the negative impacts of economic 
shocks as the changes in non-social benefits income (non-social benefits income = 
disposable income - the social benefits) and (ii) the positive effects of government 
measures as the changes in the social benefits. This chapter will measure the effect of 
the social benefits as the difference between disposable income and non-social benefits 
income due to the strict monotonicity assumption of CC as mentioned in section 3.4.2.  
Table 3.4. Income and consumption expenditure classification 




wages, profit from self-employment, property income, 
private transfer, and public transfer (deducts direct taxes 
and social security contributions) 
Social benefits 
Emergency Disaster Relief Funds, Employment Insurance 
benefit, NBLS benefit, and other public assistance  
Non-social 
benefits income 





food, alcohol and tobacco, clothing, housing, home 
appliance, health, transport, communication, entertainment, 
education (public and private), restaurants, miscellaneous  
Essential 
consumption 
food, housing, home appliance, health, transport, 
communication, education (public) 
Non-essential 
consumption 
Consumption expenditure – Essential consumption 
expenditure 




 Nearly 95 billion pounds of the relief accounted for 74.8% of the social benefits 
increment between the first quarter and the second quarter 2020 (Figure 3.8 (a) and 
KRILA, 2020; MOIS, 2020d). Since the relief was a one-off payment (Kim & Lee, 
2020; Kim et al., 2020), the amount of the social benefits rapidly decreased in the next 
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quarter. Therefore, 5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles were faced with high volatility 
in household income around the relief payment (Figure 3.8 (b)). Therefore, this chapter 
will recognise that fluctuations in the social benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic 
are largely caused by the relief payment (Nam & Lee, 2021). 
 Household expenditure: This chapter also equivalises household consumption 
expenditure by square root of household size. And it separates consumption expenditure 
into essential consumption expenditure and non-essential consumption expenditure. The 
KHIES classifies consumption items into 12 categories (KOSTAT, 2019c). Among 
them, as can be seen in Table 3.4, essential consumption expenditure includes 
expenditure on food, housing, home appliance, health, transport, communication, and 
public education (Lee & Choi, 2015; Son, Kang & Jung, 2019).  
Figure 3.8. Changes in the social benefits (billion GBP, GBP) 
 
(a) Changes in the social benefits 
 
(b) Effects on household income 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) (b) is the result of the CC analysis on the level of equivalised disposable income, 
(3) Income 95% percentile is excluded due to high standard error; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata), 
KRILA (2020), and MOIS (2020d) 
 
 
3.4.4. Poverty thresholds 
This chapter uses both absolute and relative poverty thresholds to analyse the different 
















































poverty threshold is anchored at the first Korean official Minimum Cost of Living 
(MCL) surveyed in 1999 (KIHASA, 1999). It is adjusted by price changes of all 372 
items which were included in the initial MCL as essential consumption items for the 
deep poor (KIHASA, 1999; KOSTAT, 2019a). Therefore, it can reflect the lifestyle of 
the deep poor. The absolute poverty threshold is equivalised by the OECD modified 
scale which was the same as the Korean official MCL equivalisation (MOHW, 2017).  
Table 3.5. Multiple poverty thresholds 
Poverty threshold Description 
Absolute poverty 
threshold  
anchored at the initial MCL 1999 and adjusted by price changes in all 372 




set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income (equal to the official 
statistics in Korea and the OECD) 
 
 
Secondly, as a poverty index, the relative poverty threshold is set at 50% of 
median equivalised disposable income. It is the same criterion to the official poverty 
threshold for taking statistics in Korea (KOSTAT, 2019b), and the widely used 
approach to take poverty statistics internationally (OECD, 2013; UN, 2011).  
3.4.5. Dependent, independent, and control variables 
Dependent variables: This chapter defines the following four dependent variables: (i) 
equivalised disposable income, (ii) equivalised non-social benefits income, (iii) 
equivalised consumption expenditure, and (iv) equivalised essential consumption 
expenditure. This chapter conducts the CC analysis at 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% 
percentiles in income and consumption expenditure. It allows us to identify whether this 
pandemic has delivered disproportionate impacts on the poor (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020; 
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Dang et al., 2020; ILO & UNESCAP, 2020; Mongey et al., 2020; Oh & Lee, 2020; 
Sanchez et al., 2020) and how much the government policies have affected each 
percentile (Brewer & Tasseva, 2020; Han et al., 2020; Martin et al., 2020). The bottom 
5% in income can represent the recipients of the Livelihood Benefit (a cash benefit) of 
the NBLS, because the Livelihood Benefit covers approximately bottom 4-5% of low-
income percentiles (Kim T. & Lee J., 2020).  
All dependent variables are logged to compare the effects of the pandemic to the 
two previous crises, because each coefficient can be interpreted as a percentage change 
of an independent variable on a dependent variable (Hill et al., 2018; Wooldridge, 2012). 
Minus or zero figures are imputed to one to be logged. 
 Independent variables: The CC approach needs to adopt a group variable and a 
time variable (Melly & Santangelo, 2015b). Firstly, this chapter sets the control group at 
an earlier quarter and the treatment group at a later quarter. It can catch the short-term 
changes of the crises. Moreover, it can consider the seasonality in household income 
and consumption expenditure (Figure 3.7). This chapter compares three quarterly 
changes per crisis, such as: (i) from the fourth quarter 2019 (t-1) to the first quarter 2020 
(t), (ii) from the first quarter (t) to the second quarter 2020 (t+1), and (iii) from the 
second quarter (t+1) to the third quarter 2020 (t+2) for the COVID-19 analysis. 
Secondly, this chapter sets the time dummy variable which has value of 0 before each 
crisis and 1 otherwise. 
 Control variables: This chapter also adopts control variables to control for 
observables. To select more relevant variables, this chapter conducts the Lasso (least 
absolute shrinkage and selection operator) and reviews nine potential variables (Belloni, 
Chernozhukov, Hansen & Kozbur, 2016; Lee & Hong, 2018; Tibshirani, 1996). It 
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conducts lasso linear command with plugin option in Stata (Stata Press, 2019) and 
selects five control variables: (i) householder age (hage), (ii) householder gender (hgen, 
dummy), (iii) householder educational attainment (hedu, dummy), (iv) the number of 
workers in a household (workers), and (v) the public pension receipt of a household 
(pens, dummy) (Table 3.6 and A3.1 in appendices). 
Table 3.6. Control variables 
Category Variable Description 
House-
holder 
hage age, years 
hgen dummy, gender, 0=male, 1=female 
hedu dummy, educational attainment, 0=below college, 1=college and over 
Household 
workers persons, the number of worker(s) in a household 
pens dummy, public pension receipt, 0=no receipt, 1=receipt 




3.5.1. Characteristics of households in each crisis 
Householder: Table 3.7 describes the characteristics of householders and households in 
the one-year period around each crisis. The KHIES has surveyed single households 
since 2006, so the figures of the Asian Financial Crisis express the characteristics of two 
or more member households (KOSTAT, 2019c). Firstly, the householder age increased 
from 42.2 years old during the Asian Financial Crisis to 52.4 years old during the 
COVID-19 pandemic due to population ageing in Korea. Secondly, the ratio of female 
householders increased from 0.14 to 0.28 because life expectancy of female (86.3 years) 
is longer than that of male (80.5 years) in 2021 (KOSTAT, 2021a). Thirdly, the 
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educational attainment of householders improved from 0.31 to 0.48 with the 
development of education system. Lastly, the employment rate of householders (1 – 
employment; an employed householder is coded as 0) declined from 89% to 81%.  













(4Q 2019 – 3Q 2020) 
Householder 
Age (year) 42.24 49.41 52.35 
Gender (0=male) 0.14 0.28 0.28 
Education  
(0=below college) 
0.31 0.36 0.48 
Employment 
(0=employed) 
0.11 0.22 0.19 
Household 
Size (persons) 3.63 2.86 2.41 
Workers (persons) 1.44 1.25 1.26 
Public pension 
(0=no recipients) 
0.02 0.13 0.21 
Basic Pension 
(0=no recipients) 






670.6 1,029.4 1,637.9 






438.3 725.8 1,040.6 
Essential 
expenditure 
279.9 453.7 648.4 
Observations 27,695 31,221 24,867 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Weighted average, (3) Equivalence scale: square root of household size, (4) The 




Household: Firstly, the household size decreased from 3.63 to 2.41 due to the 
increase of single households (KOSTAT, 2021a). Secondly, the number of workers in a 
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household also decreased from 1.44 to 1.26 persons. Lastly, thanks to the expansion of 
the Korean welfare system, the coverage of public pension and the Basic Pension 
expanded from 0.0 to 0.2, respectively. 
Income: Equivalised disposable income increased from £670.6 to £1,637.9 per 
month. And more importantly, the amount of the social benefits increased remarkably. 
To be specific, it was only £1.8 per month and 0.3% of equivalised disposable income 
during the Asian Financial Crisis. This is because the Korean government did not 
establish basic welfare programmes at the time (MOHW, 1998, 1999). During the 
Global Financial Crisis, the social benefits increased to £17.6 per month and 1.7% since 
the NBLS had been operated since 2000 (MOHW, 2020). Furthermore, these figures 
rose remarkably to £88.7 per month and 5.4% during the COVID-19 pandemic thanks 
to the relief (KOSTAT, 2020b; MOEF, 2020b).  
Expenditure: Equivalised consumption expenditure increased from £438.3 to 
£1,040.6 per month. And equivalised essential consumption expenditure also increased 
from £279.9 to £648.4. The proportion of essential consumption expenditure in 
consumption expenditure was between 62% and 64%. 
3.5.2. Effects on poverty  
3.5.2.1. The Asian Financial Crisis 
The relative poverty rate rose sharply from 9.7% in the fourth quarter 1997 to 13.2% in 
the first quarter 1998 and absolute poverty rate also increased from 3.0% to 7.3% 
(Figure 3.9 (a)). This is because the Asian Financial Crisis had unprecedented impacts 
on the Korean economy, so the economy shrunk rapidly in 1998 (Figure 3.3 and MOEF, 
1999). Meanwhile, the KHIES did not include single households before 2006 
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(KOSTAT, 2019c), so the poverty rate could be underestimated compared to the 
following crises. This is because single households are more likely to be in poverty in 
Korea (Ku & Kim, 2020; Park & Kim, 2016). 
However, the welfare system in Korea did not provide adequate benefits for the 
residents (MOHW, 1998, 1999). The anti-poverty effect of the social benefits can be 
measured as the difference between the actual poverty rate based on disposable income 
and the counterfactual poverty rate based on non-social benefits income (disposable 
income – the social benefits, Table 3.4). The anti-poverty effect remained at a very low 
level of 0.1-0.2%p in relative and absolute poverty (Figure 3.9 (b)). 
Figure 3.9. Effects on the poverty rate (1): The Asian Financial Crisis (%, %p) 
 
(a) Poverty rates 
 
(b) Anti-poverty effects of the social benefits 
Note: (1) Orange dotted lines: the quarter when the crisis happened (t), (2) The anti-poverty effect = the non-social 
benefits income poverty rate - the disposable income (including the social benefits) poverty rate; Source: Author’s 
calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
3.5.2.2. The Global Financial Crisis 
The relative poverty rate increased from 15.1% in the fourth quarter 2008 to 16.5% in 
the first quarter 2009 and the absolute poverty rate also rose from 7.1% to 9.1% (Figure 
3.10 (a)). These increments are smaller than the Asian Financial Crisis, because the 
Global Financial Crisis gave relatively endurable effects to the Korean economy (Figure 















































































monetary measures (Kim, 2012; MOEF, 2009).  
The anti-poverty effects of the social benefits were 1.1%p of relative poverty 
and 1.4%p of absolute poverty in the first quarter 2009 (Figure 3.10 (b)), and these 
figures are larger than the Asian Financial Crisis. This is because the NBLS was 
introduced in 2000 (MOHW, 2020), so poor households could have the NBLS benefit 
from the Korean government. In addition, these effects remained at a similar level 
approximately 1.0%p of relative poverty and 1.5%p of absolute poverty during the 
Global Financial Crisis (A3.2 in appendices). This is because the Korean government 
did not implement an additional large-scale benefit (e.g., the relief). 
Figure 3.10. Effects on the poverty rate (2): The Global Financial Crisis (%, %p) 
 
(a) Poverty rates 
 
(b) Anti-poverty effects of the social benefits 
Note: (1) Orange dotted lines: the quarter when the crisis happened (t), (2) The anti-poverty effect = the non-social 
benefits income poverty rate - the disposable income (including the social benefits) poverty rate; Source: Author’s 
calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
3.5.2.3. The COVID-19 pandemic 
The pandemic has delivered prompt negative effects on poverty compared to the two 
previous crises (Figure 3.11 (a)). For example, during the previous crises, the poverty 
rate started increasing from the next quarter (t+1) of each shock (the first quarter 1998 
in Figure 3.9 (a); and the first quarter 2009 in Figure 3.10 (a)). However, during the 















































































increased from 13.9% in the fourth quarter 2019 to 16.2% in the first quarter 2020, and 
the absolute poverty rate also rose from 5.4% to 6.8% (Figure 3.11 (a) and A3.2 in 
appendices). This is because the pandemic has brought more severe short-term impacts 
to the labour market than the two crises (MOEF, 2020e). To be specific, the number of 
temporary absence workers increased sharply (Figure 3.2 (b)) and female, young, 
elderly workers have been more likely to be in temporary absence (Oh & Lee, 2020; 
Park & Yoo, 2020; Yoo, 2020). 
Whereas, in the second quarter 2020, the poverty rates temporarily improved 
due to the relief distribution since May 2020. To be specific, the relative poverty rate 
decreased from 16.2% in the first quarter 2020 to 13.6% in the second quarter 2020. 
The absolute poverty rate also declined from 6.8% to 4.5% in the same quarter. 
However, the relative and absolute poverty rates increased again in the third quarter.  
Figure 3.11. Effects on the poverty rate (3): The COVID-19 pandemic (%, %p) 
 
(a) Poverty rates 
 
(b) Anti-poverty effects of the social benefits 
Note: (1) Orange dotted lines: the quarter when the crisis happened (t), (2) The anti-poverty effect = the non-social 
benefits income poverty rate - the disposable income (including the social benefits) poverty rate; Source: Author’s 
calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.11 (b), the social benefits could not alleviate poverty 
threat in the first quarter 2020. For example, the anti-poverty effects slightly increased: 















































































poverty and from 2.1%p to 2.4%p of absolute poverty (A3.2 in appendices). These 
figures were much smaller than the poverty rate increments. However, the anti-poverty 
effects of the social benefits sharply increased in the second quarter 2020: from 2.1%p 
in the first quarter 2020 to 7.3%p in the second quarter 2020 of relative poverty and 
from 2.4%p to 5.4%p of absolute poverty. This implies that the government measures 
have had positive anti-poverty effects during the pandemic. The relief accounted for 
74.8% of the social benefits increment in the second quarter 2020 (Figure 3.8 (a)), so 
the relief could largely contribute to this poverty reduction. In the third quarter, the anti-
poverty effects sharply decreased to approximately 3%p on both poverty because the 
relief was a one-off payment (Kim & Lee, 2020; Kim et al., 2020) and 99% of the relief 
was distributed in May 2020 (KRILA, 2020; MOIS, 2020d). 
In this regard, this paragraph discusses some limitations of the response 
measures. Firstly, the pandemic has the instant impacts on poverty, but the measures 
could not mitigate the initial poverty threat effectively. This is because introducing the 
relief took a long administrative process for design, discussion, approval, and 
distribution. Secondly, the positive effects were temporary in the second quarter 2020 
and the relief generated high volatility since it was a one-off payment benefit (Kim & 
Lee, 2020; Kim et al., 2020). Lastly, during the pandemic, the anti-poverty effects 
remained at approximately 2-3%p except for the second quarter 2020 when the relief 
was distributed. This means that the current social security system without the relief in 
Korea still has played a limited role to mitigate poverty risk in the pandemic. 
3.5.3. Effects on household income 
3.5.3.1. The Asian Financial Crisis 
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In terms of the (1) Equivalised disposable income, all five income percentiles (5%, 25%, 
50%, 75%, and 95%) commonly experienced statistically significant income reductions 
in the fourth quarter 1997 or the first quarter 1998 (Table 3.8). These effects were more 
severe on low-income percentiles, such as: (i) bottom 5% suffered the most serious 
income decrease by 33.4%, and (ii) 25% percentile faced 13.7% of income reduction in 
the first quarter 1998. In addition, high-income percentiles (95% and 75%) also 
experienced income decreases. This is because several large conglomerates and 
financial companies went into bankruptcy (MOEF, 1998, 1999), so some of high skilled 
and high educated workers lost their jobs. Moreover, this crisis left long-term effects 
(Oh, 2020). In the second quarter 1998, household income also declined at all 
percentiles, and it was significant at 50% percentile at the 10% level. 
Table 3.8. Effects on household income (1): The Asian Financial Crisis 
Dependent variable: (1) Disposable income (log) and  
                                 (2) Non-social benefits income (log) 
Percentile 
3Q 1997 → 4Q 1997 4Q 1997 → 1Q 1998 1Q 1998 → 2Q 1998 


































































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)); 
Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
 The effect of the social benefits can be measured as the difference between 
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changes in the income (1) and (2). In other words, we can understand that the social 
benefits have anti-poverty effects: if the income (1) which includes the social benefits 
decreases less than the income (2); or if the income (1) increases despite an income (2) 
reduction. These differences are very small, but only bottom 5% in the second quarter 
1998 has a slightly larger difference than other income percentiles. This is because the 
Korean government did not have basic welfare programmes at the time (e.g., the NBLS 
was established in 2000), but it introduced a provisional livelihood security programme 
for the deep poor and distributed a cash benefit from April 1998 (MOHW, 1998, 1999). 
3.5.3.2. The Global Financial Crisis 
The income (1) decreased at all income percentiles in the first quarter 2009, and 25%, 
50%, and 75% percentiles have statistically significant coefficients at the 10% level. 
Bottom 5% experienced the largest income (1) decrease by 12.2%, but it is not 
significant. These income reductions are much smaller than the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Moreover, the income (1) increased in the second quarter 2020, because the Global 
Financial Crisis had relatively manageable impacts on the Korean economy (Figure 3.3). 
 When it comes to the effects of the social benefits, the NBLS had been operated 
by the Korean government since 2000, so bottom 5% could alleviate their income 
reduction from 25.4% of the income (2) to 12.2% of the income (1) in the first quarter 
2009. This gap is much higher than the Asian Financial Crisis. However, the other 
income percentiles have very small differences between the income (1) and (2). This is 
because the NBLS was designed as a strict means-testing programme (MOHW, 2020), 
so it covered only the deep poor. At the time, the Korean government preferred a 
means-tested benefit and was reluctant to introduce a universal transfer programme 
(Kim & Lee, 2020).  
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Table 3.9. Effects on household income (2): The Global Financial Crisis 
Dependent variable: (1) Disposable income (log) and  
                                 (2) Non-social benefits income (log) 
Percentile 
3Q 2008 → 4Q 2008 4Q 2008 → 1Q 2009 1Q 2009 → 2Q 2009 


































































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)); 
Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
3.5.3.3. The COVID-19 pandemic 
COVID-19 delivered immediate negative effects on household income, so all 
percentiles faced income reductions in the first quarter 2020. This is because the 
pandemic has had severe short-term impacts on the labour market (MOEF, 2020e). 
However, it has disproportionate effects on the vulnerable (Nam & Cho, 2021; Oh & 
Lee, 2021; Song, 2021; Yoo, 2020). To be specific, firstly, in the first quarter 2020, 
bottom 5%, 25%, and 50% percentiles experienced more reductions in the income (1) 
and (2) than 75% and 95% percentiles. Secondly, the income (2) reduction at bottom 5% 
of 23.9% in the second quarter 2020 was much higher than other percentiles of 1-3% 
decrease. This implies that COVID-19 could give more critical effects to low-income 
percentiles (KOSTAT, 2020a; MOEF, 2020a).  
Despite the immediate effects of the pandemic, the social benefits had limited 
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effects in the first quarter 2020. In other words, the coefficients of the income (1) and (2) 
had small differences except for bottom 5%. This implies that the current social security 
net could not sufficiently stabilise the initial impacts of the pandemic. In the second 
quarter 2020, the social benefits had positive effects on household income (KOSTAT, 
2020b; MOEF, 2020b). Even though all income percentiles faced reductions in the 
income (2), their income (1) increased.  
Table 3.10. Effects on household income (3): The COVID-19 pandemic 
Dependent variable: (1) Disposable income (log) and  
                                 (2) Non-social benefits income (log) 
Percentile 
4Q 2019 → 1Q 2020 1Q 2020 → 2Q 2020 2Q 2020 → 3Q 2020 


































































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)); 
Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
However, the positive effects have two limitations. Firstly, the income (1) 
significantly increased at 5%, 25%, and 50% percentiles, but it was insignificant at 75% 
and 95% percentiles. COVID-19 has had more severe effects on low-income percentiles. 
However, this relief was distributed for all households and the amount of benefit was 
proportionate to household size regardless of income (Korean government, 2020a; 
MOIS, 2020a). Consequently, its effects at top 95% and 75% percentiles were small and 
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insignificant in the second quarter 2020. This implies that the relief was not effective for 
high-income percentiles. Whereas the furlough benefit in the UK has more positive 
effects on middle-income households than high-income households as it was designed 
to have the benefit limit £2,500 per month (Brewer & Tasseva, 2020). 
Secondly, the above positive effects were temporary, and it made high income 
volatility. For example, bottom 5%, 25% and 50% percentiles experienced significant 
income decreases by 15.0%, 10.1% and 5.7% in the third quarter 2020, respectively. 
This is because the relief was a one-off payment (Kim & Lee, 2020; Kim et al., 2020) 
and 99% of the relief was distributed in May 2020 (KRILA, 2020; MOIS, 2020d). 
Therefore, this relief led to high volatility in the social benefits during the COVID-19 
pandemic. This means that the relief did not act as an economic stabiliser and it raised 
income fluctuations, so government measures need to be sustainable for the vulnerable. 
3.5.4. Effects on household consumption expenditure 
3.5.4.1. The Asian Financial Crisis  
In terms of the (1) Equivalised consumption expenditure, the crisis had serious impacts 
on household consumption expenditure (Table 3.11). Firstly, all percentiles were faced 
with consumption reductions in the fourth quarter 1997. In addition, the Korean 
households reduced expenditure more than their income decrease. This is because 
households tend to reduce their expenditure from the initial stage of an economic 
depression to prepare potential further shocks (Baldwin & Mauro, 2020; Carlsson-
Szlezak et al., 2020; Lee & Lee, 2020; Nam & Cho, 2021; Yoo, 2020). Moreover, top 
95% also reduced their expenditure by 12.1% in the fourth quarter 1997. This implies 
that the Asian Financial Crisis had negative impacts at all percentiles. Secondly, 
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consumption expenditure at 5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles significantly decreased 
in the first quarter 1998, as well.  
 The expenditure (2) was more stable than the expenditure (1). However, the 
expenditure (2) significantly decreased at 5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles in the 
first quarter 1998. This is because the Korean government pronounced long-term 
restructuring plans of its economy (MOEF, 1998, 1999), so the Koreans were able to 
anticipate the long-lasting recession and would cut expenditure on essential items. 
Table 3.11. Effects on household consumption expenditure (1): The Asian Financial Crisis  
Dependent variable: (1) Consumption expenditure (log) and  
                                 (2) Essential consumption expenditure (log) 
Percentile 
3Q 1997 → 4Q 1997 4Q 1997 → 1Q 1998 1Q 1998 → 2Q 1998 


































































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)); 
Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
3.5.4.2. The Global Financial Crisis 
This crisis had relatively soft shocks on the expenditure (1). Firstly, although the 
expenditure (1) decreased in the first two quarters at all percentiles (Table 3.12), their 
decrements are smaller than the Asian Financial Crisis. For example, 25% and 50% 
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percentiles decreased the expenditure (1) by 13.5% and 12.8% in the first quarter 1998 
(during the Asian Financial Crisis), but the reductions alleviated to 7.8% and 6.4% in 
the first quarter 2009 (during the Global Financial Crisis), respectively. Secondly, the 
expenditure (1) increased significantly in the second quarter 2009.  
Table 3.12. Effects on household consumption expenditure (2): The Global Financial Crisis  
Dependent variable: (1) Consumption expenditure (log) and  
                                 (2) Essential consumption expenditure (log) 
Percentile 
3Q 2008 → 4Q 2008 4Q 2008 → 1Q 2009 1Q 2009 → 2Q 2009 


































































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)); 
Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
The changes in the expenditure (1) and (2) show relatively similar trends unlike 
the Asian Financial Crisis. At the time, inflation pressure on essential goods could have 
crucial impacts on the Korean consumer’s behaviour (MOEF, 2009, 2010). For example, 
food price increased by 12.9%, and home appliance price also rose by 9.0% from 2007 
to 2009 (KOSTAT, 2021a). Therefore, the Korean households could try to reduce their 
essential consumption as well as non-essential consumption. 
3.5.4.3. The COVID-19 pandemic 
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This chapter cannot conduct the CC analysis on the expenditure (1) and (2) between the 
fourth quarter 2019 and the first quarter 2020 (Table 3.13) because the KHIES did not 
collect quarterly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018 (KOSTAT, 2019c). In other words, 
the pre-treatment dataset of the control group (expenditure data in the fourth quarter 
2018) is not available.  
Table 3.13. Effects on household consumption expenditure (3): The COVID-19 pandemic  
Dependent variable: (1) Consumption expenditure (log) and  
                                 (2) Essential consumption expenditure (log) 
Percentile 
1Q 2020 → 2Q 2020 2Q 2020 → 3Q 2020 














































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)), 
(4) This chapter cannot conduct the CC analysis between the fourth quarter 2019 and the first quarter 2020 because 
the KHIES did not collect quarterly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018, so the pre-treatment control group data 
(expenditure in the fourth quarter 2018) are not available; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
Household consumption expenditure was expected to decrease in the first 
quarter 2020 (Nam & Cho, 2021; Nam & Lee, 2021; Yoo, 2020). Due to the first wave 
of the pandemic, consumption expenditure decreased compared to the first quarter 2019 
(KOSTAT, 2020a; MOEF, 2020a). In the second quarter 2020, the expenditure (1) 
increased at all percentiles because 90% of the relief which distributed as a credit/debit 
card deposit was spent in this quarter (KDI, 2020; MOIS, 2020d). In the third quarter, 
194 
 
the expenditure (1) increased at 25%, 50% and 75%, but the figures were not significant. 
The trends of the expenditure (1) and (2) are similar. The first reason is that the 
relief had similar effects among consumption items. For example, the relief increased 
expenditure of most consumption items by 10-20% similarly (Hong, 2020). Secondly, 
the pandemic and social distancing could have tangible effects on consumer’s behaviour 
(Kim & Oh, 2020).  
However, the government measures have two limitations. Firstly, consumption 
increased significantly in the second quarter 2020, but the increments diminished and 
insignificant in the third quarters 2020. This is because the relief was a one-off payment 
(Kim & Lee, 2020; Kim et al., 2020) and most of the relief was spent in the second 
quarter (KDI, 2020; MOIS, 2020d). Secondly, it seems that the relief cannot prevent the 
consumption reduction at the initial stage of the pandemic (Lee & Lee, 2020; Yoo, 
2020). This is because the relief took a long administrative process to be implemented.  
3.5.5. Further analysis: Effects of COVID-19 on vulnerable groups 
3.5.5.1. Vulnerable groups: female, young, and elderly households 
The pandemic and social distancing measures have delivered more negative effects on 
female, young, and elderly workers in Korea (Kim H., 2020; Oh & Lee, 2020, Park & 
Yoo, 2020). This is because they are more likely to be employed in physical proximity 
sectors (Oh, 2020; Song, 2021; Yoo, 2020). Other specific changes can also have more 
negative impacts on the vulnerable groups. Firstly, female workers can be worse 
affected by school closure because females usually take care of their children (Kim, 
2021; Song, 2021). Secondly, the young generation tends to be struggling to enter the 
labour market due to decreased recruitment caused by the pandemic (MOEF, 2020e). 
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Lastly, the elderly suffered more negative effects from the pandemic because they are 
clinically vulnerable to the transmission risk. Therefore, this chapter conducts CC on 
the three vulnerable groups to identify further policy implications.  
This paragraph defines the above vulnerable groups. Firstly, a female household 
is that its householder is a female. Secondly, a young household is one whose head is 
aged below 35. This age threshold considers the average first marriage age (male: 33.23, 
female: 30.78 in 2020) and the legal age definition of youth (between 19 and 34) in 
Korea (Framework Act on the Youth 2020, Article 3; Kim & Chio, 2017; KOSTAT, 
2021a). Lastly, an elderly household is one whose head is aged 65 and over. This age 
criterion is the same as that in the official statistics and the legal age threshold of the 
Basic Pension in Korea (Basic Pension Act 2020, Article 3; KOSTAT, 2019c). 
3.5.5.2. Effects on poverty 
Female households: The poverty rate of female households is higher than that of the 
whole population (Figure 3.12) because females generally have a weak position in the 
labour market (Marchand & Smeeding, 2016; Seok & Kim, 2012; Yeo, 2019). Due to 
the pandemic, the relative poverty rate of female households increased from 28.6% in 
the fourth quarter 2019 to 28.9% in the first quarter 2020, and their absolute poverty 
rate also rose from 10.6% to 11.5%. The relief had positive anti-poverty effects, for 
example: the relative poverty rate decreased from 28.9% in the first quarter 2020 to 21.4% 
in the second quarter 2020, and the absolute poverty rate also reduced from 11.5% to 
6.8%. However, in the third quarter 2020, the relative poverty rate increased to 23.8% 
and the absolute poverty rate rose to 9.4% because the relief was a one-off payment. 
Young households: The absolute poverty rate of young households increased 
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from 4.7% in the fourth quarter 2019 to 5.4% in the first quarter 2020, but the relative 
poverty rate of young households remained at 14.0% in the two quarters. In the second 
quarter 2020, the relief positively reduced the poverty rate, such as: the relative poverty 
rate decreased from 14.0% in the first quarter 2020 to 10.5% in the second quarter 2020, 
and the absolute poverty rate also declined from 5.4% to 4.9%. Young households 
showed resilience from the pandemic in the third quarter 2020 when the relative poverty 
rate remained at a similar level and the absolute poverty rate decreased to 3.8%. 
Figure 3.12. Effects on the poverty rate (4): The COVID-19 pandemic, vulnerable groups (%)  
 
        (a) Female households 
 
(b) Young households 
 
 
     (c) Elderly households 
 
 
 (d) The whole population 
 
Note: (1) orange dotted lines: the quarter when the crisis happened (t), (2) female households whose heads are female, 
(3) young households whose heads are aged between below 35, (4) elderly households whose heads are aged 65 and 
over; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
Elderly households: The poverty rate of elderly households is much higher than 



























































































































































system in Korea (OECD, 2018; Yeo, 2019). Due to the pandemic, the relative poverty 
rate of elderly households increased from 36.9% in the fourth quarter 2019 to 41.6% in 
the first quarter 2020, and the absolute poverty rate rose from 15.8% to 17.3%. The 
relief had temporary anti-poverty effects, so the relative poverty rate decreased rapidly 
from 41.6% in the first quarter 2020 to 35.5% in the second quarter 2020, and the 
absolute poverty rate also declined from 17.3% to 8.4%. However, in the third quarter 
2020, the relative poverty rate increased to 41.7% and the absolute poverty rate also 
rose to 18.9%. 
3.5.5.3. Effects on household income 
Female households: Table 3.14 describes the result of the CC analysis at the median 
equivalised disposable income of the three vulnerable groups. Female households 
suffered more severe impacts (-9.5%) from the pandemic than the whole population     
(-6.8%) in the first quarter 2020. The income (1) increased by 13.5% in the second 
quarter 2020 due to the relief, but the income (1) reduced by 8.5% in the third quarter 
2020. This indicates that female households faced high volatility in household income 
after the relief payment. 
Young households: Young households suffered more with the income (1) 
reduction of 16.3% in the first quarter 2020. The severe economic impacts and 
economic uncertainty arising from the pandemic may be leading to reduction in the 
marriage and fertility rates of the young generation (Kim, Kim, Park & Lee, 2020). 
Preliminary studies also point out a similar possibility in other developed economies 
(Aassve, Cavalli, Mencarini, Plach & Bacci, 2020; Voicu & Bădoi, 2021). This issue is 
more critical in Korea because the total fertility rate in Korea was 0.84 in 2020 
(KOSTAT, 2021a) and it was already the lowest level in the world in 2019 (UN, 2020b). 
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The relief also had positive effects on young households in the second quarter 2020, and 
they were more resilient to the pandemic than the whole population in the third quarter. 
Elderly households: Elderly households also suffered from severe impacts of the 
pandemic. The income (1) decreased by 9.9% in the first quarter 2020. The relief had 
positive effects and the income (1) increased by 11.9% in the second quarter 2020. 
However, they experienced a severe income (1) reduction of 13.2% in the third quarter.  
Table 3.14. Effects on household income (4): 
The COVID-19 pandemic, vulnerable groups 
Dependent variable: (1) Disposable income (log) and  
                                 (2) Non-social benefits income (log) 
 
4Q 2019 → 1Q 2020 1Q 2020 → 2Q 2020 2Q 2020 → 3Q 2020 





















































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)), 
(4) CC at 50% percentile, (5) Female: female households, young: young households, Elderly: elderly households, and 
All: the whole population, (6) The female households analysis excludes household gender from control variables; 
Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
3.5.5.4. Effects on household consumption expenditure 
Table 3.15 describes the result of the CC analysis at the median equivalised 
consumption expenditure of each group. This analysis cannot compare consumption 
expenditure between the fourth quarter 2019 and the first quarter 2020. This is because 
the KHIES did not collect quarterly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018, so this analysis 
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cannot construct the pre-treatment data of the control group (the fourth quarter of 2018).  
Female households: The expenditure (1) increase of female households (11.0%) 
was higher than the whole population (8.6%) in the second quarter 2020. The first 
reason is that low-income households generally spent a higher portion of the relief than 
high-income households (Kim & Oh, 2020; Lee et al., 2021; Nam & Cho, 2021), and 
the average equivalised disposable household income of female households (£1,375.3) 
was lower than that of the whole households (£1,650.5) in the second quarter 2020. 
Secondly, households who had more negative impacts from the pandemic tended to 
spend more of the relief benefit (Gim et al., 2021). In the first quarter 2020, female 
households suffered a greater income (1) decrease (9.5%) than the whole population 
(6.8%), and they increased consumption in the second quarter owing to the relief. Lastly, 
the income (1) of female households increased (13.5%) more than the whole population 
(7.2%) in the second quarter 2020 by the relief (Table 3.14), so the relief could facilitate 
more consumption of female households. 
Young households: Consumption expenditure of young households increased in 
the second quarter 2020, but this increase was not statistically significant (Table 3.15) 
and the level of increment (7.8%) was lower than the whole population (8.6%). This is 
because the number of young stock investors (age 20-29) increased remarkably by 180% 
from 382 thousand in 2019 to 1.1 million in 2020 (Korea Securities Depository [KSD], 
2020, 2021). This implies that young households utilised the relief to invest for future 
consumption. In addition, a stock market boom could induce more investment of young 
households, for example: the Korea Composite Stock Price Index, which is a 
representative stock market index in Korea, sharply increased from 1,457.64 in March 
2020 to 3,266.23 in January 2021 (KOSTAT, 2021a).  
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Table 3.15. Effects on household consumption expenditure (4):  
The COVID-19 pandemic, vulnerable groups 
Dependent variable: (1) Consumption expenditure (log) and  
                                 (2) Essential consumption expenditure (log) 
 
1Q 2020 → 2Q 2020 2Q 2020 → 3Q 2020 





































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)), 
(4) CC at 50% percentile, (5) Female: female households, young: young households, elderly: elderly households, and 
All: the whole population, (6) The female households analysis excludes household gender from control variables, (7) 
This chapter cannot conduct the CC analysis between the fourth quarter 2019 and the first quarter 2020 because the 
KHIES did not collect quarterly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018, so the pre-treatment control group data 
(expenditure in the fourth quarter 2018) are not available; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
Elderly households: Elderly households showed a higher consumption 
expenditure increase (10.0%) than the whole population (8.6%) in the second quarter 
2020. The reasons seem to be similar to female households. Firstly, the average 
equivalised disposable household income of elderly households (£1,157.8) was much 
lower than that of the whole households (£1,650.5) in the second quarter 2020, so 
elderly households tended to spend more of the relief benefit than the whole population 
(Kim & Oh, 2020; Lee et al., 2021; Nam & Cho, 2021). Secondly, elderly households 
experienced a larger income (1) reduction of 9.9% than the whole population of 6.8% in 
the first quarter 2020, so the relief could facilitate more consumption for elderly 
households (Gim et al., 2021). Lastly, the income (1) of elderly households increased by 
11.9% in the second quarter, which was higher than that of the whole population (7.2%). 




3.5.5.5. Effects on health and education expenditure 
Health expenditure: The pandemic could have significant effects on health expenditure. 
The health expenditure in the KHIES includes health service (e.g., out-patient services) 
and medical consumables (e.g., face masks). The pandemic has had the opposite effects 
on the two components.  
Table 3.16. Effects on household consumption expenditure (5):  
The COVID-19 pandemic, health expenditure 
Dependent variable: Health expenditure (log) 


























Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)), 
(4) This chapter cannot conduct the CC analysis between the fourth quarter 2019 and the first quarter 2020 because 
the KHIES did not collect quarterly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018, so the pre-treatment control group data 
(expenditure in the fourth quarter 2018) are not available; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
Firstly, out-patient care spending slightly decreased from £50.9 in 2019 to £49.9 
in 2020 per month (KOSTAT, 2021b) because of the concern about contagion risk in 
hospitals (MOHW, 2021). Secondly, expenditure on medical consumables rapidly 
increased from £5.2 in 2019 to £13.4 in 2020 per month (KOSTAT, 2021b), as the 
Korean government has urged wearing a face mask since January 2020 (KDCA, 2020d). 
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Consequently, health expenditure generally increased in the second and third quarters 
2020 (Table 3.16). Also, the trend of health expenditure has no distinct differences 
among the five percentiles. This is because the National Health Service in Korea 
covered 99% of residents and 1.5 million of the deep poor could have the Medical 
Benefit of the NBLS in 2019 (KOSTAT, 2021a), so the residents could access the 
healthcare service. 
Education: The COVID-19 pandemic can have effects on education expenditure 
for children due to school closure. Therefore, a CC analysis was conducted on education 
expenditure which includes tuition fees and other costs for nurseries, receptions, 
primary schools, secondary schools, and private education institutes (e.g., cram schools). 
This section sets the age threshold of a child as 19, which is the graduation age from 
secondary school in Korea, and it adds the number of children as a control variable.  
Due to social distancing measures, the Korean government has imposed school 
closure or attendance rate restrictions (e.g., 1/3 or 2/3 of capacity), so schools have 
provided online classes or mixed classes (physical and online classes) (CDSCH, 2020; 
Kim, 2021; MOE, 2020a, 2020b). Some papers point out that vulnerable students could 
experience difficulties in having an adequate educational environment (Lee, 2021; Park 
M., 2020). Education expenditure has had disproportionate effects on the five 
percentiles, for example: 25% and 50% percentiles show high volatility, whereas 75% 
and 95% percentiles have stable changes (Table 3.17). This implies that the pandemic 
has brought more severe effects to poor households (KOSTAT, 2021a). Therefore, 
COVID-19 have widened the education gap between high-income and low-income 




Table 3.17. Effects on household consumption expenditure (6):  
The COVID-19 pandemic, education expenditure 
Dependent variable: Education expenditure for children (log)  


























Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) 
bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)), 
(4) This analysis added the number of children as a control variable, (5) This chapter cannot conduct the CC analysis 
between the fourth quarter 2019 and the first quarter 2020 because the KHIES did not collect quarterly expenditure 
data in 2017 and 2018, so the pre-treatment control group data (expenditure in the fourth quarter 2018) are not 
available; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
To sum up, firstly, the government measures had positive effects on household 
income of the vulnerable groups in the second quarter 2020, but they faced considerable 
income decreases in the third quarter. Secondly, the relief had positive effects on 
consumption expenditure of female and elderly households, but it did not have 
significant effects on young households. Instead, the number of young stockholders 
increased sharply between 2019 and 2020 (KSD, 2020, 2021). Lastly, health 
expenditure rose due to increased medical consumables consumption (e.g., face masks) 





The COVID-19 pandemic has had severe impacts on public health and economy (ILO, 
2020a; OECD, 2020b; UN, 2020a). At the same time, it made policy makers pay more 
their attention to the welfare system and its limitations (ILO & UNESCAP, 2020; No, 
2020). This could provide an important opportunity to review the welfare system in 
crisis (Baldwin & Mauro, 2020; Brodeur, Gray, Islam & Bhuiyan, 2020; LePan, 2020). 
For example, as happened in 2000, the Korean government introduced the NBLS as a 
backbone of public assistance system after the Asian Financial Crisis (MOHW, 2020). 
Thus, this chapter analyses the effects of the pandemic and the government measures on 
poverty, household income, and household consumption expenditure to find policy 
implications. 
To be specific, firstly, this chapter establishes the two poverty thresholds and 
conducts the CC analysis at 5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% percentiles of household 
income and consumption expenditure to identify the disproportionate effects of the 
pandemic. Secondly, this chapter examines the effects of the pandemic on the 
vulnerable groups (female, young, and elderly households). Thirdly, it compares the 
effects of pandemic to those of the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 and the Global 
Financial Crisis 2008-2009. Lastly, it separates (i) the impacts of each crisis as the 
changes in non-social benefits income (disposable income - the social benefits) and (ii) 
the positive effects of government measures as the changes in the social benefits. 
 Effects on poverty: The pandemic has immediate negative effects on the poverty 
rate in the first quarter 2020. This is because the pandemic delivered severe short-term 
impacts on the labour market compared to the two previous crises (MOEF, 2020e). 
However, the existing social security net could not mitigate the initial poverty threat. In 
the second quarter 2020, the poverty rate decreased due to the relief distribution. 
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However, the poverty rate deteriorated again in the third quarter 2020 because the relief 
was a one-off payment (Kim et al., 2020; Kim & Lee, 2020). 
Effects on income: The pandemic has had more negative effects on low-income 
households and the vulnerable groups. The Korean government distributed the relief 
which was a universal programme (Kim B., 2020; MOIS, 2020a) and its benefit was 
proportionate to household size regardless of income (Korean government, 2020a). In 
the second quarter, household income increased at all income percentiles, but high-
income percentiles (75% and 95%) had insignificant effects. Moreover, low-income 
percentiles (5%, 25% and 50%) and the vulnerable groups were faced with an income 
decrease in the third quarter 2020 as the relief was a one-off benefit (Kim & Lee, 2020; 
Kim et al., 2020). 
Effects on consumption expenditure: Even though this chapter could not analyse 
the initial consumption changes due to lack of data availability (KOSTAT, 2020a), 
consumption expenditure was expected to decrease in the first quarter 2020 (KOSTAT, 
2020a; MOEF, 2020a). The relief could not alleviate the initial consumption shrink 
because of the administrative process in design, approval, and distribution. In the 
second quarter 2020, consumption expenditure increased thanks to the relief distribution 
(Gim et al., 2021; KDI, 2020; Lee et al., 2021). However, this effect was temporary 
since the relief was designed as a one-off payment (Kim & Lee, 2020; Kim et al., 2020).  
In addition, the consumption expenditure of young households did not increase 
significantly in the second quarter 2020. Instead, the number of young stockholders (age 
20-29) rapidly increased by 180% between 2019 and 2020 (KSD, 2020, 2021). In terms 
of education expenditure, the pandemic has had disproportionate effects, and it can 
worsen education inequality between high-income and low-income households (Lee, 
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2021; Park M., 2020; SEPI, 2021). 
 Implications: The COVID-19 pandemic has brought disproportionate and instant 
damage to the Korean economy, but the response measures could not alleviate the shock 
sufficiently. This is because the existing social security net (except for the relief) has 
played a limited role during the pandemic. In addition, the relief had only temporary 
positive effects on poverty, income, and consumption. 
The first issue with the relief is its coverage and the amount of benefit. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has brought harder impacts to low-income households and the 
vulnerable groups, so a means-tested benefit could be more efficient than a universal 
transfer (Han et al., 2020; IMF, 2021a; OECD, 2020b; Sanchez et al., 2020; UN, 2020a). 
However, the relief was designed as a universal programme (Kim B., 2020; MOIS, 
2020a) and the amount of benefit was only related to household size not income 
(Korean government, 2020a). Consequently, it had insignificant effects at top 95% and 
75% percentiles in the second quarter 2020. Therefore, the government assistance 
should be more concentrated on economically vulnerable groups. An income criterion 
(e.g., initial design of the relief in Korea) or a benefit limit (e.g., the furlough scheme in 
the UK) can be a useful option. 
Secondly, immediate and sustainable measures are more required than a 
discretionary one-off payment, so improving the current welfare system can be a 
feasible option. A country which has well-developed social security net can better 
respond to crises (ILO, 2020a). This is because welfare system can act as a 
countercyclical stabiliser in an economic downturn. However, the relief could not 
prevent the initial economic shocks in the first quarter 2020 (KOSTAT, 2020a; MOEF, 
2020a) due to administrative process. In addition, the relief had temporary positive 
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effects, but it also delivered high income volatility to low-income households and the 
vulnerable groups. Expanding the current system can be a feasible alternative to provide 
a timely and persistent remedy (Chang, 2020; No, 2020; OECD, 2020a).  
 Thirdly, unlike the two previous crises, the number of temporary absence 
workers sharply increased (KOSTAT, 2020a; MOEF, 2020e; Oh, 2020) during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. However, the government job retention scheme covered only 22% 
of them in 2020 (KEIS, 2021; KOSTAT, 2021a). Financial support needs to focus on 
those who most damaged to alleviate their negative impacts more effectively. 
Furthermore, in the long term, only 40% of temporary absence workers can return to 
their office (Park & Yoo, 2020). This implies that the pandemic can have long-lasting 
negative effects on the labour market. Therefore, more active employment policies are 
required to stabilise these effects (Kim H., 2020). 
 The last issue is potential long-term impacts on the pupils. During the Asian 
Financial Crisis 1997-1998, the young generation found it hard to get a job, and they are 
still suffering from difficulties in employment, earnings, and marriage (Choi et al., 
2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic, education inequality has been one of the most 
crucial issues. This is because vulnerable students are often difficult to have an 
appropriate educational environment, so education disparities can be widening (Lee, 
2021; Park M., 2020; SEPI, 2021). Therefore, the reducing educational disparity should 
be one of the most important issues to be focused upon.  
 Limitations: This chapter analyses the effects of the pandemic and the 
government measures using the KHIES. However, it has some limitations. Firstly, the 
KHIES does not separate the relief from other benefits in the social benefits (KOSTAT, 
2019c), so the chapter cannot clearly divide the effects of the relief on poverty, income, 
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and consumption expenditure. Secondly, the KHIES did not collect quarterly 
expenditure data in 2017 and 2018 (KOSTAT, 2019c), so it was not possible to conduct 
the CC analysis on consumption expenditure between the fourth quarter 2019 and the 
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A3.1. The Lasso (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) linear regression 
A3.1.1. Potential variables 
Category Name Description 
Householder hage age, years 
 i.hgen dummy, gender, 0=male, 1=female 
 i.hwork 
dummy, employment status, 0=employed, 1=unemployed 
(including economically inactive status) 
 i.hedu 
dummy, educational attainment, 0=below college, 1= college and 
over  
Household size the number of household member(s)  
 workers the number of worker(s) in a household 
 i.old 
dummy, old household, 0=householder aged below 65, 
1=householder aged 65and over  
 i.pens dummy, public pension receipt, 0=no receipt, 1=receipt 
 i.bpens dummy, the Basic Pension receipt, 0=no receipt, 1=receipt 





A3.1.2. The result of the Lasso linear regression 
Category Name Income Expenditure Decision 
Householder hage 0.14 0.17 Selected 
 0.hgen 0.02 0.02 Selected 
 0.hwork 0.21 0.01 (workers) 
 0.hedu -0.24 -0.21 Selected 
Household size -0.16 -0.10 (workers) 
 workers 0.31 0.12 Selected 
 0.old 0.12 0.18 (hage) 
 0.pens -0.13 -0.05 Selected 
 0.bpens -0.01 - dropped 
 cons 0.00 0.00  
Note (1) hwork is correlated with workers (corr=-0.59), (2) size is correlated with workers (corr=0.42) and considered 
when equivalised income and consumption expenditure, (3) old is correlated with hage (corr=0.71), (4) bpens is 




A3.2. Poverty thresholds and poverty rates 
A3.2.1. The Asian Financial Crisis 
 





























3Q 1996 190.9 323.4 3.0 3.1 0.1 10.6 10.9 0.2 
4Q 1996 190.9 310.2 3.1 3.1 0.1 9.9 10.1 0.2 
1Q 1997 200.3 324.0 3.3 3.4 0.1 9.8 9.9 0.1 
2Q 1997 200.3 314.3 3.1 3.2 0.1 9.0 9.1 0.1 
3Q 1997 200.3 339.7 3.1 3.2 0.1 10.0 10.1 0.1 
4Q 1997 200.3 316.3 3.0 3.2 0.2 9.7 9.8 0.2 
1Q 1998 214.0 297.5 7.3 7.4 0.1 13.2 13.4 0.2 
2Q 1998 214.0 275.4 8.5 8.6 0.1 13.0 13.0 0.1 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Monthly poverty thresholds, (3) The absolute poverty thresholds: anchored at the 
initial MCL 1999 and adjusted by price changes in 372 items (the MCL 1999 has 372 items and maintaining the same 
items and weights), (4) The relative poverty thresholds: set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income, (5) 
Non-social benefits income = disposable income – the social benefits, (6) The anti-poverty effect = the non-social 
benefits income poverty rate - the disposable income (including the social benefits) poverty rate; Source: Author’s 




A3.2.2. The Global Financial Crisis 
 





























3Q 2007 293.9 476.3 7.1 8.4 1.2 15.7 16.9 1.2 
4Q 2007 293.9 476.0 7.1 8.6 1.4 15.4 16.7 1.2 
1Q 2008 307.8 490.8 8.0 9.1 1.1 16.4 17.1 0.8 
2Q 2008 307.8 479.9 7.6 8.9 1.3 15.0 16.1 1.1 
3Q 2008 307.8 499.0 7.4 9.0 1.6 15.6 16.8 1.2 
4Q 2008 307.8 489.3 7.1 8.6 1.5 15.1 16.1 1.0 
1Q 2009 326.9 488.4 9.1 10.5 1.4 16.5 17.5 1.1 
2Q 2009 326.9 484.6 8.2 9.6 1.4 15.2 16.4 1.1 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Monthly poverty thresholds, (3) The absolute poverty thresholds: anchored at the 
initial MCL 1999 and adjusted by price changes in 372 items (the MCL 1999 has 372 items and maintaining the same 
items and weights), (4) The relative poverty thresholds: set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income, (5) 
Non-social benefits income = disposable income – the social benefits, (6) The anti-poverty effect = the non-social 
benefits income poverty rate - the disposable income (including the social benefits) poverty rate; Source: Author’s 




A3.2.3. The COVID-19 pandemic 
 





























4Q 2018 421.4 686.8 8.3 10.2 1.9 17.1 18.9 1.8 
1Q 2019 431.7 760.3 6.1 8.2 2.1 16.3 18.2 1.9 
2Q 2019 431.7 746.8 5.3 7.5 2.1 14.5 16.1 1.6 
3Q 2019 431.7 773.9 5.5 7.9 2.4 14.5 17.1 2.6 
4Q 2019 431.7 775.9 5.4 7.5 2.1 13.9 15.7 1.8 
1Q 2020 438.9 771.0 6.8 9.1 2.4 16.2 18.4 2.1 
2Q 2020 438.9 805.7 4.5 9.9 5.4 13.6 20.8 7.3 
3Q 2020 438.9 786.6 6.2 9.3 3.1 15.4 18.7 3.3 
Note: (1) 1 GBP = 1,500 KRW, (2) Monthly poverty thresholds, (3) The absolute poverty thresholds: anchored at the 
initial MCL 1999 and adjusted by price changes in 372 items (the MCL 1999 has 372 items and maintaining the same 
items and weights), (4) The relative poverty thresholds: set at 50% of median equivalised disposable income, (5) 
Non-social benefits income = disposable income – the social benefits, (6) The anti-poverty effect = the non-social 
benefits income poverty rate - the disposable income (including the social benefits) poverty rate; Source: Author’s 




A3.3. The results of CC and quantile DD  
A3.3.1. Effects on household income (1): The Asian Financial Crisis 
Dependent variable: Equivalised disposable income (log)  
Percentile 
3Q 1997 → 4Q 1997 4Q 1997 → 1Q 1998 1Q 1998 → 2Q 1998 


































































Note: (1) Coefficients and standard errors (in square brackets), (2) * p-value < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, (3) CC: 
Bootstrapped 100 times per dependent variable (default in the algorithm developed by Melly and Santangelo (2015b)); 
Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
A3.3.2. Effects on household income (2): The Global Financial Crisis 
Dependent variable: Equivalised disposable income (log)  
Percentile 
3Q 2008 → 4Q 2008 4Q 2008 → 1Q 2009 1Q 2009 → 2Q 2009 


































































Note: The same to A3.3.1.; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
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A3.3.3. Effects on household income (3): The COVID-19 pandemic 
Dependent variable: Equivalised disposable income (log)  
Percentile 
4Q 2019 → 1Q 2020 1Q 2020 → 2Q 2020 2Q 2020 → 3Q 2020 


































































Note: The same to A3.3.1.; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
A3.3.4. Effects on household consumption expenditure (1): The Asian Financial Crisis 
Dependent variable: Equivalised consumption expenditure (log) 
Percentile 
3Q 1997 → 4Q 1997 4Q 1997 → 1Q 1998 1Q 1998 → 2Q 1998 







































































A3.3.5. Effects on household consumption expenditure (2): The Global Financial Crisis 
Dependent variable: Equivalised consumption expenditure (log) 
Percentile 
3Q 2008 → 4Q 2008 4Q 2008 → 1Q 2009 1Q 2009 → 2Q 2009 


































































Note: the same to A3.3.1.; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata)  
 
 
A3.3.6. Effects on household consumption expenditure (3): The COVID-19 pandemic 
Dependent variable: Equivalised consumption expenditure (log) 
Percentile 
1Q 2020 → 2Q 2020 2Q 2020 → 3Q 2020 














































Note: (1) – (3) the same to A3.3.1., (4) This study cannot conduct CC and DD analyses between the fourth quarter 
2019 and the first quarter 2020 because the KHIES did not collect quarterly expenditure data in 2017 and 2018, so the 
pre-treatment control group data (expenditure in the fourth quarter 2018) are not available.; Source: Author’s 




A3.4. Year-on-year comparison 
A3.4.1. The Asian Financial Crisis 
 
 
3Q (t-1) 4Q (t) 
 
 




699.5 740.7 41.2 680.9 687.2 6.3 
Social benefits 2.0 2.4 0.4 1.8 2.0 0.2 
Non-social 
benefits income 





447.6 482.9 35.3 460.8 457.9 -2.8 
Essential 
consumption 
265.9 281.8 15.9 255.7 263.1 7.4 
Non-essential 
consumption 
181.7 201.1 19.4 205.1 194.9 -10.2 
 
 
1Q (t+1) 2Q (t+1) 
 
 




718.6 656.7 -61.9 690.8 601.9 -88.9 
Social benefits 2.1 1.0 -1.1 1.7 1.3 -0.4 
Non-social 
benefits income 





481.6 432.4 -49.2 463.5 394.2 -69.3 
Essential 
consumption 
278.0 261.9 -16.1 254.4 229.6 -24.7 
Non-essential 
consumption 
203.6 170.5 -33.1 209.1 164.6 -44.5 




A3.4.2. The Global Financial Crisis 
 
 
3Q (t-1) 4Q (t) 
 
 




1,051.6 1,105.2 53.6 1,046.3 1,082.2 35.9 
Social benefits 14.3 15.6 1.3 14.5 16.6 2.1 
Non-social 
benefits income 





447.6 482.9 35.3 460.8 457.9 -2.8 
Essential 
consumption 
265.9 281.8 15.9 255.7 263.1 7.4 
Non-essential 
consumption 
181.7 201.1 19.4 205.1 194.9 -10.2 
 
 
1Q (t+1) 2Q (t+1) 
 
 




1,097.9 1,096.0 -1.8 1,054.8 1,055.7 0.9 
Social benefits 12.7 14.5 1.8 14.7 16.1 1.4 
Non-social 
benefits income 





807.4 779.9 -27.4 743.8 753.2 9.4 
Essential 
consumption 
472.2 458.5 -13.6 403.7 410.9 7.1 
Non-essential 
consumption 
335.2 321.4 -13.8 340.1 342.3 2.2 







A3.4.3. The COVID-19 pandemic 
 
 
4Q (t-1) 1Q (t) 
 
 




1,521.1 1,722.1 201.0 1,701.6 1,743.8 42.2 
Social benefits 32.7 41.8 9.0 42.2 48.9 6.7 
Non-social 
benefits income 





- 1,112.7 - 1,160.3 1,094.4 -65.9 
Essential 
consumption 
- 625.2 - 671.0 679.1 8.1 
Non-essential 
consumption 
- 487.5 - 489.3 415.3 -74.0 
 
 
2Q (t+1) 3Q (t+2) 
 
 




1,667.8 1,749.0 81.3 1,701.2 1,730.1 28.9 
Social benefits 41.0 191.9 150.9 56.1 85.4 29.3 
Non-social 
benefits income 





1,070.7 1,093.3 22.6 1,126.8 1,111.7 -15.0 
Essential 
consumption 
576.5 646.8 70.3 643.4 680.9 37.4 
Non-essential 
consumption 
494.2 446.5 -47.7 483.3 430.8 -52.5 
Note: (1) Diff. = the figures in a former year – the figures in a later year; (2) The KHIES did not collect quarterly 
expenditure data in 2017 and 2018; Source: Author’s calculation (KHIES microdata) 
 
 
